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IQBAL AND HIS CRITICS

S. A. VAHID

All students of Iqbal are aware of his stupendous versatility and they try to grasp its true significance in order to gain an estimate of his greatness. But few appreciate the fact that this versatility while it leads to a large increase in the number of writers on Iqbal also increases the number of his critics, as each critic deals with a particular aspect of his multi-sided genius. This is all to the good, because after all criticism helps to add to our knowledge of a towering personality whose stature we are apt to misjudge otherwise. But this increase in the number of critics is likely to add to confusion if the critics disregard relevancy in their writings. To illustrate we have only to mention that Iqbal was a great poet, a great philosopher, a leading politician and a religious reformer. Now a critic trying to discuss his politics consciously or unconsciously refers to his poetry also. Those who do not like the stand Iqbal took in politics start discussing his sublime poetry also from the same angle. Such writers add nothing to our knowledge, but add considerably to our confusion. It is obvious that a student of politics is not necessarily the most qualified person to write on his poetry. Christian missionaries writing on Iqbal's religious ideas refer by the way to his poetry in which sometimes his religious ideas find expression. These writers may be entitled to their opinions in religious matters, and they may certainly criticise Iqbal from their angle, but when they drag in his poetry they are often guilty of a grave injustice. Their efforts to decry Iqbal and his art only mean that they are trying to stop a large number of Christian readers from enjoying a wealth of art very rarely met with even in the greatest poets of the world. It is obvious that an atmosphere surcharged with religious passions is not conducive to our appreciation of the poetic art of a transcendent genius. For a study of aesthetics one needs tools quite different to those required to approach a faith which rightly or wrongly is supposed to be a rival to one's own faith. We are glad that the number of critical writers on Iqbal is growing, but if their criticism is to serve any useful purpose it is imperative that our evaluation must be based on that aspect of Iqbal with which the critic is competent to deal. Classification of the critical literature on Iqbal is therefore necessary to facilitate the scholars to judge the significance of a particular criticism. Luckily for us in the case of Iqbal most of the criticism, if not all, can be ascribed to definite periods, and while these periods cannot be considered as

rigidly water-tight, and in many a case they do overlap each other, yet their boundaries can be more or less distinctly recognised.

Iqbal started writing poetry while still a student in Sialkot, and even this poetry, while it lacked the charm of what was to come later on, attracted worldwide attention. And critics soon appeared who based their criticism mostly on some odd phrase or unusual idiom used by Iqbal. As we all know there were two schools of Urdu poetry: the Lucknow school and the Delhi School, and these schools criticised each other's diction vehemently. Unfortunately both schools were unacquainted with the modern principles of literary criticism and their tirades against each other were mainly concerned with points of diction. Both these schools criticised Iqbal. There is no doubt that the language used by Iqbal was to some extent influenced by local usage, but perhaps the main reason for inciting the ire of both the schools was that although he got his early poems corrected by a master-poet like Dagh of Delhi school, he himself did not belong to either school. One of the items on which a good deal of criticism was based centred round gender. Gender in Urdu language is a ticklish matter and there exists a good deal of doubt about the gender of many articles in Urdu. Even the recognised masters of the language do not always agree about the gender of many objects, and so when they want to criticise each other gender provides an easy target. And it was the same in the case of Iqbal.

As regards the two schools Iqbal wrote:

اقبال لکھنؤ سے نہ دلی سے ہے غرض
ہم تو اسیر ہیں خم زلف کمال کے

This flood of criticism and literary squabbles was so great that they would have dismayed an ordinary poet, but Iqbal was made of sterner stuff. His friends wrote replies pointing out the utter futility of the criticism, and out of these replies the one written by Ambalvi and published in the *Makhzan* was most effective. As regards criticism the one by "Tanqid-i-Hamdard" which was published in the *Makhzan* was most pungent and broadbased, and Iqbal considered it as deserving of his reply. His reply was published in the same journal, and displayed a wide knowledge of Urdu prosody. After this the storm of criticism, although it never died, subsided to a large extent.

From 1905 to 1908 Iqbal was in Europe and did not write much

poetry and so criticism also shrunk in volume. On return, Iqbal wrote his epoch-making poems *Shikwa* and *Jawabi Shikwa* which extorted admiration even from the most hardened critics. Henceforth criticism was reduced to a mere minimum. And 1912 may be said to make the end of the period of literary criticism.

In 1915 appeared Iqbal's masnavi *Asrar-i-Khudi* in Persian which dealt with the philosophy of ego. This poem may be regarded as the starting point of the criticism of Iqbal's thought. In the first instance, Iqbal had translated Ego or Self as *Khudi*, but *Khudi* in Persian and Urdu languages meant pride and conceit. The result was that many readers misunderstood the title of the poem. Then Iqbal while describing a healthy literary ideal had made scathing remarks against Hafiz, describing him as a poet who advocated a life of ascetic inaction. Now Hafiz is one of the greatest lyric poets of the world, and rightly or wrongly is also esteemed as a great Sufi. Whether he was actually a Sufi or not is a moot point, but nobody can deny his claim to be the greatest lyric poet of the Persian language. Anyway, many Sufis took Iqbal's lines on Hafiz as an attack on Sufism. The result was that many poets and writers made virulent and vulgar attacks on Iqbal in poetry and prose. Amongst those who attacked Iqbal in this connection Khwaja Hasan Nizami of Dargah Nizamuddin Delhi and Khan Bahadur Muzaffar Ahmad Fazli, a retired Canal Deputy Collector of the Punjab, deserve special mention. None of these two critics were great scholars and it is obvious that they did not understand the theme of *Asrar-i-Khudi* at all, yet their attacks appealed to the popular imagination. Khwaja Hasan Nizami was a forceful writer in Urdu prose and a very effective speaker. Draped in picturesque robes he travelled up and down the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent accompanied by his numerous disciples. He wrote a number of articles against *Asrar-i-Khudi* and Iqbal in high flown language. Iqbal replied to some of Hasan Nizami's attacks and exposed the hollowness of his tirades. But Iqbal's writings could be understood only by a few learned readers, while Nizami's writings influenced the men in the street.

Khan Bahadur Muzaffar Ahmed wrote a poem in Persian attacking Iqbal. This poem known as *Asrari-Bekhudi* was read by thousands of people all over the subcontinent. The vicious and violent attacks on Iqbal contained in Khan Bahadur's poems remind us of Pope's satires. The following lines will give an idea of the tone of the poem:—

دشمن جان آمدند اسلام را — رهزن جان آمدند اسلام را

وائے براین پختگان عقل خام — اوایا را میش و بز کردند نام
از دم مکر شغالان الحذر — الحذر از بد سگالان الحذر *

There were many other writers who attacked *Asrari-Khudi* and Iqbal's philosophy of ego and the story has been beautifully told by Mr. Abdulla Quraishi in the pages of 'Iqbal,' Lahore. There were several writers who wrote in appreciation of *Asrar-i-Khudi*, the most notable of these being Dr. Abdul Rehman Bijnori and Hafiz Aslam Jairajpuri. The former wrote in English in the journal *East & West*, and the latter wrote in *Al-Nazir*, an Urdu journal of Lucknow. Iqbal appreciated the reviews of both these writers and even wrote a letter to Hafiz Aslam Jairajpuri thanking him for this appreciative review. But in spite of these sympathetic and appreciative reviews many writers wrote against the poem. And the result was that in the second edition Iqbal had to drop these lines on Hafiz and in his introduction he wrote: "I have omitted in this edition lines written on Hafiz. Although the purpose of writing those lines was merely to criticise a literary ideal and they did not reflect upon the personality of Knowledge Hafiz, they have offended some of the readers, I have replaced them by new ones in which I have composed the rules according to which literature of a nation must be judged."

Anyway this period of criticism came to an end about 1920 or so and while Iqbal's thought continued to be criticised even later on, as for example his aesthetics by Prof. M.M. Sharif in 1950, it can be safely said that the main storm of adverse criticism of Iqbal's philosophy of ego had blown over by 1920. After that year people had studied Iqbal's philosophy better and wherever any criticism was made it was balanced and fair.

There was a strange development about this time. As the storm of adverse criticism of Iqbal's *Asrar-e-khudi* as containing his philosophy of ego was subsiding, the poem was translated in English by Professor R.A. Nicholson of Cambridge. So it was read widely in Europe. And many European readers began to read in it as a call to the Eastern nations to rise against European Imperialism. The most

*They are enemies of the very life of Islam,
They mean to rob Islam of life.
Woe to these afflicted with infinity of intellect,
They have called saints goats and sheep.
Beware of the fraud of jackals
Beware of those addicted to evil ways!

notable of these was C.A. Nallino, the Italian Orientalist, who in clear terms warned the European nations against the writings of Iqbal (vide *Oriente Moderno*, Rome 1922-23 p.191). Thus started a criticism of Iqbal for political reasons. Nallino remarked about *Asrar-e-Khudi* as "un grids riscorisa Musalmana Conto l' Europeuna manifestazione dellu peon ardura aspiraiziori del irredentessori parislamia."

About 1926 or so an Indian writer K.P.S. Menon, a member of the Indian Civil Service, also wrote against *Asrar-e-khudi* from the same angle. While this criticism was going on, Iqbal entered active politics by his election to the Punjab Legislative Council in 1926. After hearing and reading his speeches in the Council the Hindus and Sikhs began to criticise Iqbal for political reasons. Then in 1928 Iqbal gave evidence before the Simon Commission. And finally came Iqbal's address as the President of the Muslim League in which he said: "The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified".

So far as the Hindu politicians were concerned this speech acted as a red rag to the bull. Now the Hindu politicians as well as the Press attacked Iqbal mainly because he advocated cultural and political safeguards for a minority of 75 million living in the subcontinent.

As time marched on Iqbal began taking a more prominent part in politics. He attended the Second and Third Round Table Conferences. He presided over the All India Muslim Conference in 1932. He was elected Chairman of the Punjab Muslim League and was appointed Chairman of the Punjab Parliamentary Board by the Quaid-i-Azam in 1936. The Hindu politicians now began seeing in Iqbal one of the main obstacles to their attempts to dominate and crush the minorities of the subcontinent, and consequently their opposition to Iqbal gained in vehemence. Thus the period in which political critics of Iqbal flourished lasted from 1926 to 1938, but it can be said to have actually started in 1920. During this period Hindu writers wrote numerous articles decrying Iqbal's work in all fields. Perhaps notable exceptions were Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Sarojini Naidu. They frequently talked of him in glowing terms. Sir Tej Bahadur could have never agreed with Iqbal's political views, and yet his admiration for Iqbal was boundless. But the most notable of the writings of the group which attacked Iqbal were '*Iqbal: The Poet and his Message*', by a

fanatic Mahassabhaite Dr. S. Sinha, and another book known as *Ardent Pilgrim* by a communist Iqbal Singh. Both of these writers thought that Iqbal's suggestion to divide the subcontinent into two countries was a sacrilege which would lead to the eventual vivisection of Mother Bharat. Dr. Sinha's book was published in 1947 and Iqbal Singh's book was published in 1952.

Sinha was so angry with Iqbal for political reasons that he could see nothing right in Iqbal. According to Sinha, as a poet Iqbal was of a very mean order; as regards philosophy Iqbal borrowed all his ideas from others and so on.

Iqbal Singh, on the other hand, criticised Iqbal for his political views, but paid rich tributes to his poetry. Recording the reasons which led him to write the book Iqbal Singh says:—"And that is to record a personal enthusiasm for Iqbal's poetry—an enthusiasm which increases every time I return to it" (p. vi).

Now we come to the last group of Iqbal's critics and these deal with Iqbal's religious ideas. Iqbal delivered his lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Ideas in Madras, Hyderabad and Aligarh in 1928. These were published in a poorly printed edition from Lahore in 1930. They attracted worldwide attention. A nicely printed edition was published by Oxford University Press in 1934. This was a new approach to Islam and a challenge to the West. In one of the lectures Iqbal said "The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich. Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement."

As regards Christianity itself Iqbal says: "It is the sharp opposition between the subject and the object, the mathematical without and the biological within that impressed Christianity. Islam, however, faces the opposition with a view to overcome it. This essential difference in looking at a fundamental difference determines the respective attitudes of these great religions towards the problem of human life in its present surroundings" (p. 9). In these and similar remarks Christian missionaries and writers detected a real danger to their missionary activities. They planned an offensive against Iqbal and began attacking him in every way possible. The first Christian writer who attacked Iqbal was Cantwell Smith.

Cantwell Smith is supposed to be an Orientalist, but is actually a fanatic Christian who has merely changed his methods to adjust to the modern age. He attacks Islam in a very subtle way and one of his favourite ways of doing this is to attack Iqbal. It is obvious from his writings that he has not studied Iqbal. When he first came to see the present writer he did not know any Urdu but he had already written copiously on Iqbal! Such are the ways of Christian Orientalists! In view of these facts it is not surprising to find this Christian author making such remarks about Iqbal: "He was a poet, not a systematic thinker; and he did not hesitate to contradict himself".

Then very patronisingly he says:

"We ourselves, in the treatment of Iqbal which here follows, have not made any undue effort to unify the contradictions of his prolific utterances."

In a fit of self-esteem Smith says about Iqbal: "He was not an economist, a sociologist, a politician, nor as we have said, an ethicist."

To judge the ignorance of Smith we have only to refer to the following remarks:

"During the First World War he was strongly pro-Islamic, pro-Turkish, and wrote some bitter verses against the enemy, *i.e.* Britain. Later he was an ardent Khilafated; some of his most passionate utterances belong to this period."*

Anybody acquainted with the history of the Khilafat movement in Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent knows that in spite of the efforts of persons like Moulana Mohammad Ali, Iqbal kept aloof from the Khilafat movement. As regards ardent poems the most ardent poems in Urdu are Shikwa, Jawab-i-Shikwa, Tulu-i-Islam and Khizri-Rah. The years in which these poems were written are given below:

Shikwa	...	1911
Jawabi Shikwa	...	1913
Khizri-Rah	...	1922
Tulu-i-Islam	...	1923

*Cantwell Smith : Modern Islam in India, p. 125.

During the First World War Iqbal only published his famous *Asrari Khudi*. It should be obvious that it is hardly necessary to deal with the utterances of a man so ill-informed and ignorant. In spite of his colossal ignorance and strong prejudices Smith makes some honest remarks here and there, as for instance when he says:

"Iqbal had a vision of an ideal society, worth striving for——— There would be in it no aggressive wars, no colour or race or class or national distinctions, no beggars or unemployed. It would be permeated by the spirit of brotherhood, social services and a spiritual warmth".

A student of Iqbal will be astonished to read Smith's following remarks:—

"Iqbal's mind was simply incapable apparently, of dealing with men in community.

Evidently Smith has not read *Rumuzi-Bekhud!*

فرد را ربط جماعت رحمت است — جوهر اورا کمال از ملت است

"Relationship with community is a source of strength to an individual whose latent capacities are thereby actualised".

To our great surprise Smith says:

"Theologically, although Iqbal was no theologian.For he made God immanent, not transcendent". And this! in spite of all that Iqbal wrote against *Wahdat-ul-wajud*. It shows how learned are the Christian Orientalists like C. Smith.

It is unnecessary to deal with other baseless remarks made by Smith in his book *Modern Islam in India*, because in his latter book *Islam in Modern History*² he has himself remarked that the book was written when he was young and immature. In this book, Smith says about his earlier book: "This youthful work has many defects; among them, those of which the writer is most conscious—chiefly the inadequate understanding of Islam and also of the crucial role played in history by ideological and moral factors—are corrected as far as

²Cantwell Smith: *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, page 210.

possible in the present study". So we shall refer to some of the remarks in his latter work. In this book Smith says:

"Yet Iqbal is so contradictory and unsystematic that it is difficult to assess him. He is the Sufi who attacked Sufism, and perhaps the liberal who attacked liberalism"

After Smith the Christian writer who attacked Iqbal was Sir Hamilton Gibb. But this must be said to the credit of this writer that he makes no attempt to hide his vituperations against the religious ideas of Iqbal under the cloak of attacks on his economics, sociology and politics. To that extent Gibb is more honest than Smith. He is quite frank in admitting that the basis of his criticism of Iqbal is essentially religious. He is honest enough to say: "In these days, when we are enveloped in an atmosphere charged with propaganda it is the duty of every investigator to define precisely to himself and to his audience the principle which determine his point of view. Speaking in the first person therefore, I make bold to say that the metaphor in which Christian doctrine is traditionally enshrined satisfies me intellectually as expressing the highest range of spiritual truth which I can conceive".* On page IX of his book Gibb, while pointing out that most of the Muslim writers on Islam are apologetic, says: "The outstanding exception is the Indian scholar and poet, Sir Mohammad Iqbal, who in his six lectures on *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* faces outright the question of reformulating the basic ideas of Muslim theology". (p. X).** Later on in the same book Sir Hamilton Gibb says: "He aimed to reconstruct the established theology of Islam; but the theology which he attempts to restate is not, in fact, the Sufi theology". Further on he says: "Iqbal has tried to refashion Sufi thought in terms of Western humanism". As if this fantastic attempt to belittle Iqbal's work was not enough the learned writer later on says "but Iqbal himself, by the contradictions and confusions in his thought, only accentuated the instability and inner conflict of ideas". The main charge that Gibb has brought against Iqbal is that he has mistranslated some Quranic verses. On p. 83 of his book he says: "Throughout the lectures he constantly appeals to Quranic verses in support of his argument. But we cannot help asking ourselves two questions 'Do these quotations represent the whole teaching of the Kuran on the point at issue' and 'Do they mean what Iqbal says they mean'? In one or two instances I suspect actual philological misinterpretations".

*Sir Hamilton Gibb: *Modern Trends in Islam*, p. xi.

***Ibid* p. x.

It is not enough to make such adverse comments. One would expect a scholar like Gibb to quote the verses of Quran which he thinks Iqbal has mistranslated.

After Sir Hamilton Gibb another Oxford man Alfred Guillaume has written on Iqbal in his book on Islam. Describing some of Iqbal's ideas that Paradise and Hell are not states, nor localities Guillaume says "It hardly needs saying that all this comes perilously near heresy in Islam". The superficial knowledge of the author may be obvious from his remarks: 'the reader can see that he (Iqbal) has left the Muslim with some principles based partly on texts which for generations have been interpreted in quite a different way, and partly on Christian thought in modern time'. It is enough to point out that all that Guillaume has written covers Iqbal's religious thought only. It is safe to conclude that Guillaume has read very little of Iqbal's poetry. Perhaps Guillaume will consider even Einstein's Theory of Relativity as Christian thought.

After Guillaume we come to the American writer J. S. Badeau, who is a Professor at the American University of Cairo. In his book *The Lords Between* he has written that according to Iqbal the Quran was given as a guide only for the period when modern science was unknown. Misrepresentation could go no further.

A remarkable Christian writer on Iqbal is Professor Schimmel of Bonn University whose book *Gabriel's Wing* has been recently published as a supplement to *Nunnen*, the organ of the Society of History of Religions. It seems that the publication of the book has been subsidised by the Society at the instance of Rev. Dr. C. J. Bleker, Secretary of the Society. The book is supposed to be a 'A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Mohammad Iqbal' but it tries to deal with almost every aspect of Iqbal. The book contains a comprehensive Bibliography of Iqbal, and it is evident that in spite of the help given by the Iqbal Academy of Karachi, the learned author must have taken great pains over its preparation.

Schimmel has paid Iqbal a high compliment when she says: "Nobody will assert that he was a prophet, that would be both wrong from the point of view of history of religions and incompatible with the Islamic dogma of the finality of prophethood—but we may admit that

he has been touched by Gabriel's wing". In spite of this compliment Schimmel has made some wide charges against Iqbal. We would prefer to repeat some of them in her own words.

On page VIII of her book she says: "Iqbal changed Western ideas according to his concept of Islam".

On page 242 referring to Ziya Gokalp she says "Iqbal did not know Turkish, has studied his (Ziya Gokalp's) work through the German translation of August Fisher, and it is of interest to see how he (Iqbal) sometimes changes or omits some words of the translation when reproducing the verses in the Lecture".

On page 585 the author says:

"Iqbal's interpretation of the Writ (The Holy Quran) is sometimes very personal and influenced by the wish of combining Quaranic revelations with the experience of modern science".

On the same page the author says:

"His criticism of the West sometimes took forms worthy of medieval polemics".

Further on she says:

"The Christian reader will be shocked by the devaluation of nearly everything Christian and European in Iqbal's work, and by the lack of understanding of the ethical ideals of Christianity (the dogmatic differences are not of interest to Iqbal and are not discussed in his work). He should then realise that Iqbal in this respect does not talk with the calmness required of a historian of religion".

Thus it will be seen that the Christian writers on Iqbal display wonderful homogeneity in their attacks on him. Their aim is to discredit him in the eyes of the Muslims as well as the Christians. To the Muslims they say that Iqbal has mistranslated Quran and misrepresented Islam; to the Christians they say that Iqbal is a fanatic Muslim.

It should not be inferred from these quotations that there are no Christian writers who have paid real homage to Iqbal and his genius. We have only to refer to Browne Nicholson, and many others. It is

well known that Browne the illustrious author of the Literary History of Persia did not have a high opinion about those poets of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent who wrote in Persian language. But he always treated Iqbal as one of the exceptions.

