IQBAL REVIEW

Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Pakistan

Vol. XIII April 1972 No. 1

CONTENTS

1. Iqbāl's Concept of the *Mard-i Mu'min* and Rūmī's Influence ... *Riffat Jehān Dāwar Burkī* 1

2. The Concept of the Magian Soul in Oswald Spengler ... *Kamāl Muḥammad Habīb* 18

3. A.J. Arberry, A great student of Iqbāl ... *S.A. Vāḥid* 37

4. The Philosophical Significance of al-Ghazzālī ... *R.E. Abū Shanab* 51

5. A Commonwealth of Muslim Nations ... *Nazīr Aḥmad Khān* 71

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Riffat Jehan Dawar Burkī	*Dy. Director, Bureau of National Research & Reference, Rawalpindi.*
Kamāl Muḥammad Habīb	*Director, Scientific Information, Atomic Energy Commission, Karachi.*
Syed 'Abdul Vāḥid	*Vice-President, Iqbal Academy, Karachi.*
Dr. Robert Elias Abū Shanab	*Philosophy Department, Florida University, New York.*
Nazīr Aḥmad Khān	*Ex-Attorney-General, Government of Pakistan.*

IQBĀL'S CONCEPT OF THE MARD-I MU'MIN AND RŪMĪ'S INFLUENCE

— *Riffat Jehan Dawar Burki*

Man is the pivot around which Iqbāl's philosophy revolves; but, though for him the Self is the fundamental reality of the world, "his revaluation of Man is not that of Man qua Man, but of Man in relation to God".[1] Iqbāl's Perfect Man or *Mard-i Mu'min* like Rūmī's "*Mard-i Ḥāqq*", though the ruler of the world, is first and last the Servant of God. It is important to stress this point in order to differentiate between Iqbāl's Perfect Man and figures such as the Nietzschean Superman, the symbol of unlimited power in a world without God.

Iqbāl considers the Self to be the criterion whereby all things are measured. "The idea of personality", he says, "gives us a standard of value: it settles the question of good and evil. That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad. Art, religion, and ethics must be judged from the standpoint of personality."[2]

According to Iqbāl, the ego "has the quality of growth as well as the quality of corruption."[3] It can expand to absorb the elements of the Universe and the attributes of God.[4] On the other hand, it can also degenerate to the level of matter.[5] Iqbāl looks upon personality as a state of tension which can "continue only if that state of tension is maintained; if the state of tension is not

---

[1] Annemarie Schimmel, *Gabriel's Wing* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963), p. 382.

[2] Quoted by R.A. Nicholson in his Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self* [trans. of Iqbāl's *Asrār-i Khudī*] (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1950), pp. xxi-xxii.

[3] S.A. Vāḥid [Wāḥid] (ed.), *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl* (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1964), p. 239.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] S.M. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām* (Reprint; Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1963), p. 12.

maintained, relaxation will ensue. That which tends to maintain the state of tension tends to make us immortal."[1] For Iqbāl it is of the utmost importance that this state of tension be maintained, for it is only by the preservation and completion of the personality that we can achieve "that awareness of reality which Iqbāl believed to be man's ultimate goal on earth, that awareness which Eliot has called the still point of the turning world."[2] The chief of the factors which strengthen the personality are:

Desire

Throughout Iqbāl's writings, great stress is placed on desire (designated by names such as *sūz, ḥasrat, justujū, ārzū, ishtiyāq* and *tamannā*) as the spring from which the Self draws sustenance. Life can be viewed as dynamic only when it is imbued with restless burning. All that has been achieved is a product of desire:

'Tis desire that enriches life,
And the mind is a child of its womb.
What are the social organizations, customs, laws?
What is the secret of the novelties of science?
A desire which realised itself by its own strength
And burst forth from the heart and took shape.[3]

Man is man, according to Iqbāl, because he has the capacity for endless yearning. In his eyes, this capacity lifts man to a station where he would not change his place even with God:

Priceless treasure is the agony and burning of desire,
I would not exchange my place as a man for the glory of God.[4]

---

[1] Iqbāl, *Asrār*, trans. Nicholson, *Secrets*, pp. 25-26.

[2] E. McCarthy, "Iqbāl as a Poet and Philosopher", *Iqbāl Review*, II (April 1961), 20.

[3] Iqbāl, *Asrār*, trans. Nicholson, *Secrets*, pp. 25-26.

[4] Iqbāl, *Bāl-i Jibrīl* (4th edition; Lahore: Sh. Ghulām 'Alī & Sons, 1964), p. 21.

Love

Love is the active sense of positive desire.[1] Iqbāl "lays great emphasis on the value of love for strengthening the Self."[2] He uses the word in a very wide sense, and means by it "the desire to assimilate, to absorb. Its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and the endeavour to realise them."[3] As Peter Avery points out, Iqbāl's philosophy is essentially a philosophy of Love.[4] Like Rūmī he preached a philosophy of dynamic love leading to the fulfilment of human destiny as well as God's purpose in creation.[5]

For Iqbāl, as for Tillich, "Life is being in actuality and love is the moving prayer of life. In man's experience of love the nature of love becomes manifest. The power of love is not something which is added to an otherwise finished process, but life has love in itself as one of its constitutive elements."[6]

Love is the fundamental urge of Being, its *élan vital* and its raison d'étre.[7] For Iqbāl, as for Rūmī, only love is an intrinsic value. Other values are extrinsic and instrumental and are to be judged according to their capacity for the realization of this primary value. Love is the only categorical imperative and strikes no bargain with God or man.[8] He who denies love is an infidel:

> I have never discovered well
> Law's way, and the wont thereof,
> But know him an infidel
> Who denieth the power of Love.[9]

---

[1] I. Singh, *The Ardent Pilgrim* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1951), p. 10.

[2] E.G. Browne, Review of R.A. Nicholson's [trans.] *The Secrets of the Self*, *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1921), p. 143.

[3] Quoted by Nicholson in the Introduction to *Secrets*, p. xxv.

[4] P. Avery, "Iqbāl and the Message of Persian Metaphysics", talk given on Iqbāl Day functions in London, April 1960.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] P. Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 25-26.

[7] K.A. Ḥakīm, "The Concept of Love in Rūmī and Iqbāl", *The Islāmic Culture*, XIV (1940), p. 268.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 269.

[9] Iqbāl, *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, trans. A.J. Arberry, *Persian Psalms* (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1961), p. 103.

Faqr

The words *faqīr* (or its synonym *qalandar*) and *faqr* (or *istighnā'*) appear very frequently in Iqbāl's verse. Iqbāl uses *faqr* to denote an inner attitude of detachment and superiority to material possession. "It is a kind of intellectual and emotional asceticism which does not turn away from the world as a source of evil and corruption, but uses it for the pursuit of good and worthy ends."[1]

Ṣayādī

Literally, *ṣayādī* means hunting, and *ṣayād* is a hunter. In Iqbāl's thought *ṣayādī* comes to denote a kind of heroic idealism based on daring, pride and honour. The *ṣayād* is most often symbolised by the lion, and the falcon (*shāhīn*).

Suffering

Suffering is included in the concept of *faqr* and is associated with all the factors strengthening the Self, but it needs special emphasis. Since "all the results of individuality, of separate selfhood, necessarily involve pain or suffering,"[2] Iqbāl was right in observing that "suffering is a gift from the gods in order to make man see the whole of life."[3]

Rūmī often uses the symbols of rue and aloe-wood exhaling sweet perfumes when burnt.[4] Iqbāl too wishes to be "burnt" — to be tried by fire — so that his heart can be perfected:

> Tongue-tied thou art in pain:
> Cast thyself upon fire, like rue!
> Like the bell, break silence at last, and from every limb,
> Utter forth a lamentation!
> Thou art fire, fill the world with thy glow!
> Make others burn with thy burning![5]

---

[1] K.G. Sayyidayn, *Iqbāl's Educational Philosophy* (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1960), pp. 187-188.

[2] S. Bhikshu, quoted in *The Encyclopaedia of Religious Quotations*, p. 432.

[3] Jāvīd Iqbāl (ed.), *Stray Reflections* (Lahore: Sh. Ghulām 'Alī & Sons, 1961), p. 103.

[4] Schimmel, *Gabriel's Wing*, p. 142.

[5] Iqbāl, *Asrār*, trans. Nicholson, *Secrets*, p. 11.

Forbearance

"The principle of the ego-sustaining deed is respect for the ego in myself as well as in others",[1] said Iqbāl. He was a great believer in forbearance and tolerance. E.M. Forster points out about Iqbāl that "whatever his opinions, he was no fanatic, and he refers to Hindus and Christians with courtesy and respect."[2]

Courtesy

While stressing that one must always be hard with oneself, Iqbāl does not forget to say, not once but repeatedly, that a leader of men must be kind and courteous in speech and manner. The full-grown ego must possess *ḥusn-i akhlāq* (beauty of disposition). This makes Iqbāl's Perfect Man as worthy of affection as he is of obedience, his heart-winning ways supplementing his world-winning ways.

Obstructions

Like Rūmī, Iqbāl considers evil to be extremely important in the development of man's personality. "Evil is the inevitable condition of good; out of darkness was created light. From this standpoint it possesses a positive value: it serves the purpose of God, it is relatively good."[3] The spirit of obstruction, symbolised by Satan, directs man's energies to newer channels. It offers a challenge to his spirit and is one of the forces behind his evolution, leading him on from conquest to conquest.

Just as the Self is open to growth, so it is open to decay. Amongst the factors which weaken *khudī*, the following are the most important:

Sawāl

Literally *sawāl* means asking, but in Iqbāl's thought it has a wide connotation and refers to any action which degrades a

[1] W. Goethe quoted by B. Stevenson (ed.), *Stevenson's Book of Quotations* (5th edition; London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1946), p. 1885.

[2] E.M. Forster, *Two Cheers for Democracy* (London: Edvard Arnold, 1951), p. 296.

[3] L. Maitre, "Iqbāl, a Great Humanist", *Iqbāl Review*, 11 (April 1961), 28.

selfrespecting ego. One of the commonest forms of *sawāl* is *taqlīd* (imitation). Iqbāl's most powerful and most moving attack against all forms of 'asking' comes in the *Rumūz-i Bekhudī*[1] when he lashes out against his co-religionists who have lost all sense of their Selfhood, and have submerged all their pride and dignity in a life of superficiality and spiritual bankruptcy.

Despair, Grief and Fear

Iqbāl has devoted one whole section of the *Rumūz-i Bekhudī*[2] to the theme that despair, grief and fear are the sources of all evil and destroyers of life.