Nicholson introduced Iqbal to the West by translating *Asrar-i-Khudi* in English. In his introduction to the Translation he pays homage to the profound genius of Iqbal in these words: "Every one, I suppose, will acknowledge that the substance of the *Asrar-i-Khudi* is striking enough to command attention. In the poem, naturally, this philosophy presents itself under a different aspect. Its audacity of thought and phrase is less apparent, its logical brilliancy dissolves in the glow of feeling and imagination and it wins the heart before taking possession of the mind. Many passages of the original are poetry of the kind that once read is not easily forgotten".

Arbery of Cambridge has translated the *rubais* of *Payam-i-Mashriq*, portions of *Zaboor-i-Ajam*, and *Rumuz-i-bekhud* and is at present busy in translating *Javid Namah* in English verses. In a message to Iqbal Society Karachi Arbery once wrote:—"Iqbal's doctrine of the indestructible significance of the individual contains a message of hope and inspiration in these days when the rights and duties of individual men are so gravely threatened by materialistic conceptions of an all-powerful state. His doctrine of the place of the individual in society, with his interpretation of the term society to mean the whole community of right believing men and women, is no less important as a corrective to nihilist tendencies in contemporary thought. His message is of universal appeal and application". Massignon did not write much on Iqbal, but has paid highest tributes to Iqbal in his masterly introduction to the French translation of *Reconstruction of Religions Thought in Islam* by Madam Meyerovitch.

Northrop has not written on Iqbal but has made frequent references to him in his books on philosophy.

Bausani has translated Iqbal's *Javid Namah* and other poems in the Italian and has written on his poetry copiously. His translations are very good but his criticism is not always well-informed. The French Scholar Madam Meyerovitch has translated several of Iqbal's books in French and is a great admirer of Iqbal

John Morek of Prague University has translated some of Iqbal's

poems in the *Czech* language. His criticism of Iqbal is generally based on political grounds.

Reference must be made to two German writers who paid their homage to Iqbal's genius by translating some of his poems. Otto Von Glassenvopp, a former Vice President of the German State Bank and Professor Hall of Evlanger University. Here mention must also be made of the numerous Turkish, Persian, Afghan and Arab writers on Iqbal, e.g. Ganjeli, Tarlan, Mujtaba Manavi, Salahuddin Seljuqi and Abdul Wahab Aizzam and others. Their criticism is on the whole balanced and well informed.

Survey of these criticisms shows that although there is prejudicious response on the part of some orientalists and native critics, large-hearted and generous appreciation of Iqbal, far beyond the boundaries of this sub-continent, is not lacking. Those who deliberately distort the message of the Philosopher, the current world situation at academic level is, have gained upper hand. The days of Brown, Nicholson and Massignon are gone; now Schacht, Smith and Schimmel are moving figures, who do not care for objective study, but spend out their resources for aims other than those appreciable to scholars and students of human civilizations.

THE SLOGAN OF THE COMING WORLD-REVOLUTION

MOHAMMAD RAFI UDDIN

The most significant of all the questions now facing the thinkers of the world is "What is man"? So far the scholars of the West who are supposed to be the intellectual leaders of mankind have failed to give a convincing answer to this question, an answer, I mean, which may be consistent with all the known and established facts of human nature and human history and which may, therefore, be considered to be intellectually satisfactory. They generally admit that the present chaos in human affairs, which has manifested itself in what seems to be an endless series of world-wars and which is fraught with the possibility of a total collapse of civilization and even of a total extinction of the human race, is traceable to a single cause and that is the absence of man's knowledge of his own nature. In the absence of this knowledge all the wonderful advancements of humanity in the knowledge of physical sciences and technology are proving dangerous instruments of self-destruction. Skinner an eminent psychologist writes in his book "*Science and Human Behaviour*":

"Science has evolved unevenly. By seizing upon the easier problems first, it has extended our control of inanimate nature without preparing for the social problems that follow There is no point in furthering a science of nature unless it includes a sizable science of human nature because only in that case the results will be wisely used".

McDougall another eminent psychologist writes in his "*World Chaos*":

"Our ignorance of the nature of man has prevented and still prevents the development of all the social sciences.

Such sciences are the crying need of our time; for lack of them our civilization is threatened gravely with decay and perhaps complete collapse."

In order to comprehend the exact nature of the problem posed by the question "What is man?" we have to consider the difference between a man and an animal. It is true that an animal is a bundle of innate desires and impulses and so is man. But the difference between a man and an animal is a difference of class and not of degree. Man is not a higher kind of animal, nor is animal a lower kind of man. Man is a class of creatures apart from the animals.

Imagine a coach being pulled by a dozen horses each of which is free to move in any direction it likes. A coach of this kind will move sometimes towards the right and sometimes towards the left and will occasionally come to a stop. Its movement will be fitful and haphazard. This happens if there is no driver inside the coach to direct and control the horses. If, on the other hand, the coach happens to be moving swiftly and smoothly in a definite direction, turning the corners and bends of its path easily and confidently, it will be right to conclude that there is a driver inside the coach who directs and controls the horses and keeps each of them in check to assure the swift movement of the coach in the direction of his own choice. The animal is like a driverless coach. Each of its inborn desires known as instincts seeks to satisfy itself independently of all the other desires. Every instinct of the animal is an inflexible and unalterable tendency to act in a particular manner for the preservation of its life and race. Whenever an instinct is stimulated the animal is forced by an internal biological pressure to start and complete the activity that is necessary for its satisfaction. It cannot check, oppose or limit the satisfaction of any of its instincts for the sake of a higher end. Indeed it has no higher end to pursue. Whenever an animal is forced to oppose any of its instincts the opposition is not the result of a voluntary choice. It is always the case of one instinct opposing another, the stronger taking the place of the weaker and the weaker yielding automatically to the force of the stronger.

Such is not the case with man whose personality is like a coach which is being controlled by a driver. Man possesses all the instincts of the higher animals such as feeding, sex, escape, pugnacity, self-assertion, self-abasement etc. Yet, unlike the animal, man is able to oppose and check the expression and satisfaction of any instinct he likes up to any extent in order to organize, unify, guide and control the activity of

all in a chosen direction. The opposition of man to his instincts is not automatic and involuntary, as in the case of the animal, but the result of a voluntary choice. He opposes his instincts in such a manner that the impulse of no particular instinct is found to be in the process of satisfaction during the opposition. So often he would rather starve his instincts and even give up his life for the preservation of which the instincts are meant to function, than abandon a particular course of action chosen by him. The life of an animal consists of a series of isolated compartments of activity each dominated by an instinct and no compartment has anything to do with the one preceding or following it. On the other hand, the life of a human being tends to become an organized whole and the activity of each instinct, to whatever extent it is allowed to have its way, is directed and controlled in such a manner that it becomes organically related to this whole. This organisation or unity, this control or direction of instinctive desires in man arising out of his ability to oppose them, is impossible, unless there is in him a desire which is powerful enough to dominate and rule all of them. **IT IS THIS MYSTERIOUS DESIRE OF MAN WHICH IS THE DRIVER OF THE COACH OF HIS PERSONALITY.** To know this desire is to know "What is man?" For it is this desire which is the cause of all human activities whether they are political, legal, military, economic, ethical, educational, intellectual, religious or artistic. It is this desire which has made history what it is, for history is nothing but one long effort of the driver of the coach of human personality acting in the individual and the society to reach his destination.

This means that it is impossible for us to understand the nature, the purpose or the scope of any of the activities of man mentioned above, whether they are of the individual or of the society, unless we develop first of all an acquaintance with this driver of the human coach and know his purpose or destination. In other words, no writer on the Philosophy of History or the Philosophy of Politics or the Philosophy of Ethics or the Philosophy of Education or the Philosophy of Law or the Philosophy of Economics or the Philosophy of Religion or the Philosophy of Art or the Philosophy of Science or the Philosophy of War has any right to offer his philosophy for the consideration of others if he does not lay the basis of his philosophy on *some* view of that desire of man which is the motivating power of his activities. His view of the nature of this desire may be wrong and incapable of being justified or defended on the grounds of logic or rationality but if he ignores this desire entirely and starts to write his philosophy of any human activity without *any* view of it, his philosophy will be lacking in the very first requi-

site of a philosophy of that activity and will not deserve any consideration. He will have a confused mind from the very beginning and his so-called "conclusions" or "findings" will be more of the order of fanciful conjectures than of the nature of reasoned inferences. He will merely waste his own time and that of his readers by writing his philosophy.

Thousands of books have been written so far in all languages of the world on the philosophies of History, Politics, Economics, Educations, Ethics, Law, Art, etc. Yet, unfortunately, none of their writers is known to have founded his philosophy on any definite view of the desire of man that is the motivating force of his activities. Karl Marx is the only exception to this rule. He has constructed his Philosophy of Economics, which is in effect, a complete Philosophy of Man and the Universe, on a definite view of the desire that is the fundamental cause of human motivation. His philosophy, therefore, at least deserves our consideration, although its consideration must lead ultimately to its rejection. For, as we shall presently see, neither his view of the motivating force of human activities nor the philosophy that he has built on its foundations can bear examination.

But what is that desire of man which is the real driver of the coach of his personality and the motivating force of his activities?

All the modern writers of the West who have expressed their views about the nature of man agree that *man has a desire to love an ideal* and that this desire is not possessed by other animals below him on the ladder of evolution. Is it this desire, then, that enables man to direct and control his instincts and functions as the driver of the coach of his personality and the motivating force of his activities? All these writers have rejected this view.

Following the Darwinian concept, the fashionable concept, of evolution they believe that what comes first in the sequence of the results of evolution is matter with its physical laws, then comes the animal with its instincts and last of all there appears the human being with his capacity to love ideals. They imagine, therefore, that if man has any distinctive capacity not possessed by the animals it must have grown out of one or more of the capacities of the animal, namely the instincts and must be intended to subserve them. Hence, their conclusion is that the real motivating force of man's activity which is the driver of the coach of his personality must be one or more of his animal instincts and that his love of an ideal, which is, of course, an idea to

which a person ascribes the qualities of beauty and perfection, must be a complicated product or a distorted form of one or more of these instincts.

Thus according to Karl Marx, the motivating force of human activity is the instinct of feeding along with other allied instincts giving rise to the economic needs of man. According to Freud the real driver of the coach of human personality is the sex instinct and the urge for ideals results from the obstruction of this instinct. Adler is of the opinion that the real force which determines the activities of man is a strong desire for power and ideals are only the false representations of this desire. McDougall thinks that the animal instincts of man are the "prime movers" of his activity and that his ideal impulse is the outcome of a compound of all the instincts (described by him as the sentiment of self-regard) and sub-serves the particular instinct of self-assertion. But, since none of the theories of these writers is consistent with the facts of human nature and human history, when we study them we have no difficulty in concluding that none of them can stand a critical examination. The common fault of these theories is that none of them explains adequately how an instinct or a combination of all the instincts which are meant to function for the preservation of life can give birth to the desire for an ideal in man which may require him to starve his instincts and even to lay down his life for its sake. It does not occur to any of their exponents that if instincts, which of course, man shares with the higher animals, cannot produce the desire for an ideal in the animal, they cannot produce such a desire in man.

The fact is that THE DESIRE WHICH IS REALLY THE DRIVER OF THE COACH OF HUMAN PERSONALITY AND THE MOTIVATING FORCE OF ALL HUMAN ACTIVITIES IS NO OTHER THAN THE DESIRE WHICH IS PECULIAR TO MAN AND WHICH IS NOT POSSESSED BY THE ANIMALS, NAMELY, THE DESIRE TO LOVE AN IDEAL.

It is admitted by eminent psychologists that while the animal knows feels and thinks, man not only knows, feels and thinks but, when he does so, he also knows that he knows, feels or thinks. This is expressed by saying that while an animal is only conscious man is self-conscious or possesses a self-consciousness or self. This self-consciousness or self (*khudi*) is the real man in the human being as distinguished from the animal in him which is constituted by his animal instincts and if there is any special capacity in man not possessed by the animals,

it can be only due to his self-consciousness or self. It follows that man's urge to love an ideal is a property of his self-consciousness. The ideal of a society is the core of its ideology. It develops into an ideology in the course of its application to the various aspects of their natural activity as a group of human beings.

The view of ideals as the motivating force of human activity is so simple and intelligible, fits in so well with the established facts of human nature and human history and its validity has become so obvious in this ideological age, that the human world cannot take long to accept it. Its general acceptance marks an inevitable stage on the road of the intellectual evolution of humanity, a stage which cannot be bypassed or side-tracked at will. YET THIS VIEW HAS REVOLUTIONARY IMPLICATIONS.

Since an ideal is always an idea of beauty or perfection, as it appears to the lover of the ideal, this view implies, first of all, that man's urge for an ideal, the driver of the coach of his personality, can be fully satisfied only by an ideal of the highest beauty and perfection. So far nobody will disagree. But when it is asked what is the most perfect and the most beautiful of all ideals there will be many answers to this question. Some will say it is Communism or economic equality and economic freedom others will say it is Democracy or political equality and political freedom and still others will come forward with the opinion that it is Hitlerism or Fascism or Mikadoism or Gandhism or English Nationalism or French Nationalism or Indian Nationalism and so on. But if we accept Hegel's definition of God as the Being who is believed to possess all the imaginable qualities of beauty and perfection, then the perfect ideal, capable of satisfying perfectly and permanently the human urge for an ideal, can be only the ideal of God. Obviously, by the very nature of this ideal, its practical realization will include the practical realization of economic equality and economic freedom and political equality and political freedom and of everything else that is good, beautiful or true in any other ideal. *In fact, the ideal of God as defined above, is the only ideal the love of which can be a condition for the perfect and permanent realization of economic equality and economic freedom and political equality and political freedom and of every other quality of beauty and perfection for which the nature of man has a yearning.* The reason is that a quality of beauty, commonly known as a value, can be realized as a part or an element of an all-beautiful ideal or it cannot be realized at all. Qualities of beauty or values support

each other in their practical realization and to the extent a quality of beauty lacks the support of other qualities of beauty, its practical realization becomes impossible.

The view that the urge for an ideal is the motivating force of all human activity implies further that history is an effort (sometimes mistaken or at other times right) of the driver of the coach of human personality, functioning in the individual and the race, to drive the coach in the direction of the ideal of God. When this driver is not driving his coach in the direction of the Right Ideal, he is driving it in the direction of a wrong ideal. He is entering a blind alley and reaching a wrong destination from which he will have quickly to retrace his steps or perish. The political, ethical, educational, legal, economic, philosophical, scientific, artistic and military activities of the human individual and society can never be rightly or fruitfully directed unless their object is the realization of the ideal of God. All activity which is not meant for the practical realization of the ideal of God is not only wasteful of human energy and definitely harmful but also fatal to the community that happens to indulge in it. This explains the disappearance from the face of earth of dozens of ideological communities or culture-civilizations which did not believe in God or ceased to have a genuine belief in God capable of being translated into action. It implies still further that all the human and social sciences with their present secular attitude are wrong and must be reconstructed and re-written with a view to giving them a correct foundation in the light of the purpose and destination of the driver of the human coach. Thus the truth that **THE URGE FOR AN IDEAL IS THE MOTIVATING FORCE OF ALL HUMAN ACTIVITY** is the rallying motto of the world-wide intellectual revolution of the future—a revolution which is inevitable and irresistible and after which there can be no other intellectual revolution of equal magnitude.

On the one hand, Pakistan which is evolving into a perfect theistic state and is going to become one in the near future, is confronted with the need to justify its political ideology before the world from the point of view of intellect and rationality. The reason is that in this age of intellectual advancement no political ideology which lacks adequate rational foundations can win the sympathy and cooperation of others and hope to maintain itself for long. On the other hand, the fact that the urge for an ideal is the motivating force of all human activity provides Pakistan with all the rational support that it can ever need or desire for its theistic ideology. This fact indeed assures not only that the ideology of theism is rationally justified but also that no other ideology

can have any rational justification. This means that the people of Pakistan will be driven to rely upon this fact not only as a light which enables them to understand their ideology clearly and completely, intellectually and scientifically, themselves, but also as an instrument to be employed by their informational and publicity services for impressing the outside world with the intellectual justification of their ideology. It is thus the destiny of Pakistan to play the role of the leader of the silent and peaceful world-revolution of the future and the fact that the slogan of this revolution has first emerged in Pakistan is a pointer to this destiny of our country.

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IQBAL—The Problem of Poetic Belief

JAMIL-UR-REHMAN HORANI

My purpose in writing this article is to have a look on Iqbal's dilemma of being a poet-philosopher in the light of some recent observations made by some notable Western literary critics on the principles of literary criticism, with particular reference to the problem of poetic belief. I would give a brief exposition to Eliot's relevant theories of criticism such as the Impersonal Theory of Poetry, Form and Matter, Poetry and Religion and Poetic belief. I would then endeavour to apply these canons of literary criticism to the works of Iqbal, with a view to finding out how far Iqbal's philosophical pronouncements could succeed in accomplishing the poetic assent; how far Iqbal succeeded in being a poet in spite of his being a philosopher. I shall have also to discuss whether any such problem does arise at all. Is there any bar on a poet being a philosopher and *vice versa*? I have asked a question to myself whether Iqbal's poetic genius was hampered by his philosophy or whether his philosophy sharpened his calibre as a poet. This question presupposes the problem as to the function of a poet whether he is there to give a message or simply to provide joy to his readers; or whether these two propositions are exclusive to each other that is if he delights, he cannot instruct, or if he instructs he can not delight. This leads us to the basic question of the nature of Art, whose interpretations can be many. Our critical literature is full of such discussions right from Aristotle to Eliot, including such great names as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Dryden, Arnold, Hali, etc. I do not intend to discuss these theories of Arts but it would be both interesting and useful to find out whether Iqbal himself had any theory of Arts, or was it necessary for him to have one.

It is not necessary for a poet to know or have any specific theory of Art on which to mould his creations; many great poets such as Dante, Shakespeare, Meer and Ghalib did not possess any such theory of Art. A great artist does not bother to know or frame any theory of Art; at times he transcends all principles and canons of Art and moulds and modifies the existing ones by his own poetic genius. Coleridge has rightly observed that *every great and original writer, in proportion as he is great or original, must himself create the taste by*

which he is to be relished; he must teach the art by which he is to be seen. A great poet refuses to be judged by the existing principles of criticism; it would be an unsuccessful attempt to judge Shakespeare by a ready-made packet of principles of literary criticism. And, in fact, it is not always useful and rewarding for a poet to have a theory of Art of his own. At times, T. S. Eliot's poetry and literary criticism seem to complement each other and this may prove fatal to both. It is also not possible for a literary system-maker to apply all his theories of Art on his own poetry and to achieve the desired effects. We may appreciate and pay our respects to the soundness of the theory of poetry propounded by William Wordsworth in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads but we are not happy to see its practical application on his lyrical ballads; neither the ballads fully adhere to the principles nor do they emerge as great poetry on this basis alone.

I want to point it out that literary criticism is not prior to literature itself. Aristotle had propounded his ideas on drama in his Poetics by deducing such principles from the works of Greek dramatists themselves. His material was already available; he simply analysed them and generalized the principles, with no doubt some of his own profound observations. I do not deny the importance of literary criticism but the extent of its importance or otherwise is out of the scope of this article. At the moment, we are interested to find out whether we can make out a plausible theory of Art from the poetry of Iqbal or not. I submit that Iqbal has, in quite a few of his verses, put forth his own Theory of Art; we want to judge it in the light of some current theories of Art of notable Western Literary critics, with particular reference to our problem of poetic belief.

Looking at the Urdu Tradition, we find that Persian Tradition of Ghazal has played a vital and prominent role in its shaping and development. It is full of amorous emotions; love-poetry is, perhaps, the most important part of our entire poetry. I do not claim that for being so, it is an inferior poetry; it has enriched our literature with very beautiful and significant similes and metaphors. But with insistence on this kind of poetry and as an easy frame and model for the new poets, *Ghazal* degenerated to a great extent as we find in *Daag* and *Ameer Meenai*; in fact, to a great extent, it had lived its life and had its culmination in such great poets as *Meer* and *Momin*; I do not still hold that in the hands of a great poet, say like *Hasrat Mohani* or *Firaque Gorakhpuri*, it would not flower into great poetry; but as a tradition, love poetry with exuberant and abundant decorative but

off-beaten metaphors and monotony of emotions, which were at times insincere, had lost its grip, and barring a few great poets, it was heavily condemned by such recognised critics, as *Hali*, *Azal* etc. As a revolt against it, a departure from this tradition took place in the works of *Hali* and it found its culmination in *Iqbal*.

To my mind, *Iqbal* is a sharp departure from the Urdu tradition of *Ghazal*. Barring a few notable exceptions our poets were not pre-occupied with social, national or philosophical problems. I have no intention to say that poetry with social, national or philosophical bias is great poetry, though in the hands of a great poet, it can be. I also do not say that we do not have great poets in our language; there had been poets who had philosophical flashes, had deep insight into human nature, and were possessed with religious fervour; there were mystic-poets in our language; but, I submit, that such poets do not fall into the major tradition of poetry; I further submit that love-poetry with a deep print of Persian Tradition, with all its metaphors and mechanics has been our major tradition; *Iqbal* has been a departure from this tradition; and has heralded a new era of poetry which we see in the post *Iqbalian* era which include such poets as *Faiz*.

Kalimuddin Ahmed remarks about *Iqbal's* theory of Art: "He has something to assert and he believes that every artist as well must have something to assert". As a poet, he assumes a new role; he refuses to be simply a provider of joy; he believes that a poet has a definite function to perform and he volunteered himself to fulfil that function—to give an inspired message to the sleeping world to awaken it to action. In the words of *Shelley*, *Iqbal* considered the function of a poet to be a "trumpet of a prophecy". He believed:

شاعری جزو است از پیغمبری

Poetry is a part of Prophethood

We can substitute *Iqbal* for *Shelley* when he, addressing to the West Wind, indentifying himself with it, says:

Drive my dead thoughts over the Universe
Like withered leaves to quicken a new birth!
And, by the incantation of this verse,
Scatter, as from an unextinguished hearth
Ashes and sparks, my words among mankind!
Be through my lips to unawakened earth

the trumpet of a prophecy! O Wind
If winter comes, can spring be far behind?

Iqbal never believed in the common place theory of 'Art for Art's sake'; we can find a number of verses in Iqbal's poetry in which he warns his readers not to take him a poet in the usually accepted derogatory sense of the word that is an entertainer:

میری نوائے پریشان کو شاعری نہ سمجھو کہ میں ہوں محرم راز دروں خانہ
Do not consider my anxious utterances as Poetry

I share the secrets of the inner abode.

Iqbal wanted poetry to work; he wanted the sleeping humanity to awaken to act. While once comparing himself with Tagore, Iqbal said that "Tagore preaches rest; Iqbal preaches action". Thus it can be observed that Iqbal believed in a purposive poetry. Iqbal took poetry as a powerful agent to quicken the sleeping energies and latent powers to act. He whole-heartedly condemns the poet who is sitting in an ivory tower, who escapes from the grim realities of life, who seeks refuge in an escape to the romantic world, one who only arouses our aesthetic responses; in his اسرار خودی (Secrets of the self) he tells the poet about his function and exhorts him to action:

اے میان کیسہ ات تقد سخن بر عیان زندگی او را بزن
مدتے غلغلیدہ اندر خریب خوبہ کر پاس درشتے ہم بگیر
خویش را بر رنگ سوزان ہم بزن غوطہ اندر چشمہ زمزم بزن
مثل بلبل ذوق شیون تا کجا در چمن زادن نشیمن تا کجا
اے عمارت از یمن واست ارجمند آشیائے ساز بر کوه بلند
تاشوی در خورد بیکار حیات جسم و جانست سوزد از نار حیات

If thou hast the coin of pcesy in thy purse,
Rub it on the touchstone of life;
For a long time thou hast turned about on the bed of silk;
Now accustom thyself to rough cotton!
Now throw thyself on the burning sand.
And plunge into the fountain of Zemzem!
How long make thine abode in gardens?
O thou whose auspicious share would do honour
Build a nest on the high mountains to the Phoenix

That thou must be fit for life's battle,
That thy body and soul may burn in life's fire!

The poet according to Iqbal is a part of battle going around him. He is an inspired person with a mission and he wishes to inspire and enthuse others to take part in the struggle; thus he is a vehement believer in the theory of 'Art for Life's sake' and has a message to give to humanity.

There enters the philosopher who wants to communicate his ideas to the people and he has chosen the medium of poetry to do so.

With some caution, I wish to submit that he was a philosopher first and poet later; as I have said that this proposition is capable of being grossly misunderstood, I would like to explain this position at some length. Iqbal as a human being had a particular point of view; he was a religious man and considered the salvation of mankind to lie in the fulfilment of the commandments of religion. He tried to take his inspiration from the Holy Quran and wanted people to follow the dictums of the Holy Book. From his own reading and experiences in life, he developed a religious mysticism as seen in Rumi and his own philosophy of Self which he found not only compatible with Islam but also a very effective means to fulfil men's mission in the World as propounded in Islam. I suggest that Iqbal had a missionary zeal for his belief and wanted to communicate this belief to the humanity; his first and foremost motive was to communicate his message, which he loved so much. He was an inspired person. Any such person who is so inspired, having a refined sensibility as he had, would have chosen the most befitting medium that is poetry. To quote Kalimuddin Ahmed again: "At times, Iqbal disclaims any desire to be considered a poet. Philosophy calls him and his main concern is to give expression to his philosophic ideas— ideas that appear valuable to him. He is no poet, he says. He has something to say and he uses poetry merely as a vehicle of expression, because probably, it enables him to express his thoughts in a concise, emphatic, concentrated and memorable fashion. 'I am not writing poetry'; 'I am not aware of the finer points of art';—such sentences occur frequently." Whether he succeeded in his attempt of putting his thoughts in its emotional equivalent is yet to be seen. Whether what he says in verse is simply philosophy or is it poetry in its real sense of the word, that is the basic question; has he been able to achieve poetic assent for his own philosophical ideas? Could he have a harmonious blend of philosophy

and poetry? Did he possess a unified sensibility? Can a philosopher be a poet? Does he lose his poetic value if he has a system of philosophy to propound? Can we say that in spite of his philosophy, he was a great poet? These are the questions which we have to answer in this paper.

Before we go on to answer all these questions in the light of the western canons of literary criticism, it would be fruitful if we may also have a look at Iqbal's process and mode of writing poetry. It is always very difficult to know the mechanics of writing poetry; even a poet would find it difficult to explain how he writes poetry. No doubt this question will receive more attention and investigation, when we come to describe and discuss Eliot's Impersonal Theory of Poetry. However, we have some first hand account of Iqbal's process of writing poetry. In a recent biography of Iqbal (روزگار فقیر) it has been claimed that Iqbal himself described his mode of writing. He was not a craftsman to put his thought in the form of verse whenever he wanted or whenever he was asked to. He had rare flashes of inspiration, say twice or so in a year, when he could write verse at length; whenever he was inspired to write, he would seek seclusion and would be nervous, as if something has been revealed upon him. *As claimed, he said, he would not be getting the idea first, but the entire verse dawned upon him suddenly in its final form.* It is said that his famous poem "Masjid-e-Qartaba" (the mosque of Qordova) dawned upon him in the shape of a prayer after he had performed "the Namaz" at the famous and historical mosque of Kordova. This shows that Iqbal was an inspired poet. In the words of Shelley, Iqbal is a hierophant of an unapprehended inspiration: the mirror of the gigantic shows which futurity cast upon the present; the words which express what he understands not; the trumpet which sings to battle and feels not what he inspires, the influence which is moved not, but moves. This, if this explanation is authentic, creates a very difficult question for us to solve. A poet who was inspired and obsessed with his missionary idea was not a deliberate versifier: it were at the sudden flashes of inspiration that he propounded his ideas in poetry that no deliberate and painful craftsmanship entered into his poetry. This paradox has to be explained if we have to answer any of our questions satisfactorily.

II

As said above it is my endeavour to evaluate Iqbal's poetry in the light of Eliot's critical canons as propounded from time to time, with

our basic problem of Iqbal's success or otherwise of achieving the status of great poetry for his philosophical thought. It, then, becomes necessary to have a look at Eliot's ideas on such major issues as are relevant to our problem. I have chosen Eliot as he is the critic of the age for the West. He has been responsible for the reshaping of the taste of the contemporary world and also of the generations to come. He has been declared as one of the best arbiters of taste of our generation.

As early as 1921, Eliot had propounded his Impersonal Theory of Poetry. His early criticism has a stamp of his being an intellectual. He had at least two important suggestions to make; firstly he would consider the role of intellect in the processes of poetry as important. He liked the poet "to have a direct sensuous apprehension of thought, or a recreation of thought into feeling" or to quote another of his remarks: "to feel their thought as immediately as the odour of a rose". This logically leads to the elimination of thought or idea as such in poetry. He considers, at this occasion, the use of personal ideas and philosophies in poetry as undesirable. He did not like the poet to have a concept. According to him, *the poet should replace the philosopher*. He is, however, confronted with a great problem: how is he going to pass judgments on such great philosophic poets as Lucretius and Dante, whereas Santayana in an earlier work (1910), declares that the poet is never greater than when he grasps and expresses the philosophic vision of his universe, as Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe did for successive ages. Eliot has a solution for his dilemma. "*Eliot finds*", remarks Kristian Smidt, "*philosophies justifiable in poetry only if, as with Lucretius and Dante, they serve, not their own ends, but those of the poetry. Therefore it is safest for the poet to borrow his ideas, so as not to fall into the temptation of subordinating poetry to speculation*". Thus, to put it into fewer words, it is not the function of a poet to argue, persuade, teach or speculate. Accordingly, the poet can deal with philosophical ideas, not as matter for argument, but as a matter of inspection. And for this purpose traditional ideas are better than original ideas'. This logically leads to the idea of the poets suppressing his own personality. To quote him again: The progress of an artist is a continual self sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality. It is in this depersonalization that art may be said to approach the condition of science "The most perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers".

As the concluding part of his celebrated essay on 'Tradition and

the Individual Talent', Eliot says that poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from personality. But, of course, only those who have personality and emotion know what it means to want to escape from these things.' Eliot does not, perhaps, have the faith in the spiritual nature of man. He thinks that the poet is only a particular medium in which 'impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways.'

This leads us to the question of the poetic processes. Eliot declares that the poet's mind is a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together. At which moment the mind acts as a catalyst and there occurs a spontaneous fusion with the effect of creating a new art emotion. *And it is not the greatness, the intensity, of the emotions, the components, but the intensity of the artistic process, the pressure, so to speak, under which the fusion takes place, that counts*". This theory of the poetic processes brings Eliot very near to the concept of *supernatural inspiration*. It is no more a matter of conscious technique. It seems that Eliot, at the moment, believes in a kind of aesthetic mysticism.

If we analyse the above observations, we come to the following conclusions: (a) The poet must avoid 'the expression of his personality'—that is he must avoid ideas and philosophies, and if he does express, he must serve the end of poetry and not his own end: he has to avoid the dangerous situation of 'falling into temptation of subordinating poetry to speculation'; the poet must escape from his personality and emotions. In fact he must avoid being deliberate and conscious in the expression of his philosophies and ideas. (b) Eliot very nearly believes in the theory of supernatural inspiration. He insists upon the value and importance of the 'intensity of the artistic process' rather than on the intensity of emotion and that leads him to a kind of 'aesthetic mysticism'. In short, it approaches the same theory of Shelley that he propounded when he says that 'Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration'. His above theory that is the Impersonal Theory of Poetry was a very impressive one and its echoes were heard around twenties in the works of contemporary writers both creative and critical, but such a position was difficult to be maintained. Whatever the case may be, in poetry, no doubt, according to Eliot, these personal emotions were to be reshaped so as to be objectified having a universal appeal. In fact, what Eliot was trying to do at that time was to check the unrestrained emotions that the Romantics believed to play upon their poetry.

Later on Eliot had to modify his position; while speaking of Ben Jonson, he says that we can't fully understand him unless we know the poet, Ben Jonson, as a person. In 1940, when he was lecturing on W. B. Yeats, he thought that "the kind of impersonality which was more that of the mere skilful craftsman was achieved by the mature poet 'who, out of intense and personal experiences, is able to express a general truth: retaining all the particularity of his experience, to make of it a general symbol'. We can now see that Eliot does not himself insist on his views of 1919. In fact Eliot is neither simply individualistic nor traditionalist alone; he is both; he believes in the harmonious blend of the both. Even psychologically, it will be impossible to depersonalize poetry completely. The poet's own experience directly and passions aroused thereof have a vital role to play in the creation of poetry. It is one thing to demand an escape from personality, and another thing to do it. It is an impossible ideal.

As far as the use of ideas in poetry is concerned, it also passed through modifications and changes. What he was trying to do in 1919 was the result of his belief that Art or Literature is merely presentation; it is not an exploration. We can, however, see that his own poetry such as 'Four Quartets' is not presentation but exploration. Lucretius and Dante are poets whose works are of permanent value though they are 'unashamedly didactic' full of poets' ideas and philosophies. His original view on the nature of poetry was that great poetry must be Universal. In the October 1932 issue of 'Criterion', he said that "All great Art is in a sense a document of its time; but great art is never merely a document, for mere document is not art. All great art has something permanent as well as changing..... *And as no great is explicable simply to the Society of its time, so it is not fully explicable by the personality of its author; in the greatest poetry there is always a hint of something behind, something impersonal, something in relation to which the author has been no more than the passive (if not always pure) medium*".

The above statement, particularly his assertion of 'a hint of something behind' alludes that Eliot believes in the divine inspiration of the poet. As has already been discussed about the poetic processes, he seems to believe in the aesthetic mysticism. The only explicit statement that he makes on this thesis while he was broadcasting on Vergil and the Christian:..... "if the word 'inspiration' is to have any meaning it must mean just this, that the speaker or writer is uttering something which he does not wholly understand—or which he may even misinterpret when

the inspiration has departed from him. This is certainly true of poetic inspiration. As poet may believe that he is expressing only his private experience his lines may be for him only a means of talking about himself without giving himself away; yet for his readers what he has written may come to be the expression both of their own secret feelings and of the exultation or despair of a generation'.

Eliot, on the basis of his *proable* theory of inspiration does not deny the poet his social role, particularly with reference to the use of language by the poet; however, this discussion is out of the scope of the present article. I would now like to sum up his ideas on this particular theme and to see it in the light of Santaya's observations on philosophical poetry before moving on to his observations on his important theory of 'Form and Matter'.

It must have been noted that there has been an evolutionary process in Eliot's critical thoughts. We cannot consider his earlier statements *final* without taking into account what he had to say later. No doubt, he insisted on the complete depersonalization of poet, but he had to allow that the poet's own emotions are important; he did not like that poet should express his ideas and philosophies, but he had to yield before Lucretius and Dante because they primarily served the cause of poetry. He believed that there was unconscious activity in the poetic process but he had also to accept that there was much conscious activity present too while the poet was writing a poem. We have to ask a question what is he trying to say after all. Eliot seems to say that *poetry is poetry*; every other thing is irrelevant whether it has philosophy or not; whether it is didactic or not; whether it is intuitional or deliberate; he is all the time occupied with *Universal and Permanent poetry*; in fact, at times he has been unconsciously trying to explain his own poetic works. While writing about 'Poetry and Philosophy' he says "we say, in a vague way, that Shakespeare, or Dante, or Lucretius, is a poet who thinks even that Tennyson is a poet who does not think. But what we really mean is not a difference in quality of thought but a difference in quality of emotion. *The poet who 'thinks' is merely the poet who can express the emotional equivalent of thought*" or the sole judge of the poetry which is philosophical or which is loaded with thought, is the success or otherwise of its being able to 'express the emotional equivalent of thought or the philosophy which the poet is aiming to express. It is not necessary that the poet himself, preferably, be not interested in the thought itself; he may be. In order to elaborate his ideas further, he illustrates his point by discussing

Shakespeare: "Champions of Shakespeare as a great philosopher, have a great deal to say about Shakespeare's power of thought, but they fail to show that he thought to any purpose; that he had any coherent view of life, or that he recommended his procedure to follow." This statement can also be true to *Ghalib* but this can not be true to Iqbal. *Shakespeare and Ghalib did not think to any purpose but Iqbal did, and we have to see whether Iqbal was capable of expressing the thought (to some purpose) in its emotional equivalent or not.*

Eliot's bias for poetry is so great that he seems to dream of a *pure poetry* and a *pure poet* that is a poet is poet and nothing else. It seems that his study of Coleridge and Shelley affected him very much to come to this conclusion. To him, they should have been greater poets had they not been having their own philosophical and critical opinions about art and life. Goethe did not impress Eliot much because he is too didactic and philosophical. He would not believe that Dante had a philosophy; it was Saint Thomas who supplied him a ready-made philosophy as did *Seneca* to Shakespeare; neither Shakespeare nor Dante did any real thinking—that was not their job; and the relative value of the thought current at their time, the material enforced upon each to use *as the Vehicle of his feeling*, is of no importance." It seems that thought is only a vehicle of the poet's feelings and the value of thought is of no importance. In fact, what he is trying to say is that thought particularly the poet's own thought is deadly to poet. It is only when the poet is able to express *his or other's thought into its emotional equivalent*, that we pardon him of his crime of using thought, because our response to such poetry would then be emotional and not intellectual since what the poet is conveying to us is an emotionalised thought; and that can only serve the purpose of poetry. Eliot very emphatically says "Poetry is not a substitute for philosophy or theology or religion; it has its own function. But this function is not intellectual but emotional. it cannot be defined adequately in intellectual terms".

While discussing about the three philosophical poets of Europe that is Lucretius, Dante and Goethe, George Santayana, after giving a brief account of the three main currents of European philosophy that is *Naturalism, Supernaturalism and Romanticism* wonderingly remarks: "Can it be an accident that the most adequate and probably the most lasting exposition of these schools of philosophy should have been made by the poets: Are poets, at heart, in search of a philosophy? or philosophy, in the end, nothing but poetry?"

George Santayana has raised a fundamental question and we have to see what answer does he give to such a problem, and to what extent it was satisfactory. If philosophy is 'an investigation into truth' or 'reasoning upon truths supposed to be discovered' then there is nothing in philosophy akin to poetry. There is nothing poetic in the works of philosophers. Even in the poetry of Lucretius, Dante and Iqbal, there are some passages where it simply presents philosophy as sugar-coated bitter tablets, which have no poetry. Santayana says: "Poetry cannot be spread upon things like butter; it must play upon them like *light* and be the medium through which we see them". In Lucretius, it is not a sugar-coated pill; in his preface, he addresses his reader if happily by such means I might keep thy mind intent upon my verses, until thy eye fathoms the whole structure of nature, and the fixed form that makes it beautiful.

George Santayana has brought out a vital fact when he says that "in philosophy itself investigation and reasoning are only preparatory and servile parts, means to an end. They terminate in *insight* or what in the noblest sense of the word may be called *theory*—a steady contemplation of all things in their order and worth." Thus we find there is a common element in Poetry and philosophy. He further adds: "Such contemplation is imaginative. No one can reach it who has not enlarged his mind and tamed his heart. A philosopher who attains it, is for the moment a poet; and a poet who turns his practised and passionate imagination on the order of all thing, or on anything in the light of the whole, is for that moment a philosopher. Thus a harmonious *blend* of a philosopher-poet can be found in a person who has a vision, an insight, a theory and can apply his *practiced and passionate imagination to it*. But still a poet who is a philosopher has a great difficulty in achieving this end because 'philosophy is something reasoned and heavy; poetry something winged, flashing and inspired. There is a danger that the inspiration is lost in the sand of versification of an idea. Long poem has to be deliberate and can not boast of poetic inspiration all through; that was, perhaps, the reason that Eliot considered philosophy and ideas dangerous to poetry; the flashy inspiration would not be able to carry on its wings the heavy and ponderous philosophy to a long way and poetry would lose its value; the poet would then serve the purpose of philosophy or of himself and not of poetry. What answer Santayana has to give to the substantial danger?

Santayana analyses as to why long poems do generally fail, when

he says: "If it be a fact, as it often is, that we find like things pleasing and great things arid and formless, and if we are better poets in a line than in an epic, *that is simply due to lack of faculty on our part, lack of imagination and memory and above all to lack of discipline.*" Santayana has a psychological explanation to his thesis. Why is it after all that "the short-winded poet himself excels the common unimaginative person or is it so that he feels more." "Rather I suppose, in that he feels more; in that his moment of intuition though fleeting, has a vision, a scope, a symbolic something about it that renders it deep and expressive. Intensity, even momentary intensity, if it can be expressed at all, comports fullness and suggestion compressed into that intense moment..... To this fleeting moment the philosopher, as well as the poet, is confined..... *What makes the difference between a moment of poetic insight and a vulgar moment is that the passions of the poetic moment have more perspective.* Santayana further adds: "Even the short-winded poet selects his words so that they have a magic moment in that which carries us, we know not how, to mountain tops of intuitions. Is it not the poetic quality of phrases and images due to their concentrating and liberating the confused promptings left in us by a long experience? When we feel the poetic thrill, is it not that we find sweep in the concise and depth in the clear, as we might find all the lights of the sea in the water of a jewel. And what is a philosophic thought but such an epitome".

So if a poet has a vision of the Universe, develops a system of thought and thinks to purpose, gives models of things, speaks about all the things we care for. What would be his problem? In such a case, the poet would be requiring much more poetical vision than the poet who suggests a few things which on account of his poetic vision, "Stretches our attention and makes us rapt and serious".

To bring out this explanation fully, I will have to quote Santayana at some length: "Form a like experience, give some scope and depth to your feeling, and it grows imaginative. give it more scope and more depth, focus all experience within it, make it a philosopher's vision of the world, and it will grow imaginative in a superlative degree, and be supremely poetical. The difficulty, after having the experience to symbolize, *lies only in having enough imagination to hold and suspend it in a thought;* and further to give this thought *such verbal expression* that others may be able to *decipher it*, and to be stirred by it as by a wind of suggestion sweeping the whole forest of their memories. Poetry, then, is not poetical for being short-winded or incidental, but on the

contrary, for being comprehensive and having range. If too much matter renders it heavy, that is the fault of the poet's weak intellect, not of the outstretched world. The picture that would render his larger subject would not be flatter and feebler for its extent, but on the contrary, deeper and stronger since it would possess as much unity as the little one with greater volume. As in a supreme dramatic crisis all over life seems to be focussed in the present and used in colouring out consciousness and shaping our decisions, so for each philosophic poet the whole world of men is gathered together, and he is never so much a poet as when, in a single cry, he summons all that has affinity to him in the Universe, and salutes his ultimate destiny. It is the acme of life to understand life. The height of poetry is to speak the language of gods".