Servitude

Iqbāl was a passionate believer in freedom, which he considered to be "the very breath of vital living".[3] In the *"Bandegī Nāmah"* Iqbāl speaks in detail about the attitude and mentality of "slaves" — those who live in spiritual bondage. A "slave" pays real homage to man-made gods and mere lipservice to the Eternal God. For the sake of his body he sells his soul. With the sadness of the Biblical verse: "For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Iqbāl says:

> A slave holds both religion and knowledge in light esteem,
> He gives away his soul so that his body may live.
> Through the munificence of kings, his body thrives,
> While his pure soul grows feeble like a spindle.[4]

Nasab-parastī

Nasab-parastī means pride in one's lineage or caste. It is to be discouraged in all forms, as it is in opposition to one of the fundamentals of Islāmic policy — namely, the equality and brotherhood

---

[1] Iqbāl, *Rumūz-i Bekhudī* (Lahore: Sh. Ghulām 'Alī & Sons, 1961), pp. 186-187.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 108-111.

[3] Sayyidayn, *Iqbāl's Educational Philosophy*, p. 40.

[4] Iqbāl, *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (Lahore: Sh. Ghulām 'Alī & Sons, 1961), pp. 258-261.

of man. Iqbāl considers *nasab-parastī* to be one of the reasons for the downfall of the Muslims.

The Three Stages of the Self

According to Iqbāl, the development of the Self has three stages — Obedience, Self-control and Divine Vicegerency.[1]

Obedience

In the first stage "religious life appears as a form of discipline which the individual or a whole people must accept as an unconditional command without any rational understanding of the ultimate meaning and purpose of that command."[2] Iqbāl, like Nietzsche, likens the Self at this stage to a camel known for its "obedience, utility and hardihood."[3] Man must fulfil his obligations as patiently as does the camel:

> Thou, too, do not refuse the burden of Duty:
> So wilt thou enjoy the best dwelling-place, which is with God.[4]

Without obedience to the law there can be no liberty. He who would command the world must first learn to obey.

> Endeavour to obey, O heedless one!
> Liberty is the fruit of compulsion.
> By obedience the man of no worth is made worthy;
> By disobedience his fire is turned to ashes.
> Whoso would master the sun and stars,
> Let him make himself a prisoner of Law![5]

One must "not complain of the hardness of the Law"[6] but submit to it willingly, knowing that discipline makes the Self grow stronger.

---

[1] Iqbāl's letter to Nicholson quoted in the Introduction to the *Secrets*, pp. xxvi-xxvii.

[2] Iqbāl, *Reconstruction*, p. 181.

[3] S. Kashya, "Sir Moḥammad Iqbāl and Friedrich Nietzsche", *The Islāmic Quarterly*, 11 (April 1955), 181.

[4] Iqbāl, *Asrār*, trans. Nicholson, *Secrets*, p. 73.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

The air becomes fragrant when it is imprisoned in the flower-bud;
The perfume becomes musk when it is confined in the navel of the musk-deer.[1]

Self-Control

The second stage in the education of the Self is when it is able to command itself. "Perfect submission to discipline", says Iqbāl, "is followed by a rational understanding of the discipline and the ultimate source of its authority. In this period religious life seeks its foundation in a kind of metaphysics — a logically consistent view of the world with God as part of that view."[2]

Both fear and love are constituents of a man's being. By understanding the meaning of *tawḥīd* one can conquer fear.

So long as thou hold'st the staff of "There is no God but He",
Thou wilt break every spell of fear.[3]

Through Love of God, man is freed from all lesser loyalties and bonds:

He withdraws his eyes from all except God
And lays the knife to the throat of his son.[4]

Prayer is "the pearl" within "the shell" of faith. It is also that which protects him from all evil.

In the Moslem's hand prayer is like a dagger
Killing sin and forwardness and wrong.[5]

Fasting adds to the powers of endurance and gives moral strength.

Fasting makes an assault upon hunger and thirst
And breaches the citadel of sensuality.[6]

The pilgrimage to Mecca "teaches separation from one's home and destroys attachment to one's native land."

It is an act of devotion in which all feel themselves to be one,

---

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[2] Iqbāl, *Reconstruction*, p. 181.
[3] Iqbāl, *Asrār*, trans. Nicholson, *Secrets*, p. 76.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[6] *Ibid.*

It binds together the leaves of the book of religion.[1]
Almsgiving is helpful towards bringing about social equality.
It fortifies the heart with righteousness,
It increases wealth and diminishes fondness for wealth.[2]

Thus in the second stage of the ego's education or development man does not merely obey the Law, but also perceives intellectually that the Law "is a means of strengthening thee" so that "thou may stride the camel of thy body"[3] (i.e. overcome the weakness of the flesh). If one would conquer the world, one must first conquer oneself:

If you can master the self-conquering technique,
The whole world will be yours to take.[4]
Without self-control, no man can attain real sovereignty.
Sovereignty in the next world or in this world
Cannot be had save through perfect discipline of the mind and body.[5]

Vicegerency of God

The third stage in the development of the Self is *niyābat-i Ilāhi* (the vicegerency of God). Although man already possesses the germ of vicegerency (*Qur'ān* 2:28)[6], "not man as he is now, but man purified through obedience, self-dominion, and detachment, can reach the high station of... Divine Vicegerency."[7]

Iqbāl describes the Perfect Man in superlatives.

> He is the completest Ego, the goal of humanity, the acme of life, both in mind and body; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. This highest power is united in him with the highest knowledge. In his life,

---

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Iqbāl, *Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*, trans. Hādī Ḥusain, *The New Rose Garden of Mystery* (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1969), p. 4.

[5] Iqbāl, *Jāvīd Nāma* (8th edition; Lahore: Sh. Ghulām 'Alī & Sons, 1964), p. 239.

[6] Iqbāl's letter to Nicholson quoted in the Introduction to *Secrets*, p. xxvii.

[7] A. Bausani, "Iqbāl's Philosophy of Religion and the West", *Pakistan Quarterly*, II (1952), p. 54.

thought and action, instinct and reason, become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end. He is the real ruler of mankind; his kingdom is the kingdom of God on earth.[1]

Nature must undergo long and painful travails to bring to birth the Perfect Man:

For a thousand years the narcissus bewails its sightlessness.
After what anguish is one of vision born in the garden.[2]

Iqbāl points out that "the development of humanity both in mind and body" is a condition precedent to the birth of the Perfect Man, who, for the present, "is a mere ideal."[3] The signs, however, are hopeful, since "the evolution of humanity is tending towards the production of an ideal race of more or less unique individuals who will become his fitting parents."[4]

Iqbāl's poetry is full of the portraits of his *Mard-i Mu'min* who "wakes and sleeps for God alone"[5] and "executes the command of Allāh in the world."[6]

His desires are few, his ideals are lofty,
His ways are gracious, his gaze is pleasing.
He is soft in speech but ardent in his quest
In war as in peace he is pure of heart and mind.[7]

The Vicegerent is a creator and interpreter of values. He is "the goal of life's caravan",[8] the ruler of all things that God created.

Man is the deputy of God on earth,
And Over the elements his rule is fixed.[9]

For his coming, the poet longs fervently:

---

[1] Quoted by Nicholson in the Introduction to *Secrets*, pp. xxvii-zxviii.

[2] Iqbāl, *Bāng-i Darā* (8th edition; Lahore: Sh. Ghulām 'Alī & Sons, 1964), p. 300.

[3] Quoted by Nicholson in the Introduction to *Secrets*, p. xxviii.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Iqbāl, *Asrār*, trans. Nicholson, *Secrets*, p. 80.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Iqbāl, *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 132.

[8] Iqbāl, *Asrār*, trans. Nicholson, *Secrets*, p. 84.

[9] Iqbāl, *Rumūz-i Bekhudī*, trans. A. J. Arberry, *The Mysteries of Selflessness* (London: John Murray, 1953), p. 57.

Appear, O rider of Destiny!
Appear, O light of the dark realm of Change.[1]

Iqbāl's Perfect Man, then, though a co-worker with God, is not a breaker of Divine Law. He is the master of all created things, but a slave to God. In fact, the degree of his servitude to God is the measure of his perfection. Iqbāl's Perfect Man, says Professor Bausani, has something to teach us:

> First: that tolerance and all those so-called virtues of modern man are not in contradiction to the simple strong faith in the transcendental. 'Wherever you turn' — to use a Koranic sentence — 'There the countenance of God stands,' ... second: Man, who is merely an impotent being completed by Him who is 'nearer to him than his jugular vein', becomes omnipotent and creator of new spiritual worlds. Third: to achieve this, a preliminary act of submission is necessary: in Dante's philosophy it is repentance, in Iqbāl's declaration of slavery — but slavery of God and only of God, of that God whose glory permeates through all the Universe.[2]

Even a cursory glance at any part of Iqbāl's philosphy, in particular his conception of the *Mard-i-Mu'min*, would reveal Rūmī's profound influence. Rūmī was Iqbāl's acknowledged *murshid*. Professor Ḥakīm has observed, "If a free man like Iqbāl could be called the disciple of any man, it is only of Rūmī."[3] Rūmī is Iqbāl's intellectual progenitor, and it is only with reference to this great mystic-poet that Iqbāl admits with frank pride:

You too belong to the Caravan of Love —
That Caravan of Love whose chief is Rūmī.[4]

Iqbāl's view of evolution has been greatly influenced by Rūmī, whose ideas on the subject were a message of hope and joy and did not bring the gloom and despair which came in the wake of Darwin's theory.[5] For Rūmī the lowest form of life is matter, but matter is not dead or inert:

---

[1] Iqbāl, *Asrār*, trans. Nicholson, *Secrets*, p. 83.

[2] A. Bausani, "Dante and Iqbāl", *Crescent and Green* (1955), pp. 169-170.

[3] K.A. Ḥakīm, "Rūmī, Nietzsche and Iqbāl", in *Iqbāl as a Thinker* (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1944), p. 201.

[4] Iqbāl, *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 200.

[5] Iqbāl, *Reconstruction*, pp. 121-122.