It is therefore clear from Santayana's elaborate psychological analysis that philosophical thought or a system of thought of all things around us is not fatal to poetry; on the other hand, in the case of a person who has strong intellect and greater imagination with discipline, philosophical ideas would make his poetry great as he would have comprehensive view of life and not a cursory one: Great poetry depends upon the depth and greatness of the poet's vision and perhaps a great poet has to have some scheme of things, though at times he may not always be able to succeed to make his vision fully dawned upon his readers. We have to see how Iqbal succeeded in achieving this end and under what circumstances. But before we proceed to examine Iqbal, we have to deal the other problem that is concerned with 'Matter and form' for being equipped fully for our discussion of Iqbal's success or otherwise of his achieving the poetic assent for his philosophical ideas.

I have already inferred before that Eliot seems to give us an idea of pure poetry. He seems to impose upon us a conception of poetry as some sort of pure and rare aesthetic essence. There are several of Eliot's utterances which go to support this idea. He once emphatically said: "*Not our feelings, but the pattern which we make of feelings, is the centre of value*". Speaking about the use of language in poetry, he says: "What is poetic about poetry is just the invention or discovery or elaboration of *a new idiom in verse*". Insisting on the formal qualities of verse, he remarks: "Poetry begins, I dare say, with a savage beating of a drum in a jungle, and it retains that essential of percussion and rhythm". To the problem of communication that what is communicated in a poem, Eliot observes: "If poetry is a form

of 'Communication', yet that which is to be communicated is the poem itself and only incidentally the experience and the thought" which are in it. Eliot has repeated that interest in poetry is 'primarily a technical interest'. There has to be something in the poem which keeps the reader's mind 'diverted and quiet, while the poem does its work'. About his own poetry, he says that he did invent some poetry out of nothing because they (certain passages in his poetry) sounded well.

Should we then infer that Eliot believes in the doctrine of art for art's sake. What we mean by the phrase 'art for art's sake' is *pure enjoyment*. Eliot should not be mistaken, though he allows strong suspicions, to be an aesthete in the sense of believing the doctrine of 'art for art's sake'. While talking about the art of Milton, Eliot says: "The music of verse is strongest in poetry which has a definite meaning in the properest words."

In a way form seems to be subservient to meaning. If we study the external influences on the poet which prove as motive force for him to write verse, it is the meaning he wishes to communicate. "Any radical change in poetic form is likely to be the symptom of some very much deeper change in society and in the individual", says Eliot.

These statements taken together are contradictory. Eliot cannot carry on consistently with his theory of the primacy of form. However, if we study him further, he seems to believe in an integral view of the relation between form and matter.

It seems he believes that the poet's meanings were being worked up for a long time; by the time, he is writing the poem, his meanings have erupted out; what is left now is a conscious art to dress it into form, but not exactly so because Eliot has already said in his essay 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' that if feeling, phrases and images are stored up together and finally fused that they are, *this can only mean that form and matter are born together in a single creative act, and that they are equally important and valuable components of the poetry that is created*'. In fact Eliot is not so obscure as he seems to be. He takes a poem as a whole and does not bifurcate it into form and matter. No doubt, there would be imperfect matter, and imperfect poem where form may look separate from the meaning but in worthy poetry they are the same things. A masterpiece is created when in a poem 'medium and material, form and content, are indistinguishable.' We

can't possibly have poetry of 'great musical beauty which makes no sense'. 'What matters, in short, is the whole poem'.

T.S. Eliot is a career. He outgrows the views he held on or around 1921. On the whole he maintained that philosophical ideas are of no importance to the poet, that 'art is independent and supreme in its own sphere'. He criticized Mathew Arnold for defining literature as 'criticism of life'. He seemed to agree with Jacques Riviere in his estimate of the use of poetry as it was entertained by Moliere and Racine that they wrote for the entertainment of decent people.

This theory of 'Art for Enjoyment', perhaps, was the main idea, when he said in his 'The Music of Poetry' that the end of understanding poetry is enjoyment and.....this enjoyment is gusto disciplined by taste'.

Any didactic poetry is inferior, according to T.S. Eliot but he said while writing on "The Lesson of Baudelaire" that "all first rate poetry is occupied with morality". In his 'After Strange Gods' he considered it desirable to subject poetry to the rule of religion by deliberately applying the criterion of Christian orthodoxy to a number of writers as the supreme test of the value of their works.

How does Eliot reconcile such contradictory observations? The basic question posed to him is whether poetry has a cultural function, whether it is capable of saving us, or he should agree with Jacques Maritain that it is deadly error to expect poetry to provide the super-substantial nourishment of man. Eliot, that too the later Eliot who outgrew his earlier ideas, agrees with Maritain's Thomistic aesthetics. Eliot would consider it now valid that all beauty emanates from God and thus belongs to the transcendental order. Fine arts assume now greater importance as exponent of beauty. It means that they are completely to be disinterested; they cannot perform any cultural function; they cannot save us; they cannot be didactic. Fine arts are an end in themselves; they are the works of beauty. Letting the human element enter into it, we come to have some moral bias as it would emerge in the spiritual struggle of man. Maritain believes in the goodness of human nature; while Eliot does not fully agree with him. Kristian Smidt brings a comparison in Eliot's and Maritain's ideas on the possible ascendance of pure poetry. He says: 'Form in poetry is the pattern of metre, sounds, images, ideas and the pattern of lines, colours, etc., in the images called up: it is harmony, correspondence,

symmetry, balance, the static reality. Jacques Maritain by his emphasis on pure form suggests that these lines can reach or enable us to reach the high realms of the spirit. And Eliot seems to express a similar idea in *BURNT NORTON*:

Only by the form, the pattern,

Can words or music reach

The Stillness

Eliot does not fully reject the idea of the cognitive function of poetry. "Poetry may, occasionally, be related to mystical apprehension. The poet may be groping for the inexpressible; he may be "occupied with *frontiers of consciousness beyond which words fail*, though meaning still exist". Though Eliot is diffident about the entire problem, yet, writes Kristian Smidt, "Eliot is very wary and non-committal on this point, but when he says that there is a relation (not necessarily noetic, perhaps merely psychological) between mysticism and some kinds of poetry, or, some of the kinds of state in which poetry is produced, he at least admits the possibility of a *noetic relation*".

Discussing the tendencies of the modern writers, particularly the fiction writers, he declares that we have completely separated literature from religion, but 'the separation' is not, and can never be complete. It is incomplete on the unconscious plane. There seems to be conflict in Eliot himself. He wishes to see the end of poetry served and does not at the same time, being a religious man himself, want to exclude religion completely from the purview of poetry. He would be very happy if poetry, over and above of its own purpose, could serve the purpose of religion. It would not be out of place to quote him on this point: "*Poetry is of course not to be defined by its uses. If it commemorates a public occasion, or celebrates a festival, or decorates a religious rite, or amuses a crowd, so much the better. It may affect revolutions in sensibility such as are periodically needed. It may make us from time to time a little aware of the deeper, unnamed feelings which form the substratum of our being, to which we rarely penetrate*".

Let poetry be poetry, and let it also serve religious purpose; Eliot would not mind it "Eliot admits that these things are compatible with the greatest poetry, provided they comply with the conditions set by the work of art and do not intrude as foreign elements." Great poets transcend the limitation which may be deadly for lesser craftsman.

They possess, or we expect them to possess a 'general awareness', which enables them to move freely and securely, whatever subject matter they choose or find. In fact, *Eliot has failed to define exactly the relations between poetry and religious belief*. What he recognizes and what is so very natural, is the practical necessity of the two; he does not conceive of them, as being placed in ideal necessity. *He wants 'a literature' which should be unconsciously, rather than deliberately, and definitely religious.*

III

We are now approaching the final stage of our exposition, that is, of 'Poetic Belief'.

When a Muslim reads Dante or a non-Muslim reads Iqbal, he is confronted with a difficult situation. How far can he enjoy poetry conveying beliefs contrary to his own belief? Should a reader believe what he reads? What would be the difference in his enjoyment if he does not believe in what the poet says. Should a poet believe in whatever he himself says? Should he believe fully or can he live by the partial belief in what he says? Can't a poet or his reader fully enjoy writing or reading what he does not, at all, or partially, believe? What is the essential relation between our enjoyment and belief while we are reading poetry?

Eliot frequently discussed these questions of belief and tells us that neither the poet nor the reader is obliged to believe in the ordinary way in the ideas which have been assimilated into the poetry or on which the poetry more or less tacitly rests. It is not very hard to find how Eliot must have come to have such a theory of Poetic belief. As a young agnostic, he read Dante and enjoyed him without believing wholly what Dante says. He thought *if he would be compelled to believe in all what Dante says, his pleasure of reading him would diminish*. He, therefore, conveniently tailored his theory of poetic belief. He even thought that a poet also needs not believe what he says in his poetry, and it is better if he does not; he, then, would not serve the end of his belief; he would keep the flag of poetry high. Eliot found this theory a favourable defence for his own poetry. In 1927, when he entered the Anglican Communion he had to change some of his ideas but not fundamentally. It seems that "Eliot's point of view is psychological rather than dogmatic (actually he fails to distinguish between belief as personal conviction and belief as impersonal dogma)", and from this point of view it is natural to regard matters of belief as

being in a state of flux determined by individuality and historical climate. This way of looking at belief makes it a kind of constantly repeated interpretation of dogma in relation to the spirit of the age. And for such a task of interpretation the poet, we may conclude, is peculiarly fitted for it demands a great deal of intuition and sympathetic imagination. Thus, by what he implies, perhaps, rather than by what he actually says, Eliot relates the psychological nature of belief much more closely than is usual to the nature of the poetic imagination.

Eliot remarks: "We are forced to believe that there is a particular relation between the two, and that the poet 'means what he says'. If we learned for instance, that *De Rerum Natura* was Latin exercise which Dante had composed for relaxation after completing the *Divine Comedy*, and published under the name of one Lucretius, I am sure that our capacity for either poem would be mutilated. Mr. Richard's statement (*Science and Poetry*, P.76 footnote) that a certain writer has effected a complete severance between his poetry and belief is to me incomprehensible".

Christian Smidt has ably pointed out three possible 'particular relations' between poetry and belief: *First*, there is the poetic use of philosophical ideas as a kind of game.....The game consists in making a kind of pattern of ideas, and for this purpose it is evident that borrowed ideas (and emotions) may serve the poet's turn as well as his own. Since every thing is proffered in play, the question of sincerity does not arise. *Secondly*, there is the emotional rendering of the poet's philosophy, which, as in the case of Lucretius or Dante, appears as a *fusion* between the philosophy and his natural feelings'. Eliot thinks that poems in which such a fusion has taken place were not designed to *persuade the readers to an intellectual assent* but to convey an emotional equivalent for the ideas.....The *third* possible legitimate relation between poetry and belief is that of poetic illustration of a philosophy which is already existent and moreover really accepted, so as to need no rational presentation or justification".

Whatever the objects of a poet may be in using a belief of whatever kind it may be according to Eliot, *great ideas or valid ideas do not simply themselves make poetry great*; even if the poet's ideas are acceptable to us; because his ideas agree with ours, it does not make by itself great poetry. But it should also not be considered that belief is quite immaterial to the poet; the belief is a kind of alloy to him, from which is derived his true material.

Now as far as the experience of a reader is concerned, one would very much like the reader to "recapture the emotion and thoughts of the poet", but Eliot likes him to enjoy poetry in his own way, "provided his appreciation is not too one-sided". He would suggest that "what a poem means is as much what it means to others as what it means to the author". The reader, therefore, has a certain scope for finding his own beliefs in what he reads and colouring it with his own view of life. But in many cases he comes up against ideas or beliefs which are obstinately explicit and must be either accepted or rejected. And this brings us to the centre of the problem of the reader's poetic assent.

We are thus faced with the problem how far the reader can go along with the poet. He has to make his choice. This is a very important question and we have to see how Eliot solves it. In his famous essay on Dante, he says, and here, I have to quote him at some length: "If there is literature, if there is poetry, then it must be possible to have full literary or poetic appreciation without sharing the beliefs of the poet."

"If you deny the theory that full poetic appreciation is possible without belief in what the poet believed, you deny the existence of 'poetry' as well as 'criticism,' and if you push this denial to its conclusion, you will be forced to admit that there is very little poetry that you can appreciate and that your appreciation of it will be a function of your philosophy, or theology or something else. If on the other hand, I push my theory to the extreme, I find myself in a great difficulty. I am quite aware of the ambiguity of the word 'understand'. In one sense, it means to understand a view of life (let us say) without believing in it, the word 'understand' loses all meaning and the act of choice between one view and another is reduced to caprice. But if you yourself are convinced of a certain view of life, then you irresistibly and inevitably believe that if any one else comes to 'understand' it fully, his understanding must terminate in belief. It is possible and sometimes necessary, to argue that full understanding must identify itself with belief. A good deal, it thus turns out, hangs on the meaning, if any, of this short word 'full'.

In short, both the views I have taken in this essay and the view which contradicts it, are pushed to the end, what I call heresies (not of course, in the theological, but in a more general sense).

So I can conclude that *I cannot, in practice wholly separate my poetic appreciation from my personal beliefs.* Also that the distinction

between a statement and a pseudo-statement is not always in particular instances, possible to establish.....

Actually, one probably has more pleasure in the poetry when one shares the beliefs of the poet; on the other hand *there is a distinct pleasure in enjoying poetry as poetry when one does not share the belief, analogous to the pleasure of 'mastering' other men's philosophical systems.* It would appear that 'literary appreciation' is an abstraction, and pure poetry is phantom; and that both in creation and enjoyment much always enters which is, from the point of view of 'Art' irrelevant.

If the beliefs presented by a poet do not agree with our beliefs, it should not hamper the capability to enjoy the poem itself since enjoyment arouses from its *understanding*."

If Eliot can't enjoy Shelley's poetry, it is not because he does not have the same beliefs but because Shelley's poetry is not coherent, mature and is not founded on the facts of life. Let the poet present any theory or doctrine but for us as readers, it must have requisite qualities to reach our understanding fully. Eliot does not insist that a poet or a reader should completely shut his mind from all ideas; after all, poetry uses ideas, sometimes deliberate ideas. He advises the readers to suspend their belief or disagreement, for if they want to enjoy a poetic piece *they must give poetic assent to the poem* temporarily forgetting their own ideas and beliefs.

He candidly says "It is wrong to think that there are parts of the *Divine Comedy* which are of interest only to Catholics or to mediaevalists..... You are not called upon to believe what Dante believed, for your belief will not worth more of understanding and appreciation; but you are called upon more and more to understand it. *If you can read poetry as poetry, you will 'believe' in Dante's theology exactly as you believe in the physical reality of his journey; that is you suspend both belief and disbelief.* I will not deny that it may be in practice easier for a Catholic to grasp the meaning, in many places, than for the ordinary agnostic; but that is not because the Catholic believes, but because he has been instructed."

It is not only in the regions of thought that the problem of poetic belief arises, but also in the realms of feelings. I. A. Richards, while agreeing with Eliot that the reader may not strictly and necessarily believe in the ideas of a poet, divides belief into two categories, 'intellec-

tual belief' and 'emotional belief' but this distinction does not fit in Richard's own observation in 'Principles of Literary Criticism', where he considers aesthetic and any other experience as similar; in fact, he believes in the *Psychic Unity*. Eliot would not agree to such a distinction; according to him the response of a reader to a poem should be taken as a whole. But, however, it does not mean that only rational analysis of a certain verse can carry us to the poetic assent. It is not only intellectual but emotional assent, a matter of sympathy with the poet's ideas, but whatever their contents may be, they have to be taken as a whole, a unity. Besides, belief can vary from mood to mood; when we are in a strict scientific bent of mind, we accord belief only to those things which are demonstrable; but, if we are in a romantic mood, we can sympathetically respond to a fairy land story. *It is the tone of the poem which gives us an initiative, which carries to a particular direction.* A poem which satisfies both our rational and emotional responses, gets, however, greater poetic assent.

III

Now, our first and foremost question that arises from the lengthy discussion we have had before is why at all there is a problem of poetic belief in Iqbal?

Why not such a question arises in the context of Ghalib? I have already said that our major Urdu tradition is *Ghazal* and in this genre of poetry, each verse has a different theme, and there is no unity of theme or thought or emotion in one single *Ghazal*; no doubt we may talk of a mood or a tone of a particular poet from the reading of his entire poetry but generally with a *Ghazal* Poet, this is very rare except the one like *Faiz* whose *Ghazal* moves like a *Nazam*.

It is not too much to say that the problem of poetic belief does not at all arise before Iqbal. The reason is that, perhaps, it is for the first time in Urdu poetry that *Nazam* gets a firm footing and flowers into an important tradition. No doubt, we have long poems like *Anis's* and *Dabir's Marsias*, *Naseem's*, *Shauq's* and *Mir Hasan's Masnawis*, *Zauq's* and *Sauda's Qaseedas*, but these can be either recognised as narrative poetry or nature poetry or the *ghazal-poetry*. In fact, *when I speak of a Nazam I mean a poem laden with ideas, with thought, with one consistent theme, one tone.* Such a poem is not found in Urdu poetry before Iqbal; and it is not found in Iqbal as an instance, in fact,

it comprises the major part of Iqbal's major Poetry. The art of writing this kind of poem has not only begun but also matured in Iqbal.

Iqbal's literary products provide a very interesting study of his mental development and the change in attitudes and finally the consolidation of his ideas into a firmer theory of life. Now I would suggest that Iqbal began as a poet, it was much later that he became a poet-philosopher. His early poetry does not offer any serious problem. He had astray ideas and started as a poet of nature and patriotism. It is only after the publication of *Bal-e-Jabril* in 1935 and *Zarab-e-Kalim* in 1936 that he emerged as a philosophic poet. On their basis, his *Payam-e Mashriq*, *Asrar-e-Khudi* and *Ranoze-e-Bekhtudi* strengthened his stand as a Philosopher-poet. At the moment we have no concern with his philosophical prose writings. Our main purpose is to find out what happened to Iqbal's poetry when he developed a common theme in his poetic works.

I have no doubt that a poet without a system of philosophy has better chances of success as a poet. The reason is, in such a case, the poet is not cut off from other streams of experience. A poet who has a philosophy to convey, deliberately ignores all other experiences, which, in no way, are inferior to his philosophic ideas, which may be as valuable as any other. Besides his art is circumscribed by his patent thoughts. Perhaps for that very reason, *Akbar Allahabadi* and *Nazeer Akbarabadi* are not as great poets as Meer and Ghalib. *Now in order to transcend these difficulties, the poet has to have greater intellect and deeper and concentrated vision of life as Santayana holds.* There is also much truth in Eliot's remarks that Philosophy is, in a way, dangerous to a poet, because, he then serves the purpose of philosophy and not of poetry. But there are in this case, two important matters which we must take into account. It should not be accepted that the poet expresses his own feelings and ideas alone. Secondly with a great intellect and a great soul, a philosophy may become life-philosophy, that is, it may become a part of his personality, that it is imbibed by him, that he has not to think it every time, that it has become a part of his emotions; in such a case to my opinion, his philosophy should not hamper his poetry. With a great mind, *philosophy should assist the poet in becoming a greater poet; it is with an inferior mind that philosophy becomes a precarious thing.* As Santayana says, it is not the stretched world which is at fault with our narrow and diffused vision.

Granting that a poet may not necessarily believe in what he says,

it may be confidently said that a poet with great and disciplined intellect and a concentrated and deeper vision, believes in whatever he says and may produce great poetry. Iqbal is one such poet, who believes in what he says because he is man of vision; he thinks to purpose, he has a system of philosophy which he has absorbed into his emotions and life; he has a deeper and pervasive vision of things around; he has a comprehensive view of life; he is an inspired person. Now with Iqbal of forties deliberate attempt is out of question; Iqbal would have an inspiration and he would have content and form together. No doubt Eliot insists at times that it is a poem as a whole and not its ideas which are communicated but he finally submits to the fact that neither of the two is prior; form and matter are integral to each other. That seems to be a perfect truth in Iqbal.

It is only when that Iqbal fails to comprehend a particular idea deeply that he fails as a poet; or where he makes deliberate attempts to explain his philosophy that he does not achieve poetic assent, for example at places in *Asrar-e-Khudi* and *Ramoze-e-Bekhudi*. And this is not unique with Iqbal; Goethe also fails at time as a poet where he is not inspired; where he is deliberately writing. An inspired poet, at an inspired moment writes great poetry retaining all his philosophy without any loss to his poetry. I think that borrowed ideas can never become a part of a poet's mental and emotional contents to the extent that he expresses them without thinking.

Iqbal at a time of his life was two persons, one, a philosopher, and the other a poet, but later the philosopher dominated. He thought and thought to purpose, and to such an extent that his thought wholly became the part of his feelings and emotions. Now when the poet and philosopher became so intermingly one in the maturing integration of his personality he wrote great poetry that can guide the philosophers, thinkers and the makers of history.

Now, if a poet philosopher is such a unity, with him should not, in fact, arise any such problem as of poetic belief, because as a poet, the rational and the emotional blend in him so marvellously that his philosophy is his passion. On this very basis, I contend that all his poetry which does not reflect his well settled attitude of life is an inferior one as compared to his philosophic poetry. In fact, this looks strange; it has been generally believed that a poet who has flashes is a greater poet, for example *Ghalib*. No doubts can be cast on the greatness of *Ghalib*, but he is great not only because he has flashes, but on

other grounds too which cannot be discussed in this article. Why does this phenomenon occur with Iqbal?