Air and Earth and Fire are slaves,
For you and me they are dead, but not for God.[1]

According to Rūmī, the self originated in the form of matter consisting of dimly conscious monads. His theory is stated thus:

First man appeared in the class of inorganic things.
Next he passed therefrom into that of plants.
For years he lived on as one of the plants,
Remembering naught of his inorganic state so different;
And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state,
He had no remembrance of his state as a plant,
Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants,
Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers;
Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers,
Which knew not the cause of their inclination to the breast.
Again the great Creator, as you know,
Drew men out of the animal state into the human state.
Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,
Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now.
Of his first souls he has now no remembrance,
And he will be again, changed from his present soul.[2]

Iqbāl's concept of the evolution of man expressed in lines such as the following is strongly reminiscent of Rūmī's thought on the subject:

That which is conscious in man, sleeps a deep sleep
In trees, flowers, animals, stones and stars.[3]

and

With what great effort have I made
Rank by rank, part by part,
Inorganic into organic, organic into animal,
Animal into brute, brute into man.[4]

---

[1] Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, *Mathnawī-i Ma'nawī*, ed. B. Furuzanfar and M. Darvish (Tehrān, 1963), Book I, p. 53.

[2] *Ibid.*, Book IV, pp. 173-174, trans. Iqbāl, *Reconstruction*, pp. 121-122.

[3] Iqbāl, *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 143.

[4] Cited in L. Badvī, "A Forgotten Composition of Iqbāl", *Iqbāl Review* (January 1965), pp. 77-78.

For Iqbāl, as for Rūmī, God is the ultimate source and ground of evolution.[1] He does not regard matter as something dead because from the ultimate Ego only egos proceed.

From its ray nothing comes into being save egos,
From its sea, nothing appears save pearls.[2]

The ultimute Ego is immanent in matter and makes the emergent emerge out of it. There are various levels of being or grades of consciousness. The rising note of egohood culminates in man.[3]

Iqbāl shares Rūmī's belief that evolution is the outcome of an impulse of life manifesting itself in innumerable forms. The vital impulse determines the direction of evolution as well as evolution itself. Life is that which makes efforts, which pushes upwards and outwards and on. All the striving is due to the *élan vital* in us, "that vital urge which makes us grow, and transforms this wandering planet into a theatre of unending creation."[4]

Like Rūmī, Iqbāl looks upon evolution as something great and glorious, not as something signifying man's sinfulness and degradation. The fall is the beginning of self-consciousness — the stage from where the Man of God will begin his conscious search for perfection. Greeting Adam, the spirit of Earth says:

The light of the world-illuminating sun is in your spark,
A new world lives in your talents.
Unacceptable is Paradise which is given,
Your paradise lies hidden in your blood,
O form of clay see the reward of constant endeavour.[5]

One of the most notable characteristics of Rūmī's thought is his ardent belief in the efficacy of constant endeavour.[6] Iqbāl shares with Rūmī this special kind of mysticism — sometimes referred to as the mysticism of struggle — the kind of mysticism which streng-

---

[1] Jamīlah Khatūn, *The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl* (Karachi: Iqbāl Academy, Pakistan, 1963), p. 121.

[2] Trans. B.A. Dār, *Iqbāl's Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd* and *Bandagī Nāmah* (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1964), p. 36.

[3] Iqbāl, *Reconstruction*, pp. 71-72.

[4] W. Durant, *The Story of Philosophy* (Reprint; London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1948), pp. 345-346.

[5] Iqbāl, *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 179.

[6] S.A. Vāḥid [Wāḥid], *Studies in Iqbāl* (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1967), p. 102.

thens and fortifies, rather than awakens or puts to sleep, the potentialities of the Self. In his Introduction to the translation *The Secrets of the Self*, Professor Nicholson comments: "Much as he (Iqbāl) dislikes the type of Ṣūfīsm exhibited by Ḥāfiz, he pays homage to the pure and profound genius of Jalālu'ddīn, though he rejects the doctrine of self-abandonment taught by the great Persian mystic and does not accompany him on his pantheistic flights."[1] Although, as has been observed above, Iqbāl could not follow Rūmī into all the regions of mystic ecstasy, their mysticism — Rūmī's and Iqbāl's — has a lot in common. It was 'positive', it affirmed life and upheld passionately both the dignity and the divinity of man. This mysticism may perhaps be best described in terms of Love — a concept which forms the chief link between Iqbāl and Rūmī. For both Rūmī and Iqbāl the Perfect Man is an embodiment of Love, a paragon of *'ishq*. For both of them Love is assimilation and expansion. It is linked with the doctrine of hardness, and the sole mean of attaining "the Kingdom, the Power, and the Glory". It is this attribute which distinguishes more than anything else Iqbāl's Perfect Man from Nietzsche's Superman and places him in close proximity to Rūmī's *Mard-i Ḥaqq*.

Not only do Rūmī and Iqbāl regard man's advent on earth as happy event; they are also staunch believers in the personal creation of destiny or man's freedom of will. In numerous places Rūmī has reiterated the thought of the following lines:

> It is certain that we possess a certain power of choice,
> You cannot deny the manifest evidence of the inner sense.[2]

And Iqbāl's writings resound with the message of the immortal lines.

> Through action life is made heaven or hell,
> This man of clay, by origin is neither heavenly (light) nor hellish (fire).[3]

Both Rūmī and Iqbāl go beyond upholding the freedom of the will to a belief in *tawakkul* or trustful renunciation. *Tawakkul* is

---

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. xiv-xv.

[2] Rūmī, *Mathnawī-i Ma'nawī*, Book I.

[3] Iqbāl, *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 307.

not born out of an awareness of one's helplessness, but is the result of *Īmān*, the vital way of making the world our own.[1] *Īmān*, says Iqbāl, "is not merely a passive belief in one or more propositions of a certain kind, it is a living assurance begotten of a rare experience."[2] Only "strong personalities are capable of rising to this experience and the 'higher fatalism' implied in it."[3] This higher fatalism, described thus by Tennyson:

> Our wills are ours, we know not how,
> Our wills are ours to make them thine[4]

is described variously by Rūmī and Iqbāl. The former says:

> The word 'Determinism' causes Love to grow impatient,
> Only he who is not a lover regards 'Determinism' as a prison.[5]

And the latter writes:

> When he loses himself in the will of God
> The *Mu'min* becomes God's instrument of destiny.[6]

Both Rūmī and Iqbāl believe that the Perfect Man's life in God is not annihilation, but transformation. "The Ideal man freely merges his own will in the Will of God in the ultimate relation of Love."[7] It is more than likely that Iqbāl's ideas about the deep love between man and a personal God, which form one of the most profound and inspiring part of his writings, were clarified and strengthened through his contact with Rūmī's thought.

The resemblance between Rūmī's *Mard-i Ḥaqq* and Iqbāl's *Mard-i Mu'mim* is quite unmistakable. In both cases the Ideal Man is a combination of the man of contemplation and the man of action. Iqbāl places more stress on action than Rūmī does, but this hardly constitutes a fundamental difference.

---

[1] Iqbāl, *Reconstruction*, p. 109.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

[4] A. Tennyson, *The Poetical Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson* (London: MacMillan & Co., 1950), p. 239.

[5] Rūmī, *Mathnawī-i Ma'nawī*, Book I.

[6] Iqbāl, *Pas Che Bāyad Kard* (8th edition; Lahore: Sh. Ghulām 'Alī & Sons, 1964), p. 14.

[7] K.A. Ḥakīm, *The Metaphysics of Rūmī* (Lahore: Institute of Islāmic Culture, 1959), p. 110.

Both Rūmī and Iqbāl believe that the whole course of evolution is steered towards the creation of the Perfect Man. "He is the final cause of creation and, therefore, though having appeared last in point of time, he was really the first mover. Chronologically, the tree is the cause of the fruit but, teleologically, the fruit is the cause of the tree."[1] To his Perfect Man, Rūmī says:

> Therefore, while in form thou art the microcosm, in reality thou art the macrocosm.
> Externally the branch is the origin of the fruit; intrinsically the branch came into existence for the sake of the fruit.
> Had there been no hope of the fruit, would the gardener have planted the tree?
> Therefore in reality the tree is born of the fruit, though it appears to be produced by the tree.[2]

About his *Nā'ib-i Ilāhi* Iqbāl says:

> He is the final cause of "God taught Adam the name of all things",[3]
> He is the inmost sense of "Glory to Him that transported His servant by night."[4]

and then, turning to "the Rider of Destiny", proclaims:

> Mankind are the cornfield and thou the harvest,
> Thou art the goal of Life's caravan.[5]

The ideal of the Perfect Man is for both Rūmī and Iqbāl a democratic ideal, which does not have the aristocratic bias of Nietzsche's ideal. Both Rūmī and Iqbāl believe that the Perfect Man can work miracles, which do not, however, "mean the annihilation of causation but only bringing into play causes that are not within the reach of common experience."[6] Iqbāl, we may remember, said that "the region of mystic experience is as real as any other region of human experience."[7]

---

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[2] Rūmī, *Mathnawi-i Ma'nawī*, Book IV, p. 27; trans. R.A. Nicholson, *Rūmī, Poet and Mystic* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1950). p. 124.

[3] *Qur'ān*, 2:29.

[4] *Ibid.*, 17:1; trans. Nicholson, *Secrets*, p. 81.

[5] Iqbāl, *Asrār*, trans. Nicholson, *Secrets*, p. 84.

[6] Ḥakīm, *The Metaphysics of Rūmī*, p. 110.

[7] Iqbāl, *Reconstruction*, p. 23.

It is not possible within the purview of these few pages to discuss in any depth the subject of this essay. However, an attempt has been made to indicate — in broad outline — the constituents of Iqbāl's concept of the *Mard-i Mu'min*, the stages of the education of the Self and some of the most striking similarities between the thought of Rūmī and that of Iqbāl in so far as they have a bearing on the genesis and growth or the Self and the emergence of the Perfect Man. Rūmī's influence on Iqbāl has been so all-pervading that it is not possible either to describe or to circumscribe it exactly. The *Asrār-i Khudī*, with which Iqbāl began his preaching of the doctrine of incessant struggle, carries as its introduction the following lines of Rūmī (quoted again in the *Jāvīd Nāma*):

> Last night the Elder wandered about the city with a lantern
> Saying, 'I am weary of demon and monster: man is my desire.
> My heart is sick of these feeble-spirited fellow-travellers;
> The Lion of God and Rustam-e Dastan are my desire.
> I said, 'The thing we quested after is never attained.'
> He said, 'The unattainable — that thing is my desire'.[1]

And in conclusion one can hardly do better than observe with Iqbāl's most eminent biographer that "a more accurate description of Iqbāl's own approach to ideals would be difficult to find."[2]

---

[1] Trans. A.J. Arberry, *Jāvīd Nāma* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 29.

[2] Singh, *The Ardent of Pilgrim*, p. 103.