What we find in Iqbal's verse is the emotional equivalent of his thought and since his major passion was his philosophy, he is a great poet, when he writes philosophic poetry. Now here, we should not misunderstand the term *philosophic poetry*; by it I mean the poetry which expresses the well-settled passion towards life and things. The reader, after all, does not read his poetry, primarily to receive instruction; it may incidentally be there, but his primary response is emotional and he readily gives *poetic assent* to it and sympathises with it. Empodocles has written his philosophy in verse; it is not poetry because it is only a way of writing with him.

To sum up, I would submit that a poet like Iqbal is an inspired person, he writes poetry when he gets an inspiration. He has a vision of life and he imbibes it to the extent that it becomes a part of his personality. He thinks and thinks only, but when he writes, he does not think because by that time his thinking has become a passion. Such a poet does not convey ideas; he conveys the emotional transformation of the ideas. And such poetry must achieve poetic assent. Iqbal's major poetry was such a poetry in which the distinction of form and content, meaning and expression, thought and medium are transcended, and therefore it is the Master Passion identical with the *Elan-vital*, that was Iqbal.

I would suggest that a full-fledged Passion is emotion and thought, concept and image, content and form all together. It stirs up thinking, sentiments, motives, in short, the whole personality of the reader at the same time. And Iqbal's poetry is an all-embracing passion which by itself evokes poetic assent and suspends the beliefs of the reader.

NATURE OF ART ACCORDING TO IQBAL

ZIAUDDIN AHMAD

Iqbal has discussed the nature of art which we may gather from his different writings and poetic works.

In his introduction to "MURAQQ-I-CHUGTAI", Iqbal wrote:

"The spiritual health of a people largely depends on the kind of inspiration which their poets and artists receive. But inspiration is not a matter of choice. It is a gift, the character of which cannot be critically judged by the recipient before accepting it. It comes to the individual unsolicited and only to socialise itself. For this reason the personality that receives and the life-quality of that which is received are matters of the utmost importance for mankind. The inspiration of a single decadent, if his art can lure his fellows to his song or pictures, may prove more ruinous to a people than whole battalions of Atilla or Changiz.....To permit the visible to shape invisible, to seek what is scientifically called adjustment with Nature is to recognise her mastery over the spirit of man. Power comes from resisting her stimuli and not from exposing ourselves to their action. Resistance to what is with a view to create what ought to be, is health and life. All else is decay and death. Both God and man live by perpetual creations".

These lines very briefly summarise Iqbal's views about the nature of art. There is abundance of studies and thinking behind these lines. Iqbal was a keen student of art and literature and when he rose to be a great philosopher these studies were deepened in meanings and sagacity. He was aware of the great philosophies of art. As he was himself a superb artist, he was directly in commune with the artistic spirit. In order to explain, what does he want to convey in his introduction to the Muraqq-i-Chughtai, I selectively reproduce from the writings of the great art-philosophers and artists.

It was Hegel, whose philosophy of art has great influence upon the theories of art as they are prevalent nowadays. Therefore, I

start with his views. He believes that only when it has attained its appropriate freedom is fine art really art; it cannot fulfil its highest function till it has established itself in the same sphere with religion and philosophy and has become simply one of the ways of expressing, or presenting to consciousness, the divine, the deepest interests of man, the most comprehensive spiritual truths..... This character art shares with philosophy and religion, but there is this difference: that art expresses even what is highest by sensuous form, and so brings it nearer to natural appearance, to our senses and feelings.

The universal and absolute need from which art, in its general character, springs, originates in the fact, says Hegel, that man is a thinking consciousness; that is that he makes explicit to himself, by means of his own nature, what he is and what the world is. Natural things are simply there and that is the end of it; man, being a mind, gives himself a double existence, since he not only like natural things, is, but also realises his own existence, perceives himself, has ideas of himself, thinks himself, and only by this active realisation of himself is he a mind. Man attains this self-consciousness in a two-fold way. First theoretically, so far as he had to bring his inmost self before consciousness—every movement of the human heart, every storm that sways it. In general he has to contemplate himself, to picture himself, to fix before himself what thought discovers as his essential character; he has to recognize only himself both in all that is called up in him and in all that he assimilates from without. Secondly, man realises himself through practical activity, since he has the impulse to express himself, and so again to recognize himself, in things that are at first simply presented to him as externally existent. He attains this end by altering external things and impressing in them the stamp of his own inner nature, so that he rediscovers his own character in them. Man does this in order that he may profit by his freedom to break down the stubborn indifference of the external world to himself, and may enjoy in the countenance of nature only an outward embodiment of himself.¹

How beautifully William Wordsworth expresses his ideas on Poetry:

“All good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelingsWhat is a Poet? To whom does he address himself? And what language is to be expected from him? He is a man speaking to

1. Hegel's Aesthetics.

men: a man it is true, endowed with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human nature, and more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind; a man pleased with his own passions and volitions, and who rejoices more than other men in the spirit of life that is in him, delighting to contemplate similar volitions and passions as manifested in the goings on of the Universe, and habitually impelled to create them where he does not find them. To these qualities he had added a disposition to be affected more than other men by absent things as if they were present; an ability of conjuring up in himself passions, which are indeed far from being the same as those produced by real events, yet (especially in those parts of the general sympathy which are pleasing and delightful) do more nearly resemble the passions produced by real events, than everything which, from the motions of their own minds merely other men are accustomed to feel in themselves: Whence and from practice, he has acquired a greater readiness and power in expressing what he thinks and feels, and especially those thoughts and feelings which, by his own choice, or from the structure of his own mind, arise in him without immediate external excitement.

"The poet writes under one restriction only, namely, the necessity of giving immediate pleasure to a human being possessed of that information which may be expected of him, not as a lawyer, a physician, a mariner, an astronomer, or a natural philosopher, but as a Man..... He considers man and nature as essentially adapted to each other, and the mind of man as naturally the mirror of the fairest and most interesting properties of nature.

"Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge; it is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance; of all Sciencecarrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the science itself.....The Poet is chiefly distinguished from other men by a greater promptness to think and feel without immediate external excitement and a greater power of expressing such thoughts and feelings as are produced in him in that manner. But these passions and thoughts and feelings are the general passions and thoughts and feelings of men².

Shelley in his "Defence of Poetry" rightly thinks that poetry acts in another and diviner manner. It awakens and enlarges the mind

2. Preface to Lyrical Ballads.

itself by rendering it the receptacle of a thousand unapprehended combinations of thought. Poetry lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world.

Iqbal also thinks:

بهار برگ پراگنده را بهم بریست نگه ماست که بر لاله رنگ و آب افزود

“The Spring has only put the scattered leaves together. It is my eye which has given the poppy colour and sheen”.

The same views have been beautifully expressed by Tolstoy, Walter Pater and Gentile.

Tolstoy believes that “To evoke in oneself a feeling one has experienced, and having evoked it in oneself, then by means of movements, lines, colours, sounds or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others may experience the same feeling—this is the activity of art.—————It is a means of union among men, joining them together in the same feelings, and indispensable for the life and progress towards well-being of individuals and of humanity”.³

Walter Pater thinks that just in proportion as the writer’s aim, consciously or unconsciously, come to be the transcribing, not of the world, nor of mere fact, but of his sense of it, he becomes an artist, his work fine art; and good art in proportion to the truth of his presentment of that sense; as in those humbler or plainer functions of literature also, truth—truth to bare fact, there.—is the essence of such artistic quality as they may have. Truth! there can be no merit, no craft at all, without that. And further, *all beauty is in the long run only fineness of truth*, or what we call expression, the finer accommodation of speech to that vision within.

Literary art, that is, like all art which is in any way imitative of reproductive of fact.—form or colour, or incident.—is the representation of such fact as connected with soul, of a specific personality, in its preferences, its volition and power.

Such is the matter of imaginative or artistic literature—this transcript, not of mere fact but of fact in its infinite variety, as modified by human preferences in all its infinitely varied forms.

3. Tolstoy’s What is Art?

Good art, then if it be devoted further to the increase of men's happiness, to the redemption of the oppressed or the enlargement of our sympathies with each other, or to presentment of new or old truth about ourselves and our relation to the world as may ennoble and fortify us in our sojourn here, or immediately, as with Dante, to the glory of God, it will also be great art, if, over and above those qualities I summed up as mind and soul—that colour and mystic perfume, and that reasonable structure, it has something of the soul of humanity in it, and finds its logical, its architectural place, in the great structure of human life.⁴

Gentile expresses his views with clarity and verve. The form of art, which every man recognizes from his own experience, or to speak more exactly, the form of certain products or experiences of the spirit which have artistic value, is the form of the Ego as pure subject. But if tried to lay our hands on this form as a concrete existence, it would be a vain shadow. Yet it reveals itself in experience in the medium of the whole creative act of thought, which besides being pure subjectivity, is also pure objectivity.

The form of art is not identical with the form of thinking, for art, as we have seen, is not thought but prior to thought. Art is the soul of thought, not the body, that pure soul which we distinguish as being the principle of life, out of which the living thing draws its whole being and makes itself our actual body; the principle in which and by which we really live. This soul in itself, prior to the body which it animates, is the unique form in which art consists.

Art is not the expression or intuition of feeling but feeling itself.

It was a mere result of adding the intuitive form to the subject matter of feeling. First there was the feeling and then the vision of this feeling; as if such immediate vision could be possible, or indeed any spiritual activity could be directed upon an object already existent.

What is called a work of Art (poem, symphony, picture, statue), just so far as it is a work of art, is closed within itself, incomparable with any other. For its artistic character is to be found in the feeling that animates it, in the soul that governs it and that makes us feel something inwardly alive, for which our hearts beat with that secret passion

4. Walter Pater's "Appreciation".

which is the very passion of life. This feeling, which underlies every distinction, is distinguishably one and without parts. Yet at the same time it is the whole. Nothing is outside it and all that comes to light in the life of the spirit must be a form of it and be its offspring.....

Art does not consist in thought, but in that moment when the mind returns to the thrill of simple feeling..... and we find that in the end we are all of us men.

The artist, like the critic, must rise above his subject matter and come into confident possession of his technique so that, when he sings, or paints, he simply translates into objective representations (in self-consciousness) nothing else but his own feeling, in which all the rest is united and fused. When he has succeeded in dissolving the world in his pure subjectivity, that is to say in feeling it, then only can he express it, drawing from himself what has flowed into him and analysing in the light of consciousness the dim and formless matter within him, the mere feeling.....

Art is the form of a subject-matter; it is the feeling which has a definite being of its own as the subject experiencing a certain world; it is the feeling of a personality which, as body and thought, includes everything within itself.

Where there is feeling there is everything; it is universal and infinite as the soul whose essence it is. And this universality and infinity of feeling is the humanity of true art, which, in expressing the most secret heart of every individual, turns out to be what is most intimate to the hearts of all men, without limit of time or place. Thus it makes all men brothers by uniting them in a single soul.⁵

Iqbal says:—

“The ultimate end of all human activity is Life-Glorious, powerful and exuberant. All human art must be subordinated to this final purpose and the value of everything must be determined in reference to its life-yielding capacity. The highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully. All that brings drowsiness and makes us shut our eyes to Reality around,

5. E. F. Carritt, *Philosophies of Beauty*, p. 323-330

on the mastery of which alone life depends, is a message of decay and death. There should be no opium-eating in Art. The dogma of Art for the sake of Art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power."

نغمہ می باید جنوں پروردہ آتشے در خون دل حل کردہ
 نغمہ گر معنی ندارد مردہ ایست سوز او از آتش افسردہ ایست
 آن هنرمندی کہ بر فطرت فزود راز خود را برنگاہ افسردہ ایست
 آفریند کائنات دیگرے قلب را بخشد حیات دیگرے

Iqbal believes in man's powers for limitless developments and creative activities and is wide awake to his high and sublime position in this Universe:

Iqbal is an Artist as well as a poet of Nature. He has the eye of an artist and interprets all the fine shades of colour in Nature. He is a minute observer of its doings and a keen student of its manifestations. Clouds, stars, mountains, trees, flowers and streams attract his imagination most. He catches a glimpse of the landscape, an outline of the mountain peak or a momentary gleam of the Sea and busies himself with his impressions. His imaginative impressions are remarkable and superb.

صدمہ آجائے ہوا سے گل کی پتی کو اگر
 اشک بن کر میری آنکھوں سے ٹپک جائے

(If the petal of a flower receives a shock from the breeze, the shock will drop from my eyes as a tear.)

Coleridge in the same strain, writes "Art is the reconciler of nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into everything which is the object of his contemplation; colour, form, motion and sound, are the elements which it combines and it stamps them into unity in the mould of a moral idea.

"By Excitement of the associative power passion itself imitates

6. A melody must be nourished on madness of Love,
 It should be like fire dissolved in life-blood.
 A melody that has no meaning is lifeless,
 Its warmth is only from a dying fire!
 The skilful master improves upon nature
 And reveals his secret to our gaze!
 He creates a new world — and gives a new life to our being.

order, and the order resulting produces a pleasurable passion, and thus (poetry) elevates the mind by making its feelings the object of its reflection.⁷

Iqbal with delicacy has thrown further light on his art and poetry.

نگاہ شوق میسر نہیں اگر تجید آتو
ترا وجود ہے قلب و نظر کی رسوائی

(If thou hast not the vision of love then thy being is merely a dissipation of the heart and the eye.)

دلوں میں ولولے آفاق گیری کے نہیں اٹتے
نگاہوں میں اگر پیدا نہ ہو انداز آفاقی

(Universe-conquering passion does not arise in the heart
If the eyes do not first produce the manner universal.)

What does the thinker Benedetto Croce say about Art? According to him art is a vision or intuition. The artist produces an image or a dream; and those who appreciate his art turn their eyes in the direction he has indicated, look through the loophole which he has opened and reproduce in themselves that image. 'Intuition', 'Vision', 'Contemplation', 'Fancy', 'Imagination', 'Pattern', 'Representations' and the like are almost synonymous words, continually recurring in discussions about art, and all leading us to the same conception or systems of conceptions, a clear indication of universal agreement.

This character of art which distinguishes intuition from conception, art from philosophy and history—that is to say, from both the assertion of the universal and the perception or narration of the events,—has also been called ideality. And ideality is the very essence of art.

What gives unity and coherence to intuition is feeling. Intuitions are truly such because they represent feeling and only thence can they arise. It is not a thought but a feeling that gives to art the airy lightness of its symbolism. Art is an ideal within the four corners of an image.

He further says: "What we seek and enjoy in art, what makes our heart leap up and ravishes our admiration is the life, the move-

7. Carritt. *Philosophies of Beauty*, pp. 134-135

ment, the passion, the fire, the feeling of the artist, that alone gives us the supreme criterion for distinguishing works of true and false art, inspiration and failure.

Iqbal has envisaged his ideal of art in the following strain:—

مری نوائے پریشان کوشاعری نہ سمجھ کہ میں ہوں محرم راز درون میخانہ

(Do not take my distressed voice as mere verse,
For I am the knower of the innermost secret of the wine-shop)

زمانہ عقل کو سمجھا ہے مشعل راہ کسے خبر کہ جنوں بھی ہے صاحب ادراک

The world takes Intellect as the light of life; who knows
That Madness is also percipient)

دنیا کو ہے اس مہدی برحق کی ضرورت ہو جسکی نگہ زلزلہ عالم افکار

(The world needs that rightful Guide, Whose
Eye is an earthquake in the world of ideas)

In the words of Prof. M. M. Sharif "It is a hidden treasure, a conserved dynamic wealth, super-abundant in the case of a genius, that finds an outlet in Art".⁸

Iqbal has profound predilection to believe that all fine art is product of intuition. The main component of poetry is the 'eye', the *Nazr*. That poetry is intuitive and revelatory and that the true art is presentation of the moods and style of the essential reality, seems to be the main stream of thought in Iqbal. This theory of the nature of poetry and art requires the concepts of 'eye', 'sight', 'mirror', etc as its logical foundation.

کچھ اور ہی نظر آتا ہے کارویار جہاں
نگاہ شوق اگر ہو شریک بینائی

"The affairs of the world are seen transformed if the seeing
Is accompanied by the vision of love".

8. Beauty, Objective or Subjective, page 65.

نگاہ پاک ہے تیری تو پاک ہے دل بھی
کہ دل کو حق نے کیا ہے نگاہ کا بیرو

("If thy eye is clean, thy heart is clean; for God has made the Heart the follower of the eye".)

مرا درس حکیمان درد سر داد
کہ من پروردہ فیض نگاہم

(The lesson of the Philosophers has given me a headache,
For I have been brought up only in the lap of the eye that sees).



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DYNAMIC CONCEPTION OF THE WEST AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF

S. MOHAMMAD TAQI

Although Galileo and Newton gave Mechanistic Foundations to human knowledge the development of scientific ideas has gradually drifted away from Mechanism to Dynamism, and it seems that the idea of 'movement' or 'change' occupies central position in our knowledge of the universe. As a consequence of their evolution in science western thought in our time shows more and more leanings towards the dynamic interpretation of reality.

But close examination reveals that the contemporary western philosophies of Dynamism are subject to dormant contradictions and have implications that the philosophy of self is bound to encounter in order to consolidate its own dynamic world-view on unmistakable footings. The philosophy of self which has been propounded in Indo-Pak sub-continent since Iqbal claims to reveal a dynamism in the nature of reality, which in all its essentials is something different from the sort of dynamism these western theories project in the structure of the Universe.

Dynamical conception of the world as it were advocated by the leaders of science and philosophy in the contemporary west is closely associated with the reality character of the appearance. They believe, to put it in general terms, that the world consists of sense-data, ideas, or impressions and since these fleeting presentations are never stationary, the world in its essence is not static. This dynamical conception is based on the concept of the 'Temporal' while the dynamic view of the theory of self is raised on deeper bases, it is grounded in the concept of the 'Duration'. It is therefore quite necessary for a philosopher of self to expose hollowness of the concept of dynamism as it pervades the current western theories according to whom the only reality which this imperfect and mortal man can ever reach or hope to decipher is a ceaseless flux and boundless vacuum. Becoming supreme in the whole realm of scientific thought, this theory has thrown into disrepute the history-long quest for the underlying reality behind the fleeting phenomena.

The distinction in philosophy between appearance and reality—the phenomenon and the noumenon,—is an old one. Appearance consists of motion and change. This appearance or change is what Dewey and Russell and many others believe to be the ultimate reality, with which we have, willy nilly, to be content, as human knowledge is restricted and cannot overstep the boundaries set up by appearances. To them appearance is reality and there is no need of further ground for this reality.

The doctrine of the reality of phenomena or appearances fits in easily with the dynamical conception of the universe as propounded by the leaders of modern science which regards motion as the ultimate and final reality.

This idea of the world as appearances and phenomena is, to my mind, a heinous logical fallacy which has had the effect of retarding philosophical enquiries and sapping the basis of higher strata of conceptualization.

Appearances and phenomena are, in the terminology of modern science, four-dimensional continua which consist of time as their cardinal ingredient. Now, time equates fully with motion. This means that appearances and phenomena consist of motion as well as space. The question of space does not concern us at the present stage of our inquiry. But so far as motion is concerned, it is obvious that motion and appearance are coextensive and the fact that they are co-extensive clearly means that appearance can, without any loss of meaning, be substituted with motion. Thus, the whole discussion revolves round the fundamental notion of motion. But motion, in turn, is co-terminous with energy which is convertible into matter. The logical way, therefore, to begin our discussion would be to make energy our central point of investigation.

At this stage of our discussion, the question which suggest themselves are: firstly, is energy appearance or reality? Secondly, does energy have any relation to space; if so, what is the nature of this relationship? If energy is accepted as the final reality, space would naturally have to step down to the second general genus in the hierarchy of genera, leaving the place of the most general genus to energy which would then be considered as the highest generalisation the human mind is capable of.

But if space, as abstracted from energy and matter (which have

become co-extensive), is regarded as the most general genus, the alternative of appearance would altogether vanish into thin air. In this case, space would become the only eternal and everlasting reality in the cosmos. It is necessary to emphasise here the fact that the word 'space', as employed in the present discussion, denotes a complete abstraction from energy and matter. Thus, conceived as above and beyond the clutches of time and energy, space is, I propose, the only reality behind the fleeting phenomena and appearances. It is infinite and existent eternally, its infinitude being all rational and on all sides. Time, motion and change denote similar, one-directional activity. In this uni-directional activity, 'before', 'herenow' and 'after' are three essential stages. 'Before' is merging in 'herenow' while 'herenow' is in its turn becoming 'after'. This process of becoming 'before', 'herenow' and 'after' presupposes continuous nothingness left over behind every 'before' because every 'before' leaves nothingness behind at its merger with 'herenow'. This condition of being is a situation in which nothingness precedes 'before' and it is what is described as contingent. Thus, 'before', 'herenow' and 'after' are all contingent as all of them leave nothingness in their wake. But the contingency of all these three necessitates the contingency of time itself since time is composed of these three units only. Now, time is co-terminant with motion and change; motion is co-extensive with energy and energy is convertible into matter, which shows that all these four, along with time, are contingent. But if time, motion, energy, change and matter are all thought to be contingent, they cannot be considered as the ultimate reality. Ultimate reality, I dare say, is changeless and timeless. It cannot change as otherwise it will lose the peculiarity of being the ultimate reality.

Change, which is the essence of time, energy and motion, has some peculiar qualities of its own which deprive it of its right of the ultimate reality. Firstly, because every change presupposes the existence of space prior to itself, space has a greater right to be called ultimate reality. Secondly, change by its very nature, is finite. Change denotes the finitude while the ultimate reality cannot be * finite. The third reason as to why change cannot be regarded as the ultimate reality is more important than the former two.