NEW ARTICLES FOR THE IQBAL REVIEW

The Editorial Board of the Iqbal Review invites learned articles on the following topics:

(i) Iqbal's Idea of Healthy Literature
(ii) Iqbal's Message to Students
(iii) Iqbal's Message to Peasants and Labourers
(iv) Iqbal's Views on the Idea of the Islamic Millat
(v) Iqbal's Philosophy of the Respect for Man
(vi) Iqbal's Concept of *Jihad*
(vii) Iqbal's Concept of Pakistan
(viii) Iqbal's Concept of Leadership
(ix) Iqbal's Concept of Social Justice
(x) Iqbal's Crusade against False Values
(xi) Causes of Decline of Muslim Power
(xii) Predestination and Freedom of Will
(xiii) The Necessity and Pre-requisites for *Ijtihad*
(xiv) The Inflexible types of Mulla & Sufi
(xv) Implications of Belief in the Unity of God
(xvi) Struggle for Preservation of Muslim State
(xvii) Iqbal's Concept of Dedicated Men
(xviii) Poverty and Priesthood
(xix) Freedom & Liberty
(xx) Iqbal's Concept of Death & Life Hereafter
(xxi) Iqbal's Concept of a Successful Life on the Earth
(xxii) Rights and Duties of Man
(xxiii) Prerogatives & Responsibilities of Government
(xxiv) Reforms in Education as envisaged by Iqbal
(xxv) Duties and Rights of Teachers
(xxvi) Islamic Socialism
(xxvii) The Inevitability of Change
(xxviii) Futility of Polemic Discussions
(xxix) Iqbal's Attitude Towards Protracted Prayers
(xxx) Characteristics of Slavish Attitude

Iqbal Review
April 1972

(*Continued from the April 1971 issue*)

THE CONCEPT OF THE MAGIAN SOUL IN OSWALD SPENGLER'S *DECLINE OF THE WEST:* AN EVALUATION

—*Kamāl Muḥammad Ḥabīb*

Such a discussion would lead us to but one simple conclusion: the germs of the modern European culture were present in the Roman, or, for that matter, in the Hellenic civilization. As an elaboration of this evolution, we might with advantage take the case of the Chinese civilization, which, with all its pitfalls, has been more or less continuous. Joseph Needham has, for instance, suggested that the Chinese tendency to be "indelibly algebraic rather than geometric" has persisted even to this day.[1] If a civilization has been alloted only a limited span of existence and no reprieve from decline is possible, one would be hard put to it to explain the resurgence of the Mongolian races in our day, as exemplified by China and Japan. Might not all this mean that the characteristic features of the Chinese civilization — or for that matter of any other civilization — are like genes transmitted from the parent to the offspring? In the event of metamorphosis, such as the one under the influence of *pseudomorphosis*, it would not be the genes that would undergo a change, but in the event of a mutation they would. Such a mutation would occur when a culture had been entirely and completely cut off from its parent culture. Hence Spengler's theory of a culture-soul as obeying characteristics specific and endemic to it should, in effect, be more likely to introduce something like the Lamarckian concept of evolution — that is to say, under the influence of a changed environment, the organism or the culture would be so utterly, totally changed as to constitute a new species of organism or culture. Spengler contends that the European culture is an entirely different species from the

[1] J. Needham and W. Ling, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1965), IV: III, xiv.

ancient Hellenic culture. In fact, taking the sum-total of the progress recorded by *Homo sapiens*, one would only say that man's evolution has been more mental than physical, and will be so in future. *Back to Methuselah* by George Bernard Shaw, one of the greatest intellectual feats of the present century, shows one of the directions this evolution might take (Part V, *As Far as Thought Can Reach*). In his preface to the play Shaw states:

> ...those who believe that the impulse that produces evolution is creative...observed the simple fact that the will to do anything can and does, at a certain pitch of intensity set up by conviction of its necessity, create and organize new tissue to do with it. To them therefore mankind is not played out yet. If the weight lifter, under the trivial stimulus of an athletic competition, can 'put up a muscle', it seems reasonable to believe that an equally earnest and convinced philosopher could 'put up a brain'. Both are directions of vitality to a certain end...offering us...our choice of any sort of contrivance to maintain our activity and increase our resources.[1]

This would but imply that no human community could really be regarded as a closed geographical or sociological unit, unless some very exceptional circumstance supervened, and on this basis we would be justified in assuming that we are correct in assessing man's progress in its totality and not through isolated case studies.

The above remarks might be regarded as a sort of interpolation. Let us carry our examination of the orientation of the latter-day Roman Empire further. Lewis emphasizes that, for modern man, dualism is one between duty and inclination:

> Take the concept of 'temptation' and nearly all that we say or think about good would vanish into thin air. But, when we first opened our Aristotle, we found to our surprise that this inner conflict was for him of so little of the essence of the moral life, that he tended to thrust it into a corner and treat it almost as a special case....The really good man, in Aristotle's view, is not tempted. Where we incline to think that good thews are more praiseworthy than mere goodness of disposition, Aristotle coolly remarks

[1] *Ibid*, p. xvi.

> that the man who is temperate at a cost is profligate (Etic. Nicom. 1104): the really temperate man abstains because he likes abstaining. The ease and pleasure with which good acts are done, the absence of moral effort, is for him the symptom of virtue.[1]

In other words, Lewis finds that the world of the ancients was characterized by the near absence of *bellum intestinum* (the divided will) which Spengler finds to be one of the principal characteristics of the Faustian civilization. It is quite in evidence in the Roman Empire immeditately after the death of Augustus. And, according to Spengler, during the days of the Roman Empire, the Classical culture had already crossed the portal leading to its "winter". This *bellum intestinum* is already with Seneca, Epictetus, and Statius. Consciousness of having a divided will would naturally turn the mind in upon itself, and such a state of the mind should proliferate introspection, individualism, and the expression of the will through the outward forms of the soul.

Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, Goethe's *Faust*, and Milton's *Paradise Lost* would thus represent the Statian concept of will; their symphonic assertion of the will would not be something new. The Kantian view that man subserves the judgment of universal law, and the utilitarian concept that human welfare should be the only guiding principle are thus extensions of the *bellum intestinum*. Abstinence for its own sake and virtue for virtue's sake find's no longer any acceptance; human nature has become too complex for that.

At the same time, together with the appearance of the *bellum intestinum* during the early days of the Roman Empire, allegory, which is conceded to be an essentially modern phenomenon, is enforcing the symbolism of Greece. Allegory personifies the various facets of the will through abstract characters. These abstract characters wove themselves into the warp and woof of the Mediaeval and Reformation literature of Europe. The allegories of Statius' *Thebaid* and the *Psychomachia* of Prudentius (a Christian) have been incorporated in literary works like *The Romance of the Rose*, *The Fairie Queene*, and *Pilgrim's Progress*. Lewis further

[1] C.S. Lewis, *The Allegory of Love* (Oxford: The University Press, 1965), p. 60.

cites quotations from Seneca to show the complex picture that Rome was becoming. Says Seneca, "Nobis quoque militande (for we must be soldiers and in a campaign where there is no inclination and no rest)"; and, further, "...let us also conquer all things. For our prize is not a crown nor a palm nor a herald to cry our name, and virtue, and strength of mind, and peace."

If such a statement is reminiscent of the New Testament, (according to Lewis), why should it not bear any resemblance to Eckhart's: "When the soul crosses over, then she sinks down and down in the abyss of the Godhead nor ever finds a footing" (Evans 335)?

I have earlier discussed in the context of the migration of the god, Mithras, to Rome how the latter-day Romans were trying to shake off the vestments of sensuosness. If Seneca alone were an exception, the antithesis between inclination and duty could have been attributed to a mere anomaly. But it seems that Marcus Aurelius, Statius, and Prudentius (all of whom were Romans); St. Paul in Ephesians and Tertullian (both Aramaeans) were all very conscious of this internal conflict.

Comparing Sankara and Meister Eckhart, Otto avers:

> For Sankara when the soul (*atmān*) has 'come home' to the Eternal Being (*Atmān*), it has arrived (*apta*), it is at rest and fully content (*santa*). But Eckhart is, in truth, never "there", never in a final static rest...Just as the slender columns and responds of the Gothic building rise and climb and do not finish in the repose of a semicircle, but by an urge after the infinity, thrust up in the completeness of the pointed arch, so Eckhart demands the climbing spirits.[1]

Might we not by the same token say that Seneca does not desire either a crown or a palm or a herald to spread his name far and wide, but something more, something that not even ceaseless effort would give him? And might we not therefore suggest that the quest for the Infinite had been bequeathed to Eckhart by his Greco-Roman forebears? If Spengler, who is inclined towards positivistic and relativistic modes of thinking, and Otto (who,

[1] R. Otto, *Mysticism, East and West* (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 204.

though he echoes Spenglerian overtones, is also profoundly Christian) share the view that the search for the Infinite is essentially a Gothic characteristic, one is justifiably led to refute them on the ground of historical evidence. The *Qur'ān* alludes to something even more than infinity when it says to man: "And verily unto thy Lord is the limit" (53:14).

Further, the core of Islām is panentheistic, and panentheism seeks quest in the Infinite only.

Now, if the Senecan mode of thinking is juxtaposed with what Spengler says of the Classical civilization, *viz.*, "...in the classical the bodily and tangible, the sensuously-saturated prevails and therefore...in the mode of worshipping, the centre of gravity lies in the sense-impressive cult,"[1] one can only say that, whatever might have been true of the earlier literature, the latter-day Classical literature, especially the literature of the Claudian and Antonine eras, would only contradict Spengler's contention. The appearance of allegory (which possibly had its gestation in the *Aeneid*) along with the antithesis between inclination and duty is so synchronous and apposite that one would not even be able to explain its appearance on the basis of the theory of *pseudomorphosis*. Further, if the tendency in the Faustian culture has been towards the spiralling ascendency of the will, how could one explain that from "Augustine to Calvin to Barth the torment of eternal damnation is assigned and approved independently of moral responsibility?"[2] One would therefore be justified in partly assigning this fact to the I-Thou duality which has been the recurrent feature of every civilization, but which finds its very pronounced expression in the West European civilization. Fatalism can result from the "I, subject A", becoming "the central pivot of the world to the exclusion of Thou (or God). In Islām, on the other hand, the "I" as the free centre surrenders itself entirely to Thou, and, seeking Thou, moves on to the path of *ijtihād*. Heim discusses the decline of the West from the Christian viewpoint, and observes: "...fatalism, wherever it has arisen, in Greek tragedy, in the later period of the ancient German polytheism and again in our own times, has always been merely the form

[1] O. Spengler, *The Decline of The West*, trans. F. Atkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959), I, 401.

[2] S. Hook (ed.), *Necessity, Indeterminism, Sentimentalism and Freedom* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 190. The remarks are Hook's.

assumed by a dying religion shortly before it has become extinct."[1]

Might not therefore one be led to postulate that the *bellum intestinum* of the Claudian-Antonine eras of the Roman Empire represents the embryo which became an adult during the post-Reformation period of Europe? It is this divided will which Fichte takes to the other extreme when he says that "nothing outside you matters here, but only yourself" (*Theory of Science*). Another fact of the battle between the will of man ("I") and the understanding of Thou thus is expressed through the medium of existentialism, and this in its embroyonic stages is present in both Lucretius and Seneca. While in Islām "Thou" is not a metaphor, the Western theology has been "making the eternal Thou into It, into something —making God into a thing."[2]

The Roman world, then, was becoming more and more entangled in complexities, and, as it was, these complexities did not exclude the so-called "Magian" world: it too was becoming more complex simultaneously. The *Thebaid* and the *Psychomachia* are not very good poems, precisely because they are too non-sensuous, too abstract, too lacking in flesh-and-blood characters. They represent the transitory period which flowered only after the Renaissance into Sir Philip Sidney's *Arcadia*, and Edmund Spenser's *Fairie Queene*, to quote only two instances. Greek civilization in its pure form might have disintegrated by A.D. 400, but the elements which we associate with the Western civilization, whatever the differences visible on the surface, are definitely present in the present-day European civilization.

Another point which Spengler emphasizes regarding the Classical man is that the

> Classical culture possessed no *memory*, no organ of history in this special sense. The memory of the Classical man — so to call it, though it is somewhat arbitrary to apply to alien souls a notion derived from our own — is something different, since past and future, as arraying perspectives in the working of consciousness, are absent, and the

---

[1] K. Heim, *Christian Faith and Natural Science* (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1959), p. 215.

[2] M. Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1959), p. 112.

> pure present, which so often aroused Goethe's admiration in every product of the Classical life and in sculpture particularly fills that life with an intensity that to us is perfectly unknown.[1]

That the present with the Greeks was there with intensity cannot be denied, but equally the concern with the self that finds its expression in existentialism might well be an alternative expression of that intensity. However, the difference between the Greek and the modern European attitudes to time has been pointed out by Bridgman from another angle. Western man, he says, has so far failed to correlate time, especially in scientific works, with experience by thinking of it as a homogeneous and one-dimensional sequence, with the past and future lying on opposite sides and separated by the present which is in continuous motion from the past to the future. The modern Western man thus, according to him, is oblivious to the time of experience, which consists of "a blurred sequence of memories culminating in the budding and unfolding present." The time of experience has a unique apex, with the possibility that everything may go awry. Modern man thinks of the time as stretching before him and, imagining himself as going to join it, he tends to build a base of probability and thinks that the future is predictable. Bridgman believes that the ancient Greek thought of himself as facing the past, with the future behind him coming over his shoulder, as the landscape unfolds to one "riding back to the engine in a train." The Greek did not deny the future; but for him the future represented an unknown variable.[2]

The Classical man, then, lived in the time of experience. But he could also live in the world of the abstract: Plato certainly does in the *Timaeus*. Be that as it may, might not one also say that the Classical "world-fear" was rooted in the experience of the ancient man, since the future to him was unknown, with man in the early stages of development, mental evolution, and association with his environment? And equally man would of necessity visualize the

---

[1] Spengler, *Decline*, I, 9.

[2] P.W. Bridgman, *Nature of Physical Theory*, pp. 29-32, quoted in W. Mays, *The Philosophy of Whitehead* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 209.

concrete first and the abstract afterwards by gradually piecing together and weaving his concepts.

But even otherwise also Spengler seems to have overshot his mark. Would one say that the Faustian art of historiography develop all of a sudden, and was never in the chronicle-phase? If Herodotus in his *History* is a story-teller, he can also tighten the framework of his narrative until it becomes objective, as, for instance, when he describes the Greco-Persian wars. And this is true of historians like Plutarch, Polybius, and Tacitus too, who gave to the Europe of today the notion of history. Herodotus, in his own age, was a progressive; unlike Hellanicus, his contemporary, he did not take history as "a mere record of year-to-year occurrences without artistic design in structure or expression."[1]

Collingwood has justly criticized Spengler on the score of his contention that the Classical man lacked memory.[2] But even the text of the *Decline* itself betrays certain inherent contradictions. While discussing an entirely different subject, *viz.*, the technique of war, Spengler quotes Cato's deliberately dry insistence (and now one of the most celebrated Latin quotations), "Ceterum censeo Carthigenum esse delendum" (Carthage must be destroyed).[3] He is here quoting a pragmatic patrician and (if heartless) patriotic Roman who could well visualize the past (the first two Punic Wars from which Rome escaped by the thinnest imaginable skin of the teeth), the present (the prosperity of Carthage and its competition with Rome), and the future (lest the Carthaginian militarist oligarchy be resurrected from the ashes of the defeat suffered at Zama). *Pax Romana* therefore demanded the destruction of Carthage and the elimination of the fear of another Cannae or Trasiminus at the hands of another Hannibal who might yet shake off the yoke of present Carthaginian submission and quiescence to avenge the two wars — this time to the finish. One would hardly say that just because Cato was looking at the past, the present and the future for him arrayed themselves in a single perspective; they would, in our age,

---

[1] J.A.K. Thompson, *Classical Influence on English Prose* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 19.

[2] R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: The University Press, 1946), p. 183.

[3] Spengler, *Decline*, II, 422.

array themselves like that for a statesman concerned with the weal of his country.

Our final conclusion would therefore be that the term "Classical" might be a convenient term for demarcating the present-day man from his ancient forebears. And, since both run into the quicksands of mixture, no one knows when and how the Classical man in the sense visualized by Spengler ceased to exist and therefore there was no Classical civilization that disintegrated in the sense implied by him; it just metamorphosed itself or rather evolved into another civilization. Nor can Spengler deny that the Ionian and Dorian migrants from Northern Europe were close siblings of the Saxons, the Vandals, and the Normans, and that they founded what he calls the Gothic civilization. The same thing, by the same analogy, applies to the so-called "Magian" civilization, which has a very old history. The expanding world-vision of the Semitic people, the accidents of history, and the glory of their past, all contributed to the transfiguration and transmutation of their world-vision. In the Fertile Crescent itself possibly a pure Semitic civilization did not even exist. It is beyond any doubt that north-eastern part of the Arab Oikumene had had considerable Hittite, Kassite, and Mittanian infusions during the second millenium B.C. With the Hurrians, Hittites, and Kassites (who governed Mesopotamia from 1959 to 1171 B.C.) intermingling with the Semites, the Semitic race must have undergone considerable transformation in the result. By the time of Augustus, Syria abounded in considerable foreign elements — Armenian, Greek, and Caucasian — so that, to say that the Syrian was intensely Magian and out to shed the slough of Hellenism would be justifiable only to a very limited degree.

There are several aspects of the earlier Muslim contributions to philosophy, historiography (notably Ibn-i-Khaldun, who formulated the stages of growth in a given culture), the physical, and medical sciences, and astronomy which provide many of the links which join the Europe of the Renaissance period with that of the Dark Ages. Iqbāl subscribes to Spengler's view that the spirit of modern Europe is anti-classical; nevertheless, he highlights the fact that Spengler is at times likely to be carried away by the momentum of the generalities which he feels he has unearthed from the facts he has marshalled:

> .... The anti-classical spirit of the modern world has really risen out of the revolt of Islām against Greek thought. It is obvious that such a view cannot be acceptable to Spengler; for, if it is possible to show that the anti-classical spirit of modern culture is due to the inspiration which it received from the culture immediately preceding it, the whole argument of Spengler regarding the complete mutual independence would collapse.[1]

The early Muslim scientists and philosophers like al-Rāzī, Ibn Sīnā, al-Khwārazmī, Jābir Ibn Ḥayyān, Ibn Rushd, Ibn al-Haitham and others pioneered the expansion of knowledge through the application of observation to natural phenomena. This has been taken to its perfection by the West. It might be well to recall in this context that Mondino da Luzzi's work on human anatomy, which became the standard text book during the Mediaeval Europe, was based on the original text of Bū 'Alī Sīnā. Ibn Al-Haitham's *Kitābal-Manāẓir* (Treatise on Optics) exercised considerable influence on Roger Bacon and was the source of about all that was known about light and vision till the Renaissance. Similarly Latin translations of Ibn Rushd were "widely and illicitly read" throughout Western Europe. During the Dark Ages, when the whole of Europe was tormented and obsessed with the idea of a finite, mortal, and destructible world, Ibn Rushd's view to the opposite was like a shower revivifying the parched greenery of an arid landscape. Singer says about Ibn Rushd:

> Averroes was the greatest of all the Western Muslim philosophers and one of the most influential thinkers of all time... The Averroan doctrine that caused most discussion was his teaching concerning *the eternity of the world*, which some of his interpreters have represented as the denial of creation ... Averroes is really an evolutionist in the true sense of the word; that is to say, he believes not in a single act of creation but in a creation renewed every instant in a constantly changing world, always

[1] S. M. Iqbāl, *The Reconsturction of Religious Thought in Islām* (Reprint; Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1968), p. 143.

> talking its new form from that which has existed previously. The world, though eternal, has a *Mover* or *Agent*, constantly producing it, and, like it, eternal. This mover can be realized by observation of the eternal celestial bodies which have a perfected existence only through their movement. Thereby may be distinguished two forms of eternity, that with and that without cause. Only the Prime Mover is eternal without cause...[1]

Arabic numerals were introduced into Europe by Pope Silvester (d. A.D. 1003), and this introduction gradually did away with the cumbersome employment of the abacus for calculation purposes. The enormous impact of the Arab numerals on the West can thus be well imagined. Leastways also, al-Khwārazmī's works on mathematics, alchemy, and astronomy were translated into Latin by Robert of Chester.

No one can gainsay that the progress of any culture depends upon the genius and collective drive of its own people: other factors can only catalyze and quicken the progress. Aristotle's *Poetics*, for instance, although for Spengler it spelled the stultification of Gothic (and therefore of Faustian) poetry and drama, passed into Italian hands through Arab sources. And all of a sudden, as if by magic, Europe began humming with life. Hence in a considerable measure — even if one differs with Iqbāl as to the degree of the Muslim influence over Renaissance Europe — the Arabs arranged a reunion between the parent Classical culture and its long-lost modern European offspring. As emphasized earlier, such a reunion would just not have been possible without the European avidity to seize upon the repositories of knowledge from the past and its enquiring spirit. A living civilization alone spares no avenue unexplored.