Change, by its very nature, has three states as its fundamental

* 'The Finite Universe' in the Proceedings of the Forth Session of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress, PP 143-148.

units. These are 'before', 'herenow' and 'after'. Between these three states (a,b,c) two more states intervene. The state coming between a and b covers innumerable possibilities. Also, the state y which intervenes between b and c, has innumerable possibilities too. Then again, a third state z comes after c, having an infinite field of innumerable possibilities.

These six states, a,b,c and x,y,z are all the possible and conceivable stages through which every change has somehow to pass. Now, if change is considered as the final reality, the question would arise as to which one of the six states is the final reality. Change as such is comprised of only first three stages a, b and c. The question is: at what point in a,b or c the motion becomes real in the ultimate sense of the word? Is it reality at a,b or c or at all of them collectively? Whatever answer this question may have, the fact remains that the very existence of these states excludes the possibility of reality. Of these three states, everyone has something more or something less than the other two, as it were very clearly shown by the fact that these are three states, not one. Here, the famous principle that no two things in the world can in all respects be identical, applies very aptly, as otherwise they would be one, not two. Thus, everyone of the three states of change has some excess or diminution in relation to the other two. If, therefore, the three states of change are considered as the final reality, they would naturally consist of something more or something less than reality since all of them are severally considered realities.

Therefore, the diminution or excess of reality at every stage in comparison with the other two stages is unavoidable. But this makes reality unreal as neither more nor less than reality is to be considered reality. One is more and the other is less than reality and, therefore, both of them are a little bit different from reality. And this is reduction to absurdity.

Thus, change alongwith motion, time, energy and matter cannot be considered as reality. But in the case of space, the situation is altogether different. Space can be abstracted away from time, motion, etc. Thus abstracted, it can be regarded as the final reality, acting as it does as the final resting place of all our notions and external motions in the universe. The view that time can be merged with space, as Einstein innocently believed, is quite inadmissible. Time is essentially an activity. The serious mistake that Einstein commits in regard to the merger of time and space in his theory of relativity is *due to a con-*

fusion between the meanings of the words 'space' and 'place'. The word 'place' has a significance of very limited applicability while space is the most general notion the human mind is able to conceive. Interpreted thus, space as distinct from place is a kind of conception which cannot be equated with the concept of activity.

Indeed some very obvious and clear differences exist between the conceptions of space and time. A very apparent difference is that space can be abstracted from time *while time cannot be conceived of as existing without space.* Metaphysically speaking, the very notion of time requires that it should not be regarded as anything more than a contingent entity. At the same time, the view that space is contingent is patently ridiculous. The idea the word 'space' conveys is the widest possible notion a human mind can comprehend. This widest possible notion is comprised of what is termed as the Universe and the non-activity preceding it and reigning beyond the farthest conceivable confines of this universe. Space thus defined and the idea connoted by the word "time" as explained above represent two quite different categories. One is completely fundamental while the other is a mere auxiliary.

Space is the ultimate reality while time, along with other similar processes, is simply a derivative of it. It is only a particular manifestation of the Ultimate Reality which is infinite in all directions, ubiquitous, and all-inclusive.

The western theorists of the present age universalize time, and thus make the whole concept of reality superfluous. Time cannot be ultimate. It is space which is presentation of the ultimate reality. The philosophy of self, as it was propounded by Iqbal and leading thinkers internalizes this truth in the concept of 'spacious presence'.

The category of 'spacious presence' with which the ultimate ego is omnipresent in objective terms is projected in the category of space. The dynamic aspect of this objective consciousness is posited in the notion of 'Duration'. When Iqbal disowns the 'time as a mechanical concept', he was in fact visualizing a higher order of reality in the idea of Duration.

This 'Duration' is reality without succession. A reality which is without succession is supratemporal, which provides the ground for

the fleeting temporal things, the appearances and the presentations. As an abstract concept this duration is space.

I have already pointed out that the notion of space loses its significance when it is used in the sense of a 'place,' Iqbal has this sense of the word 'space', when like Bergson, he speaks of the spatialization of time. But when the word 'space' is restored to its full meanings as the infinite boundless objectivity, the human mind can ever comprehend, it transcends the 'localizations' and in the order of consciousness is reproduced as the 'spacious presence'.

LOGIC SOCIAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF

A.H. KAMALI

Modern Social theory, since its very inception with a bold positivistic programme, has been irreconcilable to the basic demands and dimensions of the social reality, for its uncritical formalization around the category of "Nature"; Nature idealized as a field of linear causation or that a blind and relentless transaction of forces, the one yielding an evolutionary image, the other a mechanistic model of the universe. Whatever picture of the universe, evolutionary or mechanistic, a social scientist adopts, one finds him internalizing the idea of 'Nature' in his thinking. Internalization and attendant universalization this idea seeks in social science of our time, are hinderances to the adequate access to all the facets of the societal system. The positivistic programme fails on that account in several respects. Its failure is most conspicuous, when it tries to theorize about ethical, aesthetic and other associated phenomena in the folds of the social sciences. Whenever one tries to understand a thing in terms of the compositive forces which are responsible for its genesis, continuity and growth, one is just in possession of a half truth. The other half is its value-dimension. The thing carries some importance, bears upon its shoulder some value, or represents a motif, or embodies a meaning in its presentativeness. Perception of the contents of experience, when follows the logic of Nature, and advances on the techniques which are relevant to causal and interactional analysis, simply naturalizes the whole of the phenomena. To such a complete "naturalization," i.e. perception of everything in terms of the vector of forces, the philosophy of self cannot agree, for its complete neglect of the perception of value in the actual process of the world. Max Weber, by his guiding definition identifies sociology with a "worth-free science" and thus as a methodological principle naturalizes its theoretic frame of reference. It means that sociology is bound to perceive every instance, or piece of social reality, in the category of "Natural Growth". This may go on indefinitely; but it should be clear that from this mode of vision, the urge for ideal, which is innate to the life of the self, and contributes some important elements to the societal system, becomes completely oblivious.

Value consciousness is as much a 'positively' given fact as the natural origin of an event. The logic of the Natural Sciences cannot meet the objectivity of this positive fact. And therefore Sociology, as it adopts the methods and techniques of the natural sciences cannot assimilate the data, which constitute the value dimension of the Society, hence need for a new Science.

The new Science which may proceed on to objectify the value-aspect of the societal system i.e. the cultural system must have a logic of its own. Its logic must be adequate enough to select those contents of experience which somehow or other represent the pervasion of value in the category of the social reality. Such a logic is the demand of the philosophy of self. When the logic of natural science approach is supplemented by this new logic, then alone, we may have an adequate mapping, and theoretical formulation of the Totality of the social system, which is at once, a cultural system and a natural system.

Following paper is an attempt in this direction. It takes into account the germinal social sciences, Anthropology and Sociology, which try to claim the whole area of society in their domain. It tries to clarify their logical intents, by propounding the present state of affairs and their logical meanings; then, it goes on to distinguish the laws of structure and the laws of culture, as basic groups of theoretic intents in the field of social inquiry. This attempt results in two kinds of logic for social reality, to be incorporated as necessary tools in the philosophy of self for the domain of positive research so as to lead to a comprehensive theory about man, universe, and the whole of reality.

It is of interest to examine Anthropology in the background of Sociology, for it is in this examination that inconsistencies and equivocations of the modern social theory are thoroughly exposed. The monopolarity of social thinking i.e. its fixation only on one pole of perception (Nature), rather than on the two poles, as the social reality is itself axialized, produces one of the most startling situations ever conceivable in the basic sciences. Either there is only one science; or anthropological researches are merely a phase of the sociological research. This situation can be harmonized by logical determination of the category of culture as posited against or over and above the category of Nature. It means that the logic which guarantees the individuality, distinct survival and growth of anthropology has a locus standi quite different from that of sociology. Our task is to develop that logic.

The conclusions are veritable aspects of the philosophy of self, as it transforms into the philosophy of society, philosophy of science, and philosophy of culture.

I

Anthropology, as its etymology suggests, is the 'Science of man'. But, its very nomenclature is provocative and breeds conflict, for the founders of sociology already anticipated in their own science the culmination of all knowledge about man. Comte's hierarchy of sciences assigned to sociology the function of total study of man; Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology and Social Physics all arranged in a historical as well as in a logical order, exhausted for him the set of sciences. Spencer conceived in Sociology an all-embracing synthesis of the entire human phenomena. Thus, beyond Sociology there was no prospect of any Anthropology; Sociology itself was Anthropology. Crowned as the queen of all sciences at the hands of W.F. Small, it expected that all departmental science would submit, to its high office, fruitful conclusions. All known phenomena and partial theories would be then reproduced and synthesised in a coherent and comprehensive knowledge about man in the development of this science.

Now, appearance of Anthropology was to institute a challenge to its high authority. But there were other factors which delayed the unavoidable conflict, latent in the development of the former side by side with that of the latter.

Although it was bound to an empirical content i.e. to human society, sociological science was fashioned on 'apriorism'. Some major premise about human nature in general combined with a minor premise about the dynamics of life was thought sufficient for deduction of the entire course and structure of human organizations, and societies. There were obvious limitations to this approach: it is practically near to impossible to exactly deduce the total determinations of a concrete event, a here and now, from some general premise. Theoretical sociologist must always remain at the level of abstraction. But, it is important to grasp that from 'Apriorism,' sociological thought moved towards the models of physics and chemistry; and as the Neo-Kantians put the matter, the latter group of sciences being 'generalizing' in essence as they were by their very technique, are unfit to deal with the 'individualized' reality. We may agree with the Neo-Kantians or not, it is, however, beyond doubt that sociology, from its very inception, had

a definite orientation to deal with generalities. It is also a historical fact that sociology was classed in the group of the natural science in as much as it had to discover the universal laws of human societies. Physics and chemistry :s Sciences were supposed to discover general laws of the inorganic nature.

Anthropology on the contrary had its origin in the company of such disciplines that were not enlisted with sciences. Foremost among them was history. Those who were interested in narratives and fine arts took history, literature and archaeology. But, Modern Philosophers of Science, Leibnitz and Descartes, never took them seriously. It should not go unnoticed that Kant's work was primarily a philosophy of physics; and his philosophy of categorical imperative was the culmination of what could be said about man. Literature, poetry and history were conceived of as artifacts, not sciences. And Anthropology had its origin in their soil.

Historical narratives have to stop after many intervals at last on or about 2400 B.C. and cannot proceed further. *Anthropology made its appearance, primarily as an investigation in pre-history.* Archaeology was also digging the past, but Anthropology came with a different programme.

An Archaeologist digs the earth to discover the remains; samples collected from a site are seriated in accordance with the layers of the deposits in which they are found; then they are seen in the ensemble of the remains of the same layer. The types of the artifacts, the typical characteristics of the ensembles determine the type of the people living there and Seriation determines their order of existence in time. Definite principles of stratigraphy have been evolved to bring to record the pre-historic past. Now, the important difference between history in general and archaeology may be noted: history in general orders the seriation in accordance with chronology; it has to record every particular event (historically relevant) on the cross-section of space-time continuum it is a systematic account of the singular happenings. But, archaeology, has a different direction; in accordance with the documents it has to reconstruct the past. These documents are 'externalities', 'presentations', and 'artifices' of the people: their pottery, vessels, ruined dwellings, and streets. Archaeology cannot know more than the *state* of their knowledge in technology, the *manner* of their arrangements and decorations, the *plans* of their ecological settings. *To such a kind of knowledge, which is unable to record singular events, but can reconstruct*

the manners, the styles, the arts and techniques of people is given the name of 'Cultural History'. A cultural history is a programme determined by the nature of the 'contents' yielded in archaeology. It can simply discover the outer linings of a people, their abstract ways of living; their 'material' expressions. *Historical inquiry can be extended over to the oblivious past in the form of this chequered discipline, i.e. the Cultural History.* Tylor, the founder of anthropology remarks, "if the field of inquiry be narrowed from history as a whole to that branch of it which is here called culture, the history, not of the tribes or nations, but of the conditions of knowledge, religion, art, custom, and the like among them, the task of investigation proves to lie within far more moderate compass¹....."

And to this moderate compass, Tylor and Morgan add a new mode of inquiry and area of research. Tylor formulated his conviction, basic to his new mode of research, in 1888 as follows: "the institutions of man are distinctly stratified not unlike the earth on which he lives. They succeed each other in series, substantially uniform over the globe". And Morgan, another founder of Anthropology expressed: "like the successive geological formations, the tribes of mankind may be arranged, according to their relative conditions, into successive strata. When thus arranged with some degree of certainty they reveal the entire range of human progress from savagery to Civilization."² These quotations round off the whole programme and technique of anthropology as it was visualized by its founders. It was definitely a branch of historiography addressed to prehistory. but with more concrete advantages over and above archaeology as its field was given in the form of the living societies; the data taken over from them could fill the general outlines provided by archaeological research:

II

The new mode of inquiry in pre-history by studying the small societies scattered over different regions of the globe, each exhibiting a level in the history of mankind, presupposed a *linear theory of human evolution* that mankind is at different levels at different places of the same ladder of evolution. The 'aboriginals' and 'primitives' are remini-

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1. Primitive Culture; p. 1.
 2. Ancient Society.

cents of the earlier stages of the evolving humanity which has touched its highest mark in the unfolding of the Western Society.

In spite of Questionable validity, the hypothesis of *linear evolution* gave tremendous fillip to the study of primitive societies in the hope of providing missing links of social evolution comparable to the researches to find out the 'fossil man' and 'primates' to complete the seriality of biological evolution. Ethnographical expeditions were, consequently, organized with all seriousness; the ages of dependence on tourists' diaries, explorers' narratives, and missionaries accounts were gone with the first hand collection of facts about the conditions of natives and savage societies.

Ethnographical expeditions could not be handicapped like those of the archaeological excavations to be limited only to the state of arts and conditions of dwellings, styles of temples, images and other artifacts. Full-fledged, living and moving human communities were before the gaze of the field-worker. He could collect all types of human data, social, inter-personal, institutional, economic, and political without any restriction.

This could be a source of conflict between anthropology and sociology, but the linearity hypothesis was accomplishing a division of scope between them. Anthropology seemed to occupy a seat between biology and sociology, specializing in the borderline regions lying between the "primates" and the mature 'social systems' of mankind. '*Primitive Mind*' was being delineated into a specific category filled with a distinguishing content of its own in the upward trend of human evolution. Comte's evolutionism with mythological—Metaphysical—positive stages, Tylor's Scheme of movement from Savagery, Barbarism to Civilization tended towards definite categorization of social and intellectual evolution of the mankind. Identified with the study of primitive mentality, with the pre-civilized phases of human evolution, Anthropology could be differentiated from Sociology in respect of its empirical content thereby avoiding the always inevitable conflict with the latter. Malenesians, Zunis, Todas, Eskimos came to prominence as worthy objects of studies relevant for this science.

The idea of static human nature meanwhile was subjected to serious strain by Beard, Veblen and Dewey in the United States, and the German thinkers were gradually moving towards dynamic Conceptions of human reality. Max Weber vouchsafed that the Categories and the

structure of mind are also subject to Change. Durkheim and Levy Bruhl conceived Quantitative change in the evolution of nature. Pre-logical mind and logical mind, collective consciousness and evolving individual consciousness, mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity in these and similar binary concepts, these thinkers and others including Westermarck and Hobhouse defined the whole range of human and social evolution. Primitive mind and savage society were thus conceived of as conditioned by mechanical solidarity, pre-logical consciousness and collective morality. This is the story how a qualitatively differentiated content was singled out for the junior science of anthropology. Now it seemed possible that Anthropology not only in respect of tendency but also in respect of objective reality could occupy a domain discriminable from that of sociology. Both the disciplines were further differentiated from one another on the basis of distinctions in methodological convention. Theoretical orientation from the general to the particular in the case of sociology and direction from particular to the general in case of anthropology contributed to their peculiar distinctiveness from each other. Anthropology was attached to 'ideographic method, and sociology to 'genero-graphic' method.

III

Distinctions in contents combined with separate methodological conventions would have been sufficient to make Sociology and Anthropology really separate and mutually autonomous Sciences, but for some vital cross-currents that worked for their cementations. Empirical tendencies in the sociological science had never been completely subdued; with the development of theory, problems of its empirical evidence and its readjustment to the requirements of observation necessitated increasing borrowing of factual material in its corpus. Methodological programme of many sociologists enunciated priority of field observation, and by way of abstraction establishment of generalizations. It is generally agreed, "that the late W.I. Thomas of the University of Chicago, with his publication of the 'Source Book of Social Origins' in 1909 was the first sociologist to introduce new foundations of scientific thinking, stressing the necessity of Concrete, Objective, detailed studies of simple societies which would throw light on the more intricate behaviour patterns and on the development of Social institutions in modern complex societies"² Franklin H. Giddings,

² Young Pauline V and Others:

Scientific Social Surveys and Research, Chapter IV, P. 86.

Stuart Chaplin, E.W. Burgess and E.S. Bogardus were among the first to organise classroom courses (1912-1918) in the U.S.A. providing training in concrete field methods of Study.⁴ This development was bound to have far-reaching consequences. It meant field techniques, social surveys, mass interviews, group tests, and switch over to statistical model. Sociological approach came gradually in this way closer to the anthropological. But anthropology itself could not remain at the plane of mere observation; its exponents felt a tendency towards generalization. Its descriptive propositions were to be assimilated in terms of the explanatory propositions. This resulted in heavy borrowing of sociological theories, and explanatory models from all other sciences, easily accessible to ethnographers. Classification of sociological conceptions and examination of the nature of sociological inquiry resulted, although gradually, in a new development. It moved from the 'secondary status of a synthetic science to the position of a basic science. Now, it began to appropriate fundamental and universal modes of *sociation*; and its subject-matter became co-extensive with every phenomenon of 'social formation'. This change of outlook made the anthropological content, i.e. primitive mentality, a part of the subject matter of the basic science of society.

In fact, the two sciences were never separated in France. Hubert and Maus accomplished excellent works difficult to categorize as Anthropology or Sociology. Durkheim refused to admit their division, and took them as part of a 'single inquiry', with the same concepts and operating on the same material: Empirical side ethnography and Theoretical side sociology. Important contribution to the study of religious phenomena by the French Scholars⁵ were punctuated by theoretical conclusions on the basis of ethnographical data. These works demonstrate the merger of one content with the other; accession of anthropology to sociology.

Emergence and wide use of analytical procedure, realized in the reduction of complex social phenomena to simple components, accentuated by the methodological inventory of 'Social types' in the design of 'The Elementary Forms of religion' one of the masterpieces of Durkheim, led to new models of sociological construction with very far-reaching implications. Primitive societies in the new models were treated as expressions of the simple forms of social developments and therefore an inquiry into their simple structures—the forms of the

⁴ *Ibid* P. 87.

⁵ Mauss, "Essai sur le sacrifice".

savage life—became indispensable and fundamental part of sociological scholarship. Maus was thoroughly in the steps of Durkheim in disallowing alienation of ethnography from sociology. His work 'Les variations saisonniers dans les Societies eskimo', is both ideographical and theoretical.

British scholars, in the meantime were labouring under the linear evolutionary hypothesis. Westermarck was always interested in the general science of the (developing) social phenomenon; and his 'Origin of Human Marriage', and 'The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas' were hailed as contributions to sociological literature while they could also be assigned to the vague science of anthropology. The Britishers as it has been said above, till the late thirties always revealed an evolutionary outlook of social phenomenon which was amenable to one single science of Sociology without delineating an anthropological science within its general limits. Hobhouse's 'Mind in Evolution' provided schematic organization of the human and sociological material for the British academic circles. Along with Wheeler and Ginsberg, Hobhouse prepared "the Material Culture and Social Evolution of the Simpler People". Profusely documented, as it were, this work unequivocally demonstrated that anthropology could never be separated, in the British tradition, from sociology. Hobhouse was convinced that sociology is a synthetic science, and Ginsberg always takes it to be a synoptic science.

IV

Historical scholarship is a distinctive quality with the German researchers in almost all the fields of humanitarian thought and ideographic work in economics, politics, mythologies, linguistics and religion forms their outstanding contribution. But, Dilthey showed the path of structural approach, and psychology was already a-historical since long. George Simmel, Ferdinand Tönnies and Max Weber were moving towards formalism. Sociology was becoming a study of all the forms of sociation. The general category of sociation as has been told earlier was conceived to have associative and disassociative process in its classification. Max Weber's innovation of 'ideal types' applicable to all the fields in social inquiry meant that all the possibilities of associations and disassociations must be constructed, and Applied Sociology should have to operate with theoretical constructs yielded thereby. Ethnography in representing the actual structure of communities was intellectualized as an extension of the applied sociology, and so

could not be logically established as a new field of inquiry. Thus in Germany, also there is no discipline that could be identified as Anthropology.

In Britain, however, Anthropology has enjoyed a distinction of its own in spite of theoretical failures to differentiate it from sociology. There have been professional scholars entitled as anthropologists. The distinction lies in the division of labour, without a 'logical division' of either object matter or of mode of inquiry. Work on the remote societies needs a full time job; and those who are in this business are easily identified as anthropologists. Codrington, Seligman, Rivers, Malinowski, Forde, Frith and their students did field work but as an essential phase towards theoretical sociology.

V

All the above developments lead to one general conclusion: If there could be an autonomous science of anthropology, it would have been possible only on the linear hypothesis of evolution, on the basis of which it could be allocated those forms of society for study which are substantially and qualitatively lower than those studied by sociology and have been remarkable from that point of evolution wherefrom individual consciousness and organic unification grow out from the collectivistic cohesiveness of the earlier modes of life of man and his societies.