And here perhaps one sees the *Decline* at its worst. At times Spengler displays what verges on antipathy towards other civilizations than his own. One such glaring instance is the following passage:

> What might not have come out of Basque drama had it remained under the impression of the mighty epic and the

[1] C. Singer, *From Magic to Science* (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 89.

> Gothic Easter-play and Mystery in the near neighbourhood of Oratories and Passions, without ever hearing of the Greek theatre! A tragedy issuing from the contrapuntal music, free of limitations to the plastic but here meaningless, a dramatic poetry that from Orlando and Palestrina could develop...to a pure form of its own; that was what was possible and that was what did not happen; and it is only to the fortunate circumstance that the whole fresco-art of Hellas has been lost that we owe the inward freedom of our oil painting.[1]

Not only has Spengler jettisoned the spirit of an objective historian; but so emotionally has he been carried away by the glorification of the Faustian achievement in the arts that he has gone to the length of condemning his own heritage — the heritage left to Europe by Greece and Rome. In Mediaeval England and Germany the narrative was allegorical, with the purpose of telling *exampla*, and the Seven Deadly Sins, the Seven Sacraments, the Twelve Requisites of Shrift, and the Twelve Graces of Shrift are introduced into the framework of the narrative, as an example of which one may cite *Handlyng Synne* of Robert Mannyng of Brunne and the miracle or "mystery" plays. So neither the Anglo-Saxon nor the Gothic "Easter-play" is entirely faustian, since allegory is a latter-day Classical phenomenon, and Spengler should therefore reject the Easter-play also, because it represents, primitive Christianity, and this, of course, was Magian! In any event, when the Classical drama reached Europe again during the Renaissance period, it was seized only because apparently the miracle plays had exhausted all possibilities of further development, having no flesh-and-blood characters.

Let us carry the argument further. However much Spengler might try to ascribe the Classicism of Europe to taste, how did it happen that the Easter-play was relegated to the relic-house of curiosity, and its place was brazenly taken by dramas based on the Aristotelian principles of plot and action with both contemporary and ancient (Classical) themes? Nor on his own argument can he refute the fact that the modern Faustian civilization — in fiction,

---

[1] Spengler, *Decline*, I, 333.

music, drama, and other arts — seeks its symbols not from its own Gothic or Celtic past so much as from an age that is not associated even with Rome but with Greece, that is to say, from its own primordial past now conveyed to the present age through the dim medium of myths. Even such Faustian figures as Hegel and Goethe have accorded a very high pedestal to Attic tragedy, with the former holding *Oedipus Rex* to be a work of art that can only be imitated but not surpassed. Are we, then, not justified in concluding that the "collective unconscious" of the Europe of today finds in the archetypal myths from Greece the areas of experience covered by the primaeval forests of human memory?

In his otherwise extremely illuminating discussion of Attic tragedy and its characteristics, Spengler asserts that there are two types of female characters in the Attic drama: Amazons and *haetaerae*. Gilbert Murray, on the other hand, has convincingly shown that both in the Greek myths and in the Scandinavian Ynlinga saga occur several wives who are of the Gaia-Rhea-Clytemnestra-Jocasta type. He further suggests that it is more than probable that the Greek and Scandinavian myths derive from a common source. The character of Electra also finds a parallel in the foster sister of Amlooi, Prince of Jutland, in Saxo Grammaticus' *Gesta Danorum* (History of the Danes), Books III and IV, which constituted the original sources of *Hamlet*.[1]

Spengler's detailed examination of the plastic arts of Western Europe is absolutely superb, and as an elucidation of its past trends would remain so for quite some time. However, the modern European characteristics have evolved. By elaborating too exhaustively on their characteristics he tries to derive certain conclusions, which only succeed in complicating the issue. The irresistible appeal of Classical literature does not lie merely in its sensuousness, but also in its search for the universal within the particular. But, even if it comes to the particular for its own sake, Classical literature is not wanting in it either. An example of realistic literature from Greece is Theocritus' *Adoniazusae* (Women at the Festival of Adonis).

The Apollonian and Faustian — and for that matter the

[1] Sir G. Murray, "Hamlet and Orestes" in *Five Approaches to Literary Criticism*, ed. W. Scott (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 274.

Magian — civilizations are, then, the expressions of an expanding world-vision, and not of the death of one world-vision, and the birth of another. Expansion in world-vision would be accompanied by corresponding modifications in the arts of painting and music and literary genres, not to speak of scientific experimentation, for in such cases empiricism is bound to be replaced by precise observation. And to this expansion in world-vision every culture has contributed in one way or the other.

There is, however, something substantial in Spengler's generalizations: it is only his biological interpretation of history that is questionable. Another considerable weakness of the *Decline* lies in the dogmatic and pontifical postures adopted by the author. His study on the nature of numbers and the divergent paths which mathematics adopted at the hands of the Classical, Faustian, and Magian men is definitely a remarkable contribution to the history of scientific thought. The Greeks systematized, and of this Aristotle and Theophrastus are the two outstanding instances. But the Greek approach to science in general was teleological (with the exception of Aristotle and Archimedes) rather than experimental, and it was the shackled version of this approach that continued in Europe down to the Renaissance period. In the modern scientific approach the phenomenal world is interpreted on the basis of repetition in Nature and the application of the interpretation not only to the human understanding but to technological progress. The present-day scientific enquiry traces the causes from the effects; the Greeks primarily moved from the effects to the causes. A classic instance of the Greek approach would be the Platonic concept of Time, according to which Time, together with axioms (natural laws), had its birth in chaos. Life in a society holding such views would tend to move within set grooves and adjustment would therefore be difficult. Popper in *The Open Society and its Enemies*[1] has emphaized the recurrent battle between oligarchy seeking a return to tribalism and democracy, with Plato as the arch champion of the oligarchic pattern of rulership. Added to this was the presence of the helots in the Greek society. Departure from postulates in a world-view of this kind would be

[1] Sir Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 405.

difficult, and in ancient Greece the fixity of approach is writ large over Aristotle's *Poetics* in spite of his championing the cause of experimentation. Early Muslim pioneers like Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sīnā, and Ibn al-Haitham as the pioneers of expeimentation and observation are closer to the post-Renaissance Faustians than to the Greeks.

Since Spengler regards each culture to be the equivalent of an organism, having its own individual soul, the antinomies which I have emphasized earlier are inherent in his very approach. One fails to understand why, with his encyclopaedic knowledge, Spengler should not have been able to discern the differences between the Persian and Arabic ethos, and should have insisted on the inclusion of the Sassanid-Irānian within the Magian unit, when Semitic culture has its own separate and distant heritage. Nor does he seem to be aware, for instance, that apocalypse is not a fundamental tenet of Islām, and represents an extraneous trapping.

On other scores also, Spengler adopts extreme attitudes, *e g.*, on the Marcionian heresy. Marcion's attempt, it is true, was primarily directed at the resolution of the evil-good duality just as the latter-day Zoroastrian attempt was. He found evil so pervasive that he even went further than the Gnostics in putting the spirit of man besides his body, in the realm of evil (*Demiurge*).[1] Nevertheless, he still retained the Christian precept of evil, and most of the controversy in the heresy arose because Marcion tended to take the *Old Testament* at its face value and not symbolically; hence his denouncement of the God of Sacrifice of the *Old Testament*, and his reduction of the flesh to the domain of evil. Even otherwise also, Marcion's heresy is just one of the instances of the efforts directed at the resolution of the evil-good duality.

Yet, with all his failings, Spengler has made a sustained effort at the extrication of a unitary picture out of that bafflingly varied material called history. He arrived at certain conclusions, for the simple reason that for him these conclusions represent the very quintessence of history, that is, if we desire to learn from history. Heller, in this context, observes:

---

[1] K.S. Latourette, *A History of the Expansion of Christianity* (New York: Harper, 1938), p. 125.

> It is impossible to refute such a mighty enterprise by listing...factual inaccuracies....The proper tools of empiricism can only deal with Spengler's brushwood, and inflict a few scratches on his landscape of peaks and velleys. The assertion, for instance, that Spengler's culture-organisms have no real historical existence goes right outside the range of empiricism. It is impossible to destroy an analogy 'empirically', however much 'evidence' is assembled for the campaign. All historical generalizations are the defeat of the empiricist; and there is no history without them....Professor Toynbee (whom Mr. E.H. Carr accuses of wanting to have Spengler metaphysically and eat him empirically) finds it disappointing that the author of *The Decline of the West* has nothing to say about the genesis of his cultures.... But, if one grants Spengler the power of genius, then it is as meaningless to blame him for his shortcomings as it would be to reproach Picasso for sometimes ignoring the rules of perspective. For what Toynbee finds disappointing is the very core of Spengler's method.[1]

What is, however, surprising is that most of his critics, while essentially correct on many points, criticize Spengler without in the least possessing his courage and daring. Lerner, while stating explicitly in his preface to *America as a Civilization* that his work is not meant for those "looking for the historical, the descriptive, the polemic, or the apocalyptic", nevertheless does try to evolve a unitary pattern in the history of the United States. But all that he achieves is mere circumlocution. Caution of the kind betrayed by the passage quoted below from the above work is definitely something pale and second-rate beside Spengler's daring:

> The long journey we have made through the pages should lead to a different conclusion. There is still in the American potential the plastic strength that has shaped a great civilization, and it shows itself in unexpected ways, at

---

[1] E. Heller, *The Disinherited Mind* (London: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 161-62.

unpredictable moments, in disguises tha trequire some imaginative understanding to unveil.[2]

Such a non-committal approach hardly adds anything substantial to man's effort at deriving lessons from history. Nor does the reader need to be told that history can be a matter of accident. When Spengler wrote the *Decline*, in spite of the fact that Germany was lying rather supine then, the supremacy of the West was more pronounced than it is now in many ways, at least in Asia and Africa, and no challenger was in sight. And yet, with all that supremacy and hegemony, Spengler could see the penumbra of disintegration lengthening in many ways: the growth of "Megalopolis", decline in the quality of the literature, and so on. One cannot therefore accuse Spengler of indulging in generalities for their own sake. Every thinker has a purpose and an aim central to his writing and therfore possesses a certain degree of bias. On the score of the bias — as this writer has emphasized earlier — it is harder to exculpate the author of the *Decline*. He has tried to correlate the individual and collective existence with history in his own way through a survey of the soul-expressions of the various civilizations that have so far flourished on our planet by defining and tracing their characteristic expressions. This in itself constituets a very original approach. For him such a correlation was well worth the risk, as it has been for others, Collingwood, Toynbee, Dawson, and Whitehead (*Adventure of Ideas*), to name only a few philosophers of history among many. But writers like Collingwood have a limited perspectivc; they are primarily concerned with the West. Spengler did his best to forge the key that he considered proper for unlocking the door leading to the secret chamber of history. He failed, but, while many of the generalizations that he has made in the course of the attempt are arrant wrong, it is equally such generalizations that can salvage history from being converted into either a mere chronicle of facts or gathering round it the patina of fiction.