But, the hypothesis of Linear Evolution, popular in the Hegelian, Spencerian and Marxian thought and strengthened for a time by the Darwinian Evolutionism could not hold ground for long even in Biology. Julian Huxley writes, "A century and a half ago, it was generally accepted, even by professional naturalists that nature represented a single scale culminating in man. There existed, they supposed, a ladder of life, each rung of which represented by a different type of animal, with humanity as the highest of all. From this point of view, each kind of living creature represented merely a step on the way to man, its nature and incomplete realization of human nature. But, with further study, especially after it was illuminated by the theory of evolution a wholly different and more interesting picture emerged. The various types of animals—insects, fish, crustaceans, birds and the rest—could not be thought of as the rungs of one ladder, the steps of a single staircase, they now appeared as the branches of a tree, the overgrowing tree of evolving life.....*It might still be that man was the summit*

of the whole; but he was at the top of the tree only by being at the top of one particular branch. There existed many other branches, quite different in their nature, in which life was working out its ends in a different way from that she had adopted in the human branch⁶”.

Representation of this new picture of human life carries with it the image, as a logical correlate, that social evolution is branching, evolving autonomous societies, unique in their character, spreading outwardly according to their own forms of movement and developing in their own way as the several branches of a tree grow and flourish. *Eskimos, Zunis, Toda, Gonds, Assyrians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks and Modern Western Society cannot be arranged in one line of evolution. This conception shakes to foundation the very subject-matter of Anthropology so far as it is conceived of as dealing with the earlier forms of social evolution. The societies it studies, the so-called ‘primitives’ are not in continuity with the contemporary societies but are specimen of some other societies, now extinct. They may represent some points of evolution of the societies of which they are instances hence no more primitive in character. Repudiation of linear theory deprives anthropology of its individuality, of the uniqueness of its subject-matter that it studies the ‘Collectives’ composed of ‘pre-logical minds’ representing as it does, the earlier stages of the so called uni-directed singly oriented social evolution.*

Sorokin remarks, “.....in order for a linear motion or change to be possible, the changing unit must either be in an absolute vacuum, free from interference of external forces, or these forces throughout the whole process of change must remain in such a ‘miraculous balance that they mutually and absolutely neutralize one another at any moment and they permit the changing unit to move for ever in the same main direction.....evidently both of these hypothesis are factually impossible.even material bodies are under the influence of at least two main forces: inertia and gravitation, which change their rectilinear or uniform motion into a circular or curvilinear motion..... When we consider that man, society and culture are much more complex ‘bodies’, that they are subject to the influence of inorganic, organic and socio-cultural forces, their linear change throughout the whole historical time becomes still improbable. Add to this undeniable fact that each of these ‘Units of change’ itself incessantly changes in the process of its existence and thus tends to upset the direction of the change

6. “Uniqueness of Man”: “The Intelligence of Birds”.

and the assumption of eternal linearity of change becomes impossible"⁷. These logical observations strengthened by Sharif's observations⁸ also prove threatening to Anthropology if it tries to justify its claims on the basis of the concept of linearity.

VI

Independent (lines of) development of different societies leads to the principle of Societal Pluralism as the main stay of all scientific constructs implying work on the classification of all 'social species' as there is a classification of bio-species which exist in nature contemporaneously.

There are changes, evolutions, and variations within the species but the species 'themselves' 'exist' side by side, and have no 'temporal' connection of succeeding each other. Therefore, the evolutionary model of social theory must yield to the non-evolutionary model of structure analysis. Species being contemporaneous, demand non-evolutionary but dynamic "formen" in their approach. Chances of change in a species of any given order of existence submit to various alternate or partially alternate sets of combinatory patterns of variation; a case indeterminate ontologically and unpredictable epistemically.

Behaviour of a natural system as subject to exact measurement in its future course presupposes an irreducible general condition that it would abide by the requirements of an already known pattern continuously. General conditions of its patterning are ontic in character and constitute a novel fixation in the nature of an open system hindering so far as they exist the growth of those future developments, which do not accord with them. If the fixation of a pattern of events is not predetermined, however, in the initial nature of the system to which they belong, it constitutes a uniqueness, an irreducible designation in nature. The evolving structure splits itself up into rival fixations simultaneously emerging and growing into further alternation and unique determinations. *Consequently the hypothesis of evolution is modified by the principle of irreducible developments that do not admit explanation in terms of the former states of the system.*

⁷. Socio-Cultural Dynamics and Evolutionism" by Professor Sorokin in "The Twentieth Century Sociology" edited by George Curvitch and Wilbert E. Moore. P. 104-105. Philosophical Library N.Y.

⁸. Symposium on the Philosophy of History. Pakistan Philosophical Congress Proceedings 1954.

Historical course of life as it passes through the emergence of 'unique' patterning implies that the analysis of a given state of the system not only involves (1) the component factors but (2) the a-historical principle of unique patterning such that it cannot be searched out in the precedent conditions for its pre-determination in the nature of 'evolving reality'. At every stage of nature, at the becoming of every novel formation, a 'break' in evolutionary continuity is witnessed and it should be taken into consideration independent of the evolution itself. This requirement involves that a Philosophico-Scientific approach must include in its empirical orientation a model of the specific organization of the system that has emerged. This sort of approach shall necessarily be morphological rather than evolutionary and shall represent the 'emergent' structure or organisation that has appeared at the plane of natural actuation. Its methodological device shall be factorial analysis. If in a chain of evolution, every link is uniquely designated and is manifestly inexplicable, then it is merely an a-historical juxtaposition arranged in an order of temporality. An evolutionary model shall be broken into non-evolutionary models replacing each other in a Temporal Succession. Many simultaneous models of arrangements of the same set of agents give rise to let us denote it, *comparative morphology*, or the science of comparative forms .

What has been achieved in comparative biology or comparative psychology is simply this: the skeleton, physiological-structures, nervous organization and behavioural patterns of the organisms, all paralleled discontinuities indeed, can be arranged on a graduation scale with lacuna here and there. But that A in the scale of complexity is at a lower place than B does not demonstrate that ontically A has its genetic origin in B. Although it may be said that there is nothing at present to resist this conclusion, but it may also not be denied that the researches do not compel us to accept the evolutionary hypothesis of genetic origin. Comparative Biology simply points out graduation and continuity in complexity and even after the reclamation of the missing links which are supposed to fill up the gaps, the idea of continuous evolution of one species from the other will not be demonstrable with logical certainty. It will equally show continuity of discontinuities. Beyond that as to the genetic origin of a particular species, whether biological or social, this will not enlighten us any more than we are used to now.

It seems that (1) Comparative studies of the forms and (2) morphological analysis are the only scientifically relevant approaches which

seem to be philosophically valid and put a check on uncautioned hypostatization.

Social order is unique determination in the world: it constitutes a specific category. But to conceive of it as a formation from a certain point of evolution continuously developing into levels after levels in linearity is not a correct judgement. On the other hand, it means a direct fall in the clutches of the dogmatic evolutionism of the nineteenth century. Morphological conception demands that different societies must be conceived of as novel determinations open in the very possibility of the emergence of the Social Category of Being.

Developing into alternate forms, societal systems are mutually differentiated in respect of their unique and unprecedented patternings. They exist and are contemporaneous. Contemporaneity does not mean, however, that they occupy the same geo-physical moment of time on the globe. Toynbee makes a dubious case for contemporaneity by placing it on the fact that all civilizations have sprung up during the last six-thousand years which is so small a span in relation to the natural history of the earth stretching to billions of years that it is almost equal to a pin-point or the 'one single day'. Contemporaneity has deeper meanings; it indicates that the existence of the serial moments in succession on the Geophysical temporal system is accidental to societies and must be abstracted away. Then, they are contemporaneous in real sense of the word; and even though they have appeared one after another in the Chronicles of mechanical time it does not change their essence for they are not in the logical relation of mutual succession. This analysis leads to a decisive refutation of the division of empirical contents between Anthropology and Sociology. Breakdown of the evolutionary linearity into comparative morphology of societies means repudiation of the so-called distinct fields of these sciences based on evolutionism.

VII

'Structural analysis' so characteristic of physics and chemistry not only begins to reshine in biology, but re-emerge in social studies. In the form of history-writing, it has been almost everytime present in dealing with human affairs; but as a philosophically justified mode of approach it has come with Dilthey, who felt Societal Pluralism apparently indifferent to the propagation of evolutionism. He tried to outline a typology of society, with the obvious intention to use the

'basic type' of a society as the law of patterning unique to that society. Typological schemes of different societies like that of Dilthey's *Lebens systeme*, Nohl's *Stil*, 'Euclidean Man', Danilevsky's 'Solitary types' and 'Transmittable Types', Spengler's 'Appollinian Man', 'Faustian Man' and 'Magian Soul', Sorokin's prototypes of 'Idealional' 'Idealistic' and 'Sensate' Societies all are efforts towards a-historical broader formulations of 'Social Species'.

These approaches integrate typical ethnographical methodology—in the form of historiography of peoples—with the general sociological approach of theoretical treatment. Every unit of study is an irreducible sein like larva in biology; its morphological changes are studied; some larvae are three-stage, others are five-stage and still others are seven-stage developments. All these developing larvae exist in a-historicity in relation to each other, exhibiting their own prototypes.

Use of singular propositions in the broader compass of General propositions cuts across the division of 'theoretical science' and 'field-work studies' and makes constant reference to the unit of studies. Not the individual persons, nor even human relations, but the whole society as a 'Type' has to be kept in the focus of investigation. This type of approach is essentially a revolution of the type of comparative morphology in biology after the atmospheric blight of evolutionism in theoretical sciences about man.

Boas, Malinowsky and their colleagues performed tasks similar to that of the philosopher-historians as they studied whole societies in their ethnographical works. The unit of study was the whole 'social structure'; all data were collected to fit in the Totality of social organization; the concept of linearity was discarded to study every prototype of society in its givenness and for its own sake.

Now the real situation was: those who professed themselves as anthropologists were different from the sociologists only so far as they were primarily concerned with specific phenomena; their method was 'case-study', in the formulation they indispensably included the singular propositions; while the sociologists were not bound to this approach; specific phenomena they cited only for instantiation and nothing else. Anthropologist's primary frame-of-reference was social whole, but sociologist's primary reference was the forms of 'Sociation'.

It was Malinowski, who introduced the term of 'functional whole' in the ethnological works and since then social structure has become

the central frame of reference with British Anthropologists. Brown, Lloyd Warner, Evans-Pritchard, Fortes and many others have extensively utilized the concepts pertaining to sociological inquiry in their intensive studies of single societies, and this variety of science is called by them 'Social Anthropology'. The idea of 'social wholeness' has been the leading heuristic concept with them. But it does not give a distinctive characteristic to anthropological approach; for a social structure is exhaustively reducible to social relations also; if not to primary, to secondary relations. Consequently, the construct of social whole or social structure is not a distinguishable category in its own right, and as such there is no scope for the development of a new science within its formulations. Sociology and sociology alone is capable of grappling with the complexity of its existence. Moreover, all the particular social processes and interpersonal relations are to be constructed out of the theoretical propositions of sociology. Therefore an ethnographer recording social structure can be none other than a sociological field-worker.

VIII

The problem of search for a distinguishable objective content to justify its autonomous survival encounters anthropology almost every time. Direct initiation of field-studies, introduction of projective techniques, group surveys, and case study methods have been taken over by the Sociologists and thus has come to an end the only mark of distinction that could be had by the ethnologist.

But, in the United States, however, anthropology does not admit an open merger with sociology. The original archaeological restraint to study such transmittable systems as arts and state of knowledge, technology and styles of arrangement has always been there in the American development of the Science. It has always developed there in close contacts with archaeology, and more or less has been a part of historiography. Evolutionism was violently disrupted by the philosophy of functional wholes of Malinowski and Brown to introduce a-historical time-less character in the structural analysis of the British Social Anthropology, but, in the U.S.A. overthrow of linear evolution meant a more faithful archaeological and ethnographical research. "In short", explains Boas, "the method we try to develop is based on a study of the dynamic changes in society that may be observed at the present time."⁹ Boas stated theoretical principle of the cultural an-

⁹. Race, Language and Culture: pp. 285.

thropology in the following words: "If we try to understand what the people are at the present time, we have to inquire into their descent. We must consider the climatic and geographic changes that have occurred. All these have no relations to the laws that may govern the inner life of society. They are accidents. Culture can be understood only as an historical growth. It is determined to a great extent by outer occurrences, that do not originate in the inner life of the people"¹⁰.

There are two important factors to be reckoned in the whole United States tradition of anthropological studies: (1) The internalization of the archaeological deterrant as a regulative principle; (2) understanding Society and its present functioning by referring it back to the past. The present is conceived of as a natural growth in the course of time, and therefore a naturalistic and causal explanation of the 'present' is an inevitable requirement of the methodological technique of anthropology. Lowie and White stress on the uniqueness of the historical occurrence and Boas was typically anti-theoretical although was never against generalizations based on the comparative studies of different people.

Historical reconstruction in the light of the regulative principle of archaeological restraint necessitates selection of data that are persistent and repetitive. Uniqueness of historical episodes integrated with the emphasis on permanent and recurrent events yields the notion of the *patterns* of society. The American anthropologists are not interested in events but in the patterns of events. The idea of culture comprises of the repeating patterns of events in the history of a people. But, the entire phenomenon of recurrence and continuity of patterns and the occurrence of unique events has been seen by and now in the light of natural growth as an outcome of historical series. This view implies that culture and society are somewhat identical and should be explained by the same set of causal line.

The causal explanation takes the route of historicography (Lowie and Boas) or directly grounds itself in the bio-psychic structure of human organism (Malinowski and Brown). The approach is one or the other, it makes no difference, for in every case it is basically *causal* and *naturalistic*. *American Cultural Anthropology* and *British Social Anthropology* have been thus naturalistic, and their naturalism stems from seeing the evolution of society and culture as from the basic human

¹⁰. *ibid*

propensities and the laws of mind—the flux of natural tendencies of human organism. Consequently, it is also of little difference whether the social institutions are studied in their structure or the institutionalized behaviour—the responses of persons as they are stratified is studied. Therefore, when the British Scholars like Firth remark that 'there is no essential difference between contemporary British Social Anthropology and the best American work'¹¹, they are quite correct. Firth says, "Society emphasizes the human component, the people, and the relations between them; culture emphasizes the component of accumulated resources, non-material which the people through social learning have acquired and use, modify and transmit"¹². This aspect of Social inheritance to be sure has never been absent from the works of the 'Social Anthropologists' as they have already grasped the accumulated resources of society under the concepts of 'repetitive behaviour', 'Social organization', etc.

IX

A real break occurs in the naturalistic tradition as with Kroeber, Cluckhohn and their followers, in whom American Anthropology plans to become real Culturalogy in intention. The break has been remarkably expressed in these words. "Behaviour is never Culture", says Cluckhohn, "rather, concrete behaviour or habits are part of the raw data from which we infer and abstract Culture"¹³.

At another place he writes, "the most specific quality of anthropological research arises from its preoccupation with Culture. This concept (in the technical anthropological sense) refers to those selective ways of feeling, and reacting that distinguish one group from another—ways that are socially transmitted and learned (with of course, some change through time) by each new generation. In the strict sense, we can speak of culture only when there are two or more objectively possible and functionally effective means or modes of meeting the same need (for example shelter, choice and preparation of food, weaning of children), and a given group exhibits a consistent and stylized preference for one path to the goal among a number of alternatives that are—from the observer's point of view—all open. A culture is not merely a congeries of customs. One cannot grasp the network of selective prin-

¹¹. David Bindey: "Theoretical Anthropology" pp. 100

¹². *Ibid.*

¹³. *American Journal of Sociology*, L 1 (1948) p. 336.

ciple unless one understands the core values, the cognitive assumptions and what the logician calls the 'primitive Categories' ¹⁴.

About the range of cultural data Kroeber says, "Sociology, economics, government and jurisprudence investigate social, economic political and legal functionings, particularly in our own or other advanced civilizations. Anthropology tries to formulate the interactions of these more special activities within the total culture of which they form a part, and equally, so, whether the culture be high or low, present or past¹⁵....."

Following theoretical points are thus clarified:

1. Culture does not refer to the bio-psyche bases of behaviour and their crystallization in habitual activities, but rather to a new order—the system of values.
2. All the contents of the world can be seen in the light of the cultural problem, from the stand-point of choice and alternate possibilities.

Every event, activity, habit or performance is accompanied by approval or disapproval. This phenomenon is unique, and presupposes an order that in some sense must be above natural order. Human organisms seem to possess a sensitivity which stimulate them to accord with the requirements of value in all the phases of their life. This requirement is a selected and controlled pattern of activity in face of a particular problematic situation.

Recurrence and repetition of pattern, persistence of particular organization, and abiding by some determinate rules of action define the culture of a people. It seems to be above nature in the sense that it does not form part of the natural growth, and natural causal explanation is out of place in dealing with its manifestation.

But, Bidney calls it a culturalistic fallacy, and denounces it as super-organic theory meaning thereby a theory of culture which does not admit the reduction of Culture to the structural givenness of the bio-

¹⁴. 'Common Humanity and Diverse Cultures' in the "Meaning of the Social Sciences" edited by Daniel Lerner, p.247.

¹⁵. Introduction to 'Anthropology Today' An Encyclopedia prepared under the Chairmanship of A.L. Kroeber; p.2.

psychic organism, and does not seek its origin in its propensities. "Ultimately Culture is not intelligible by itself, for the simple reason that culture is a correlative phenomenon, always involving some reference to nature, including man and his geographical environment. One may distinguish at least four variables in the cultural process, namely, human nature, society, geography, and social experience. Any cultural explanation is an attempt to indicate the limiting conditions of a given cultural phenomenon or pattern by reference to the interrelations of these factors¹⁶". Although Bidney tries to mark out a distinction between deduction and explanation, yet it cannot save 'cultural phenomena' from reduction to 'naturalistic' standpoint, which again transforms Anthropology into a naturalistic synthetic Science.

Bidney says that his position has influenced Kroeber and has led to the modifications of his view. This claim is abundantly confirmed in the 'Introduction', Kroeber has written to the Encyclopedic Inventory, 'Anthropology today': "It is evident that anthropology—however specific it may often be in dealing with data—aims at being ultimately a co-ordinating science, somewhat as a legitimate holding corporation co-ordinates constituent companies". This was the dream of Comte, Spencer and Ward about Sociology; and now it is that of Kroeber. The latter undoubtedly assigns to the notion of *Culture* the role of the ultimate synthetic principle as he says "there is one principle that anthropology already has in hand to serve towards a larger synthesis of understanding: the concept of culture." But, like Bidney, White, Lowie, and the Social Anthropologist, he reduces it to the naturalistic perspective of happenings: "This is the idea of culture—of human civilizations, whether rudimentary or advanced—as something entirely a part of nature, wholly an evolutionary development within nature, and therefore to be investigated by the methods of fundamental natural science, but an unprecedented, and richly ramifying development of nature"¹⁷.

This position is quite hazardous. The content of anthropology is a complex event composed of the fundamental data investigated by different sciences, by virtue of which again it becomes a mere natural synthesis.

¹⁶ "Theoretical Anthropology": 'Society and Culture': pp. 85-124.

¹⁷. Ibid p. 112.

X

Uniqueness and logical Autonomy of anthropology as the study of culture solely depends on the logical fact whether the cultural system is unique and irreducible or not. If it is reducible to the Nature, there remains no business for anthropology; it becomes a leisure time hobby to construct a synthesis like that of Scientific cosmology on the basis of informations yielded by other sciences. If this status is what it yearns for, it has no place among the basic natural sciences, hence cannot use the methods of those science.

This struggle for a subject matter has not come to an end. It is open. But, one thing is clear; existence of anthropology is compromised with the essence of Culture, which constitutes its objective foundation.

XI

Although, Anthropology internalizes the category of Culture as the objective field of its activity, yet the unfortunate failure to observe the distinction between Nature and Culture epitomises the massive confusion which shakes this discipline to its very foundation.

Taylor grouped together "knowledge, belief, art, law, moral customs and all other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" in the idea of Culture, and Malinowski also emphasized that it 'comprises inherited artifacts, goods, technical processes, ideas, habits and values'. These words are suggestive: they refer to the 'wholeness' and 'totality' that belongs to this phenomenon and also to its generality. Culture is not a random mass inheritance but a compact entity. It is related in some intrinsic manner to the variety of its contents as unity in multiplicity.

Malinowski used it as the central ordering principle in the mushroom of his ethnographical data. His observational procedure was regulated by the study of facts in the background of the *whole* Culture. It was his main thesis that every aspect of activity, every complex of traits can be intelligently grasped only in relation to its function in the totality of culture, wherefrom is obtained its significance and rationality. But, there is no distinction between 'cultural structure' and 'Social structure' in Malinowski's model of explanation. They are one, and denote, in their unity, an orderly growth of responses that satisfy biological urges of the human organism. Accordingly, Society is pro-

duct of bio-psychic structure; and culture is structural configuration of society, a web of persistent, inherited action patterns.

Identification of Society and Culture is conspicuous with Sorokin also, who conceals the vagueness of differentiation between society and culture by putting into use a compound term "Socio-Cultural" to denote concretely found human societies and their ways of existence. "The totality of the immaterial meanings-values-norms, not objectified as yet through the material vehicles but known to humanity; the totality of already objectified meanings-values-norms with all their vehicles; finally, the totality of mindful individuals and groups—past and present; these inseparable totalities," remarks Sorokin, "make up the total Social Cultural world, superimposed on mankind's physical and biological worlds¹⁸". Since the 'Social and Cultural' seem to denote the same objects, their alternate use is made feasible by the Compound term. Anthropologists like Malinowski and Clifford-Brown by using 'Social structure' and 'Culture' as integrative models have also employed them as denotatively equivalents. It is, in my opinion, a scientifically permissible procedure in an area of study, where the connotative contradistinctions have not been yet fully grasped. Sorokin brings to focus the quality of the 'Cultural' as follows: "In contradistinction to the inorganic phenomena that have only one physico-chemical component, and to organic phenomena that have two components—physical and vital (life)—the Cultural or super-organic phenomena have the 'immaterial' component of meaning (or meaningful value or norm) super-imposed upon the physical and/or vital components. Its presence radically changes the very nature of the inorganic or organic phenomena upon which it is super-imposed.¹⁹" This definition though points out the perspective in which the cultural realities may be found, yet it dangerously edges towards the unhappy identification of the Cultural with the Social. Sorokin, explicitly recognises only two levels of infra-cultural order of existence (i) inorganic phenomena and (2) organic phenomena—physical and vital, and therefrom directly goes to the Cultural phenomena itself as a 'meaningful' paraphernalia raised upon them. This means that social relations are outrightly cultural in their connotation. It means not less than a logical failure to distinguish between the *Social* and *Cultural*, reinforced by indiscriminate use of the term 'cultural data' for 'social' and other 'human' data.

Znaniecka is also not different. He employs only two broader categories: (1) *natural* system and (2) *Cultural* system; 'humanistic co-

¹⁸. Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis: P

¹⁹. Ibid: P

efficient' functioning as the criterion of discrimination between them. "The difference concerns the part which human experience and activity", says Znaniecke 'play in the real world...Natural systems are objectively given to the scientist as if they existed absolutely independent of the experience and activity of men...very different appear such indubitably cultural systems as those dealt with by students of language, literature, art, religion, science, economics, industrial technique and social organization. Generally speaking, every cultural system is found by the investigator to exist for certain conscious and active historical subjects, i.e. within the sphere of experience and activity of some particular people, individuals and collectivities, living in a certain part of the human world during a certain historical period'²⁰. Connotative identification between cultural data and any data given in the human world is thus made complete. Child-mother, leader-follower, and other inter-human relations whether one calls them Social or Cultural, it causes no difference in their shades of meaning, according to these thinkers. This mutual substitution of the *Cultural* and the *Social* as a linguistic device, would have been accepted but for the storm of confusion in its vagaries, between 'fact' and 'value'. "All actions writing a letter,... a house, building a railroad, fighting a war, are dynamic systems of values organized by an activity... the whole existence of a cultural System as a system of values is essentially founded on those series of actions by means of which the system is being actively constructed"²¹. These Considerations presuppose a distinction between 'fact' and 'value'.

When it is said that human personalities "exist as value, which active subjects experience and modify" and that "a group is composed fundamentally of individual members, each of whom is a social value for all the rest, the object of the collective assistance and control of the group as a whole and all of whom co-operate in supporting the group as their common value", I feel that the problem of fact is confounded with the problem of value. *The idea of identity between a human content and a value intention confuses the whole range of factual dimension with that of the normative. This is why there is vagueness of distinction between the Cultural and the Social phenomena, we confront right from Weber to Sorokin and Znaniecke.*

XI

It is quite evident that every normative judgement presupposes an existential proposition: "X has value" involves the givenness of 'X';

²⁰. *Methods of Sociology*: P 34 f

even in the most distorted form 'X is value'. Consequently, a question in its own right about the composition, essence, and structure of 'X' is justifiable. Apart from its status as subject of a normative judgement it is what it is. *Logical priority of existential nature of a thing over its normative determination clearly demonstrates that there is a distinctive problem about the structure of things and that of the structure of the systems produced as they were, when they are in interactions.* Consequently, primary and secondary relations, social distance, hierarchy in a collective, isolation, co-operation, individualization, introversion, division of labour, compulsion, mass, group, crowd etc. are entities in their own right prior to the judgements of their value that apply to them. If society is a "meaning-Component" super-imposed on the homo-sapiens, even then it does not outrightly entail the 'non-material norm-value' component. The latter is another superimposition, and in the idea of culture, reference is made to this component rather than to the social component. A concrete human association or group is, undoubtedly, a socio-cultural phenomenon: yet the primary distinction between the social as implying existential reference, and cultural as entailing normative reference is not obliterated. It may be approached from *factual standpoint as a sociological object*, and may also be approached *from normative point of view as a cultural object*. The directions of investigations are different.

Culture is a superimposition of value dimension on the process of becoming. It introduces a new order of meaning in the world of facts. *There are always two magnitudes of entities (1) in relation to becoming and (2) in relation to value.* Even the world of external nature is not worth-free in the context of Culture in which the physical objects are reproduced as parts of the spiritual world. The spiritual and human world, a value world in the order of Culture, is, on the contrary, empty of values, when apprehended in the context of becoming: *Love, hate, war, and accord all are value-less affairs in their pure existential causal nexus. Only when they are reproduced in the order of values they occupy a position in the configuration of Culture.*

Karl Mannheim's exposition of different modes of givenness²¹ with their respective cores of meaning is worth-mentioning here: "If we look at a natural object, we shall see at the first glance that which characterizes it.....it is taken as nothing but itself and is fully cognisable without being transcended..... *Cultural product* on the other hand, will

²¹. Objective, expressive, intentional, and documentary. *Essay on the Sociology of Knowledge* : Chapter 11 on the interpretation of *weltanschauung*

not be understood in its proper and true meaning if we attend merely to that stratum of meaning which it conveys when we look at it as it is 'itself'—its objective meaning; we have also to take it as having an expressive and documentary meanings are strata laid down upon the stratum of objective meaning." Now, every cultural product or manifestation was such an objective meaning. "In science this objective meaning is a theoretical proposition, and in our sociological example, it has at least a considerable theoretical component. In the Plastic arts.....the objective meaning is itself a purely visual content....." "Objective meaning, that is, meaning to be grasped by objective interpretation, is rooted in the structural laws of the object itself; certain elements and phases of sensible reality here become necessary stage in the progressive realization of meaning²²". "On this objective structure (meaning) of an event, that is, on its pure 'naturalness' is raised the second and third layers of meaning that articulates it into a cultural object." "Now, however, it must be added that expressive meaning too is always embedded in this stratum of objective meaning—a form within form as it were."²³ Mannheim very tersely itemizes here the a priori givenness of the 'factuality', 'objectivity' and its structural law before it is posited in the higher order of cultural consideration. 'Assistance' and devotion, sacrifice and friendship are all objective configurations of Social events emerging out of the dynamics of the real at the human stage of existence. They require objective vision, and epistemic hold of their constitutive laws i.e. the principles of their becoming should be grasped as we do grasp for example, the colourless nature, its thermal systems and gravitational fields. Cultural contextualization existing in its own right develops upon this stratum of grasp and when the natural things pass through it, they are transformed into contents of cultural experience.

XII

To an experiencing subject, Cultural Phenomena looks like an external cobweb of arrangements for the contents of Social interaction. It seems to be a gigantic scaffolding which enfolds and sustains the massive structure of the social system.

If you perceive social life, as a stream of events, a flow of inter-personal acts, then Culture as a whole would appear to you as a chain of highways, which regulates the traffic between individuals in the social space. The stream of life must pass through it. The 'must' is an

²². *Ibid*—50.

²³. *Ibid*—52.

imperative, which is attached with every valve and turn of the Cultural system. It must devour the Spontaneity of human spirit, harness the savagery latent in every individual, and civilize his behaviour.

Seen in relative isolation, empty of the contents of inter-personal life, it is but an ethereal being, a mere skeleton, an abstract outline, a thin sketch. But out of necessity, it seems, that social process has to follow it; human behaviour receives the shape it gives, and collective expressions exhibit the patterns, it imposes on them.

This phenomenon is amenable to only one logic; the logic of the forms and their reflections, Plato handed down to the posterities.

The Platonists were certainly wrong for their attempt to understand the logic of becoming with the tools of the Platonic System of concepts. The Hegelians and the life-philosophers rightly condemn them. But *an outright dismissal of Platonism is also patently wrong. In one realm of meanings, i.e. in the domain of culture at least, the Platonic Philosophy acquires relevance and due application.*

Perception of the world as a phenomenon of reflections of the eternal verities is a value-perception, a recognition of the world as a cultural phenomenon, in which the immutable forms shine here and shine there.

The events are discrete; they are waves of the universal flux. As the forms are impressed upon them or as they display the form-Qualities in their composition, they do not remain mere juxtaposition of forces, congeries of energies, and vectors of the field dynamics. They become 'signs', 'mirrors', 'media' and 'carriers' of meanings, eternal meanings, aesthetic, moral, utilitarian etc. Plato's problem is not the horse 'become' in the laws of genetics, but the 'model Horse', the horse which determines the value of every existing horse in the scale of perfection and imperfection. Therefore, Plato needs not return to observation to get information about the contents, physiology and growth of the horses. When he perceives a particular horse, it is merely to notice the documentation it has received of the 'Model Horse'. Plato, however, was wrong to conceive it of as the only end of knowledge. *Cognitive intent has several ends; Platonism is a response to only one end of the cognitive inquiry. It is interested in the 'documentation', anything possesses as it comes to existence. The 'particulars', besides being existing, have a role in the universe; they are bearers of forms, carriers of meaning,*

media of norms; they are the stuff, through which some 'eternal things' are expressed and signified. It is to this aspect of the Realm of Existence that Platonic Logic is addressed. Accordingly, the particulars, the material things, the facts of the world are phenomena of Significations. They are significant. What they signify, in Platonic terminology, are Universals. The world, we encounter in experience, according to this mode of consciousness, is a documentation of the eternal and unchanging world of the Universals.

Universals, themselves, are 'determinate' modes of expressions of the Archeform—the form of the "Good", the light of all the Lights.²⁴ The world of forms is a reflecting system of the Supreme Universal in profused diversity and formulates multiplicity of expressions converging in the unity of *the expressed*. This is a spectacular model, a perfect built, and a complete scheme of that order of universe which operates on the *sign-significatum logic*.

The *sign-significatum context of experience does not pierce, indeed, through the crust of facts and does not penetrate into their compositive factors; it simply touches them and marks its seal upon their tissues, adds a new dimension to them, crowns them with a new meaning, classifies them according to the rules of signification and puts them to the place to which they are fit in accordance with their sign-function in relation to the significata.* This scheme does not possess a logic of factual investigation; *the universals do not belong to becoming, and it is useless therefore to find their place in the sphere of becoming.* I conclude, therefore, that the whole tradition of British Empiricism and the Neo-positivistic movements, all engaged in the problem of becoming, are not correct in their denunciation of Platonism for reification. In their denunciation, they are supported by the life-philosophers blaming Platonism for escapism. It could not however dawn upon them that the direction of their problems is different from that of Plato; They are concerned with facts and their composition; Platonism with fact and their significance. *Rehabilitation of Platonism as scheme of this different order of reality at once convinces us of the Realism of 'Forms. Universals are real; they belong to a context not subject to the surges and rules of becoming. They are incessantly beaming forth and are reflected in those facts, capable of receiving them.* They preserve their ineffable identity in their reflections, by virtue of which the facts that mirror them gain degrees

²⁴. Most mature expression of Platonism, with its rigorous apparatus of schematization is delivered in Hakim Ishraque Shahbudin, Surharwardi's Hikmat-e-Ishraque. 'Light of the Light' is the key concept of the "Ishraque Philosophies".

of similarity, and form a community of reflection, expression or radiation.

Now, to understand the structure of the world of Universals, let us envision that the 'Arche Form' stands in the relation of reflection to the lower 'forms', which reciprocate it, by the relation of mirroring. 'Archeform' has one to one correspondence with its reflections that is, with the lower forms, which in their own way display different modes of its expression. These modes are but copies of the *First Form*—the *Model of the models*. *Every lower stratum is a limitation; it is a restricted copy of the Ultimate Form, a determinate expression: All the lower strata of forms are different limits but referring to the same Primeval Form, the Original Norm, the Ground Universal. The lowest stratum of the forms is the same identity with the most narrow and definite limits; it is the world of ideas; and it is this layer of 'expressiveness' which is adequately detailed to encompass even the minutest data-configuration of the incessantly variegated world of becoming. Receiving the formal application, the world of becoming is revolutionized, it becomes significant; in 'idealization', it signifies the eternal 'ideas'. The ideas are ever repeating, recurring reflections of the higher forms in the world of facts which continuously mirrors them and is made intelligible as an inexhaustible fund of documentation of the 'Normal World'. Beneath its significant countenance, the world is an oceanic vibration of the structural dynamics, formative forces, synthetic processes changing compositions of events intelligible in the procedures of sciences, like physics and psychology, chemistry and sociology formulating each in its own field the laws of vectors and interactions.*

Thus, the rich world of ours is member of two different contexts, with two different problems and necessitating two different modes of characterization: (1) The logic of facts and (2) the logic of significance.

XII

Central complex of Platonic Realism is embodied in the notion of 'Pattern': it represents the 'universal' everything has to imitate; the general 'Form' every figure has to assume, premier 'Shape' from which none is spared.

The Arche Form, copied in every form, by its impression and seal on the flux of reality raises everything from bare existence to *meaningful* existence and is called pattern of the things. *The Archeform is a self-*

contained Meaning. It exists in itself and bestows meanings on anything which signifies it. It is not a tool to some end, because it exists for itself; nor is it an end to some means, for it exists by itself; nor does it need a justification as it constitutes its own justification and for all sign-systems it is the 'law of sufficient reason'. Acts, affairs, conditions and contents by following it as a model, by reminding of its image in their realization and by possessing one to one correspondence with its sein become meaningful, rational and significant. Urge for the ideal, unfolded in the self-consciousness of the self, is an ever renewed struggle for imitation of the 'Archeform'. This cultivation of the Supreme form, Meaning of the meanings, reason of all rationality is what is meant by the life of Culture.

Culture is the whole of life, but it lies in the *Pattern* that pervades everything of the human world. Functioning as the universal predication of all things of the human environment, it refers to their original meaning and ultimate justification. Historians and philosophers of Culture observe that "there is a law or the uniformity which operates everywhere that human culture is given."²⁵ The criterion of the cultural data is posited in the Principle of Uniformity in the multiplicity of facts. This uniformity inducted out represents their high Pattern of existence, you may say, it is their habit that, "the term habit", says Spengler, "is used of a plant to signify the special way proper to itself in which it manifests itself, i.e. the character, course and duration of its appearance in the light world where we can see it. By its habit each kind is distinguished in respect of each part and each phase of its existence from all example of its species. We may apply this useful notion of habit in our physiognomic of the grand organisms²⁶ and speak of the habit of the Indian, Egyptian and classical culture, history or spirituality. Some vague inkling of it has always for that matter underlain the notion of *style* and we shall not be forcing but merely clearing and deepening that word if we speak of the religious, intellectual, political or social style of a Culture²⁷". Apart from the Naturalism in the analogy between Culture and biological (natural event) growth that goes with Spengler, this point made by him leads to one of the most valuable clarifications, and points out that the inquiry into the Cultural phenomena is oriented towards the discovery of the 'form' or style and ways the things have in the flux of events. Kroeber speaks of the 'fundamental patterns charac-

²⁵. Paul Legitie quoted from P. Sorokin's 'Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis' pp. 15. A&C Black Ltd., Boston.

²⁶. i.e. Cultures.

²⁷ Decline of the West; Pp 104.

teristic²⁸ of a culture continuously preserved in the changing social system. Consequently, *the field of culture does not imply a reference to the contents of reality but to the forms of reality. In this search Platonism is already implied.* Hence the Superiority of the Spenglerian term 'style'. Charles G. Shaw comments "..... the Spenglerian idea of style is so unusual and so illuminating that it may receive the stress of another paragraph. 'Style' says Spengler 'is not what the shallow Semper, the worthy contemporary of Darwin and Materialism, supposed it to be, the product of material, technique and purpose. It is the very opposite of this, something inaccessible to art reason, a revelation of the meta-physical order, mysterious 'must' a destiny"²⁹. It is a destiny and a must, because in the unrepentive it is repetitive; in the perishable, it is abiding, in the new it is the old; in the unprecedented it is the precedence; in the unique emergence it is familiar profile; and in the novel accumulation, it is recurrent crystallization. Its incessant cultivation in the stream of becoming constitutes the permanent life of culture right now in the ephemeral context of Nature. *Corresponding to every natural event—and note that from physical to psychic, social and spiritual all events are natural—there is an immediately applicable particular 'pattern', but it signifies the Universal Pattern or General Style, and the term Culture denotes the entire class of these patterns. They are counterpart of the sensuous ideas of the Platonic system, most rudimentary and opaque Expressions of the Ultimate Form.* The natural processes by adopting them are formulated as the Cultural system.

XIII

World of nature in its immediate flow is a living process of passing forms. Little facts and their aggregates spring from its forward drive; many forms are made and undone in its thrust into the future. This is the natural origin of forms; *poor Semper, biologist Darwin and materialist Marx are not altogether wrong in their perception of the forms as outcome of natural forces governed by the laws of composition. But, these very 'forms' are sign-bearing. Consequently, the logic of analysis, the one that breaks every Gestalt to its causal components, is suspended. New logic comes into force, the logic of Culture.* This logic picks up similarities and fits them into similarities of higher levels till all events are fitted into the ultimate 'similarity'. *The same old inductive logic of Aristotle is the logic of Cultural consciousness not the modern logic of scientific*

²⁸. 'Configuration of Cultural Growth' 1944.

²⁹. Trends of Civilization and Culture; P 644-1932

*analysis*³⁰ which studies structures. From the particular, the Aristotlean logic moves to the general. It does not see the structure of things but the form (of the form) of things. Never made to grasp the constitution of events, it attends to their forms. The events signify the form, in the course of their becoming.

Two distinct laws: the laws of structure and the laws of culture define the bipolarization of the Universe. The 'World-forms' under the laws of structure are one set of entities and under the laws of Culture, another.

'Style' designates the ultimate 'similarity' which operates universally in the whole course of the events. Consequently, it is Central Category of Organization under the second set of laws.

'Principle of Uniformity', cornerstone of the inductive logic, has nothing to do with the constitution of events. It cannot grasp the structural processes in their becoming. It is a Cultural principle: and criterion of selection of the Cultural data.

The Logic of analysis, of experimentation is the technique of structural analysis. It is this logic, we use in Science, whose main object is not to discover uniformities, but to discover the inner composition of the events, entities, and things of the world. Its basic concepts are therefore 'energy', 'interaction', 'collision', equilibria and 'tension', etc.

The logic of ascription of a predicate to a subject, the movement of consciousness in Aristotlean Methodology as an activity posits a content into a form. It is thus fundamentally an activity akin to Cultural Reason. The most ingenious plan of the nature of its formulation as it maybe called is propounded in the Critique of Pure Reason, which was claimed by its illustrious author to be a general philosophy of what we call science. This masterpiece, however, simply traces out the modes of Cultural thinking. It is this thinking or Process of intellection which in all essential is a synthesizing activity, and produces uniformity of the experience, which in its process is regenerated into the unity of an all-comprehensive formal system, and discloses, ultimately, one law, one order and one universal predication.

Many philosophers of culture are prone to denote this *Universal* by the word 'Idea'. This word, however, cannot be taken in its subjective meanings i.e., equivalent to borne in mind or held in mind. It is unconditionally an objective presentation before consciousness; and every cultural product is apprehended through its mediation. Its immediate grasp in the entities given in the empirical field of consciousness may be known as Induction in the Aristotlean sense of the term; and

³⁰. Used in Physics, Chemistry, Biology, etc.

its immediate application on the objectivity as formulation in the Kantian sense.

The formulated objective experience witnesses its being as such and constitutes its sign-system. Cultural system comprises of the sign-system that exhibits the 'Idea' not only in the totality but also in each of its partial presentation. *All the presentations before their formulation in sign-system are natural events; and with their formulation their naturalness is not divulged but subsumed in a new determination. Their structural laws are not modified but are conserved to bear the insignia.* Compositional determinations are integrated with the 'reflective' or formulational determinations. The basic distinction, we have maintained, between the laws of structure and the laws of Culture remains untampered with; and it is one of the most primitive distinction which should be consciously maintained by every investigator who takes upon himself to explore the field of culture.

XIV

Anthropology as the science of Culture operates in a unique order of existence which is sharply distinguished from Nature. It discovers cultural laws rather than natural laws. Its epistemological procedure is inductive, and ultimately it is a descriptive science. Sociology, on the other hand, is a Natural Science: its method is that of the natural science; it discovers the laws of composition. It studies the dynamics of Society in the pure category of transaction and field force, vectors and equilibria.

These two modes of inquiry: One Cultural and the Other Natural are integral elements of Social inquiry, founded on the philosophy of self.

The social experience by itself is unable to suggest the articulation it receives on the basis of the idea of Nature or that of Culture. Pure Form of Sociation, therefore, is free, in its own presentativeness, from being perceived as a Natural phenomenon or as a Cultural Reality. When the cognitive Intention gives a push to it on Natural mode of Reality, it becomes a Sociological Perception, but when the Intention moves it on the basis of the Cultural mode of Reality, it becomes an Anthropological Perception. Both of these Perceptions unfold different kinds of Logic, and therefore Sociological Experience is differentiated from the Cultural Experience.

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