---

[1] M. Lerner, *America as a Civilization* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957), p. 950.

QURANIC CONCEPTION OF HIGHEST VIRTUE

"The highest virtue from the standpoint of Islam is "Righteousness," which is defined by the Qur'an in the following manner: 'It is not righteousness that you turn your faces in prayers towards east or west, but it is this that one should believe in Allah, the Last Day, and the Angels, and the Scriptures and the Prophets, and give away wealth for His sake to the near of kin and orphans, and the needy and the wayfarers and the beggars, and for the redemption of captives, and keep up prayer and pay the poor-rate, and who perform their covenant when they have covenanted, and are patient in distress and affliction.'

It is, therefore, evident that Islam, so to speak, transvaluates the moral values of the ancient world, and declares the preservation and intensification of the sense of human personality to be ultimate ground of all ethical activities.

Man is a free responsible being; he is the maker of his own Destiny; and his salvation is his own business. There is no mediator between God and man. God is the birthright of every man.

The Qur'an, therefore, while it looks upon Jesus Christ as the Spirit of God, strongly protests against the doctrine of Redemption, as well as the doctrine of an infallible visible head of the church—doctrines which proceed upon the assumption of the insufficiency of human personality, and tend to create in man the sense of dependence which is regarded by Islam as a force obstructing the ethical progress of man."

Mohammad Iqbal

Islam as an Ethical and a Political Ideal—a lecture delivered in 1908.

Iqbāl Review
April 1972

A. J. ARBERRY, A GREAT STUDENT OF IQBĀL

— *S. A. Vāḥid*

Iqbāl was a Cambridge man. He was in Trinity College from 1905 to 1907. Cambridge produced three great orientalists of the present century—E. G. Browne, R.A. Nicholson, and A.J. Arberry who were all admirers of Iqbāl. Referring to Iqbāl's *Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, Professor Browne says, "The other shorter but fuller account of Mulla Sadra's doctrine is given by Shaykh Muḥammad Iqbal, formerly a pupil of Dr. McTaggart in this University of Cambridge, and now himself a notable and original thinker in India, in his excellent little book entitled *Development of Metaphysics in Persia.*"[1] Professor Browne was one of the first scholars to review favourably the English translation of *Asrār-i Khudī* by Nicholson. It is worth mentioning here that Professor Browne had a poor opinion about nearly all those poets of the subcontinent who wrote in Persian, even 'Urfī and Ṣā'ib.[2] Professor Nicholson translated *Asrār-i Khudī* into English. This translation attracted a good deal of attention. About the poem itself Professor Nicholson wrote in his Introduction to the translation:

> The artistic quality of the poem is remarkable when we consider that its language is not the author's own. I have done my best to preserve as much of this as a literal pure translation will allow. Many passages of the original are poetry of the kind that, once read, is not easily forgotten, *e.g.* the description of the Ideal Man as a deliverer for whom the world is waiting and the noble invocation which brings the book to an end.[3]

---

[1] E.G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (4 Vols; Cambridge: The University Press, 1959), Vol. IV, 19.

[2] While talking to Sir Tej Bahādur Saprū on this subject, Professor Browne said that Iqbāl was a rare phenomenon.

[3] Nicholson (trans), *Secrets*, p. xxx.

Professor Nicholson also wrote a detailed note on *Payām-i Mashriq*, which was published in a German journal.

It was Professor A. J. Arberry who made it possible for the English-speaking world to appreciate Iqbāl by reading his great poems in English translations. He translated the quatrains contained in *Payām-i Mashriq*, and published these translations as *Tulip of Sinai*.[1] He translated the *ghazals* contained in *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* and published these as *Persian Psalms*. He also translated into English verse *Shikwa*, *Jawāb-i Shikwa*, and Iqbāl's *magnum opus*, *Jāvīd Nāma*. No scholar can equal Professor Arberry's achievement as a translator. In the masterly introductions to his translations, he surveys different aspects of Persian poetry and Iqbāl's poetic art. In his Preface to *Persian Psalms*, he says, "He [the reader] will find himself in a new world of thought and feeling, a world vibrant with hope and high endeavour, a world revealing the vision of a great thinker who saw in these sorely troubled times the dawn of a new age."[2] In his Introduction to the translation of *Jāvīd Nāmah*, he says,

> Both the *Asrār-i Khudī* and the *Rumūz-i Bekhudī* were composed in rhyming couplets, following a very long tradition in Persian didactic poetry going back a thousand years. The metre chosen by Iqbāl for these poems is the *ramal-i musaddas-i maqsur*, the same as that employed by the greatest of Persian mystics, Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207-1273), in the greatest didactic poem in Persian literature, the *Masnavi*. I have summarised the early history of this verse-form in the preface to my *Tales from the Masnavi*. (Allen & Unwin, 1961), which the reader may wish to consult. One noteworthy feature of the convention is that the poet lightens from time to time the weight of formal exposition by the introduction of illustrative anecdotes; to this tradition Iqbal also conformed. When, however, he came to compose the third of his trilogy, Iqbal varied the pattern strikingly; the *Javid-nama* is conceived as a narrative poem, or rather, a poetic drama, in which the didactic

[1] Arberry (trans.), *The Tulip of Sinai* (London: The Royal Indian Society, n.d.).

[2] Arberry (trans.), *Persian Psalms*, p. viii.

is put into the mouths of *dramatis personae*. A further remarkable novelty is the interspersing of lyrics, in various metres and in the monorhyme characteristic of the Persian ghazal, the effect of which is a very great enhancement of the poetic tension of the whole."[1]

Thus it will be seen that all students of Iqbāl owe a special debt of gratitude to Cambridge for having provided two eminent scholars, Nicholson and Arberry, who introduced Iqbāl to the West by means of their translations. Of these two Professor Arberry is decidedly the more devoted, thorough and comprehensive as an Iqbāl scholar.

Professor Arberry was born on May 12, 1905 in a small house in the working class quarter of Pratton, Portsmouth. The fourth of five children in the family, his formal education began at the age of three when he joined the babies' class in a council school. When eleven years old he tried for a scholarship to Portsmouth Grammar School, but failed. Next year he succeded in getting one of the ten free places available. He completed Senior Cambridge at 16. He decided to be a Classics scholar and went to Pembroke College, Cambridge, at Michaelens in 1924 after securing a scholarship. At Cambridge he took a first in Part I of the Classical Tripos in 1925 and a first in Part II in 1927. It so happened that in 1927 Pembroke produced not less than 5 first men in Part II of the Classical Tripos, and so there was no chance for Arberry in the academic world. A friend advised him to apply for E. G. Browne Studentship founded out of the funds bequeathed by Professor E. G. Browne to the College for the encouragement of Oriental studies. Arberry applied for the Studentship and, after having won it, he worked very hard and, in 1929, took a first in both parts of the Oriental Language Tripos.[2]

In 1931 Arberry was elected the Junior Reseach Fellow by his College. In this connection he went to Egypt. In Cairo he met the lady whom he married in Cambridge in November 1932. About this time the Headship of the Classics Department of Cairo University fell vacant. Arberry applied for it and was appointed to

[1] Arberry (trans.), *Jāvīd Nāma*, pp. 11-12.

[2] Most of the information is based on the material contained in Arberry's *Oriental Essays* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960).

take charge of the post immediately. He continued in this post for two years. While in Cairo he witnessed Aḥmad Sharqī's masterpiece *Layla Majnūn* and was so taken up by it that he sought permission to translate it into English. While in Cairo, Arberry also edited two mystical texts.[1]

About this time the post of the Assistant Librarian of Indian Office, London, fell vacant. Arberry got the job and remained in this position for the next ten years.

On September 1, 1939, Arberry was transferred to the War Office, and attached to the Postal Censorship Department in Liverpool. In the summer of 1944, the Chair of Persian in London University fell vacant and Arberry was appointed to it. Thus at long last he returned to the academic world. In 1946, the Chair of Arabic also fell vacant and with it the headship of the Middle East Department, and Professor Arberry was appointed to it. In 1947, Professor C.A. Sotorey resigned from the Sir Thomas Adam's Chair, and it was offered to Arberry. Thus Arberry returned to Cambridge, and his old College reelected him a Fellow. Settled in Cambridge, Arberry started on his great work as an Orientalist, writing on Ṣūfīsm, Rūmī, and 'Umar Khayyam besides translating Iqbāl. In Cambridge he took special interest in the Muslim students, mostly from the Middle East and the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. It was as a result of his efforts that the authorities of Pambroke College allowed the Muslims residing in Cambridge to hold Friday prayers in one of its Halls. Whenever I happened to be in Cambridge on a Friday, I found Arberry taking special interest in preparing the Hall for prayers.

Besides his translations of Iqbāl's poems, his Oriental scholarship includes a translation of the Holy *Qur'ān*,[2] his well-known book *Revelation and Reason in Islām*,[3] and several books on Ṣūfīsm.[4] Towards the end of his life he was concentrating on Rūmī

---

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

[2] Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted* (2 vols; London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1955).

[3] Arberry, *Revelation and Reason in Islām* (The Forward Lectures for 1956 Delivered in the University of Liverpool; London, 1957).

[4] E.g., *An Introduction to the History of Ṣūfīsm* (Longmans, Green and Co., [1943]; and *Ṣūfīsm: An Account of the Mystics of Islām* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963).

and wanted to continue the work of his predecessor and teacher, Professor Nicholson, on that great mystic. Referring to Nicholson, Arberry once wrote:

> If years and health are given me to complete, as it is my fondest wish to do, the work on his favourite Rūmī which he did not live to finish, whatever good thing I accomplish will be by right his. Disciple never had a wiser, a profounder or more loving Master.[1]

The following incident will clearly show his devotion to Rūmī. Once Professor Annamarie Schimmel, Professor Arberry and the writer were having lunch in a hotel in Cambridge. Our talk turned to Rūmī. Arberry recited some verses from him and was so affected that tears began rolling down his eyes.

Arberry was fully conscious of the difficulties of translating a poet like Iqbāl. He candidly admits:

> Iqbal presents the translator with all the usual problems connected with translating poetry, and with further problems, still more difficult of solution, posed by his elusive style and idiosyncratic vocabulary. That this elusiveness was deliberate is proved by a remark he jotted down in a notebook dating from 1910, and published by his son Javid in 1961: 'Mathew Arnold is a very precise poet. I like, however, an element of obscurity and vagueness in poetry; since the vague and the obscure appear profound to the emotions.[2]

When he started translating Iqbāl, Arberry was lucky enough to have access to some of the mistakes that Iqbāl had pointed out in Nicholson's translation of *Asrār-i Khudī*. In fact, Arberry prepared a statement of all these mistakes and collected them in a pamphlet which was published by Shaikh Muḥammad Ashraf of Lahore. In the Preface to this pamphlet, Arberry says:

> The most arresting fact which emerged from the study of this new material was the extreme difficulty of reaching a correct interpretation of many passages in Iqbal's poetry. Professor Nicholson was at the height of his great powers when he made his translation of the *Asrār-i Khudī*, it was

[1] Arberry, *Oriental Essays*, p. 232.

[2] Arberry (trans.), *Jāvīd Nāma*, p. 13.

shortly after the completion of this task that he began work on the *Mathnawī* of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, a labour which occupied the rest of his life and crowned his splendid achievements in the field of oriental studies. All who put their hands to translating Iqbal may therefore well feel humbled when they consider how many times the inner sense of his poetry escaped Professor Nicholson's deep and careful scholarship. But they may well rejoice that fortune has preserved this unique example of Iqbal's exegesis of his own writings; by studying carefully the material which is assembled in these pages, the future worker in this field will find much to assist his undertaking.[1]

Before undertaking his work of translation, Arberry not only prepared himself well for the task but also availed himself of every possible help that he could get. There were before him not only the translations of Iqbāl's works by other scholars, but also examples of Iqbāl's work in this field. Naturally one would expect that, prepared as Arberry was for the great task, mistakes in his translation would be rare. And it must be admitted that mistakes are very few. In some cases, Arberry has failed to understand Iqbāl correctly. Apart from these few mistakes, his translations are on the whole superb. They reflect the passion and fire of the original in a remarkable degree as will be seen from the following specimens:

(*i*)

بگذر از خاور افسونیٔ افرنگ مشو
که نیرزد بجوے ایں همه دیرینه و نو
چون پر کاه که در رهگذر باد افتاد
رفت اسکندر و دارا و قباد و خسرو
زندگی انجمن آرا و نگهدار خود است
اے که در قافلهٔ بے همه شو با همه رو
تو فروزنده تر از مهر منیر آمدهٔ
آنچنان زی که بهر ذره رسانی پر تو!
آن نگینے که تو با اهرمنان باختهٔ
هم بجبریل امینے نتوان کرد گرد
از تنک جاشئی ما میکده رسوا گردید
شیشه گیرد حکیمانه بیا شام و برد(۲)

[1] Arberry, "Notes on Iqbāl's *Asrār-i Khudī* (The Secrets of the Self) (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1950), p. vi.

[2] Iqbāl, *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, pp. 184-185.

Arberry's translation:

Eschew the West, and do not be
Bewitched by Europe's wizardry;
Not worth a barley, in my view,
Is all her ancient and her new.

Mighty Darius, Iskandar,
Khusrau and Kaikobad — all are
A blade of grass upon the way
Swept by a passing wind, to-day.

Life is the Self to beautify,
To guard the Self right jealously;
Upon a caravan thou art —
Fare on with all, but go apart!

Radiant thou camest from the sky,
Far brighter than the sun on high;
So live, that every mote may be
Illumined by thy brilliancy.

Thou hast not spared thy precious ring
Idly to Ahriman to fling —
To pledge thee which it were not well
Even to trusty Gabriel.

The tavern is ashamed, because
So narrow is become our glass;
A beaker take, and prudently
Drink wine — and then be off with thee![1]

(*ii*) دم مرا صفت باد فرو دین کردند
گیاه را ز سر شکم چو یاسمین کردند
نمود لالهٔ صحرا لشین ز خوننابم
چنانکه بادهٔ لعلے بساتگین کردند
بلند بال چنانم که بر سپهر بریں
هزار بار مرا نوریان کمین کردند

[1] Arberry (trans.), *Persian Psalms*, pp. 117-118.

فروغ آدم خاکی ز تازه کاری هاست
مه و ستاره کنند آنچه پیش ازیں کردند
در آ بسجده و یاری ز خسروان مطلب
که روز فقر نیاگان ما چنین کردند(۱)

Arberry's translation:

Soft my breath doth pass
Soft as April airs;
Jasmine-sweet the grass
Springeth from my tears.

Desert tulip glows
With the blood I shed
As in beaker shews
Wine all ruby-red.

Soareth so my flight
O'er the highest sphere
That the souls of light
Seek to trap me there.

Labours ever new
Make man's dust to glow;
Moon and star still do
As long time ago.

Come, O come to prayer;
Court no prince's door;
So our fathers were
When the world was poor.[2]

(*iii*) زمستان را سر آمد روزگاران
نواها زنده شد در شاخساران !
گلان را رنگ و نم بخشد هواها
که می آید ز طرف جوئباران
چراغ لاله اندر دشت و صحرا
شود روشن تر از باد بهاران

[1] Iqbāl, *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, pp. 178-179.
[2] Arberry (trans.), *Persian Psalms*, pp. 114-115.

دمے آسودہ با درد و غم خویش
دمے نالان چو جوئے کوهساراں
ز بیم ایں کہ ذوقش کم نگردد
نگویم حال دل با راز داراں !(۱)

Arberry's translation:

The days are ended
Of winter long;
The branches quiver
With living song.

The breeze in beauty
Arrays the rose
As from the river
It gently blows.

The tulip's lantern
In desert bare
Is fanned to brightness
By the spring air.

A little eases
With grief and pain
Or like a hill-stream
Laments again.

Lest my heart's passion
May softer grow,
Not to the trusty
I'll tell my woe.[2]

(*iv*) Describing the beauty of Kashmir, Iqbāl says:

کوه هائے خنگ سار او نگر
آتشین دست چنار او نگر !
در بهاراں لعل می ریزد زسنگ
خیزد از خاکش یکے طوفان رنگ !

---

[1] Iqbāl, *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 53.
[2] Arberry (trans.), *Persian Psalms*, pp. 30-31.

لکه هائے ابر در کوه و دمن
پنبه پران از کمان پنبه زن !
کوه و دریا و غروب آفتاب !
من خدا را دیدم آنجا بے حجاب!(۱)

Arberry's translation:

Behold her mountains turbaned in white,
behold the firey hands of her chenars;
in springtime rubies leap down from the rocks,
a flood of colour rises from her soil,
stippled clouds cover mountain and valley
like cotton-flocks strewn from a carder's bow.
Mountain and river, and the setting of the sun:
there I behold God without a veil.[2]

(۲) یا رب درون سینه دل با خبر بده
در باده نشه را نگرم آن نظر بده
این بنده را که با نفس دیگران نزیست
یک آه خانه زاد مثال سحر بده
سیلم، مرا بجوئے تنک مایهٔ مپیچ !
جولانگهے هوادی و کوه و کمر بده
خاکم به نور نغمهٔ داؤد بر فروز
هر ذرهٔ مرا پر و بال شرر بده(۳)

Arberry's Translation:

I pray thee, Lord, to me impart
Within my breast a conscious heart:
Give me the vision to divine
The rapture pulsing through the wine.
It never pleased me, to receive
Another's breath, that I might live:
Give me a breath as light as morn,
A sigh that in the home was born.
I am a torrent: do not set
Me dribbling in a rivulet,
But give my waters space to spill

[1] Iqbāl, *Jāvīd Nāma*, p. 187.
[2] Arberry (trans.), *Jāvīd Nāma*, p. 118.
[3] Iqbāl, *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, pp. 4-5.

O'er valley broad and spreading hill.
Illuminate my lifeless clay
With anthems David used to play;
Let all my atoms swiftly spring
Upborne upon an ember's wing.[1]

A study of the texts and their translations given above will show that this great scholar has succeeded in a remarkable degree in retaining the beauty and grandeur of the original. While one may find instances in which he failed to interpret Iqbāl correctly, on the whole every student of Iqbāl will find in these translations wealth of scholarship and art.

After reading Arberry's translations of Iqbāl, one is reminded of great masterpieces in the English language in this field: Nicholson's translations of *Diwān-i Shamsi Tabrīz* and Getrude Bell's translations of Ḥāfiz. There is no doubt that all these translations have enriched the English language. In the words of E.G. Browne, it can be said of all these translations "I can recall but few English verse-renderings of Eastern poets which seems to me so adequate and so beautiful as these."[2]

Arberry has himself remarked, "It has been said that the ideal at which the translator should aim is to produce a version as near as possible to what his original would have written, had he been composing in the translator's language and not his own."[3] It can be safely said that Arberry has succeeded in a remarkable degree in achieving the ideal he set before himself. This he could do bacause he also loved Islāmic culture. His work on Islāmic culture helped him in realising the subtleties and intricacies of a culture whose values, ideas and symbols form the basic framework of the context of Iqbāl's poetry. Arberry considered Iqbāl as a true representative of that culture. He used to say that Rūmī saved the world from chaos seven hundred years ago and it is only the study of Rūmī that can save Europe today. As he regarded Iqbāl as a true disciple of Rūmī, he felt that the study of Iqbāl would help the Europeans today. Referring to his stay in Egypt, he remarked, "Though politics sometimes clouded the serenity of the academic sky, politics was

[1] Arberry, (trans.), *Persian Psalms*, p. xi.
[2] Arberry, *Oriental Essays*, p. 179
[3] Arberry (trans.), *Jāvīd Nāma*, p. 14.

never my business; and I look back on my years in Egypt, which took me also to Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, as among the happiest of my life."[1] Though he never visited Pakistan, he always took great interest in the intellectual development of the country. He considered Pakistan as a representative of Islāmic culture and his ardent wish was that this country should always remain so. In a message to *Bazm-i Iqbāl* in 1950, he wrote:

> Iqbāl's doctrine of the indestructible significance of the individual contains a message of hope and inspiration in these days when the rights and duties of individual man are so gravely threatened by materialistic conceptions of an all-powerful state. His doctrine of the place of the individual in society, with his interpretation of the term society to mean the whole community of right-believing men and women, is no less important as a corrective to vialist tendencies in contemporary thought. His message is of universal appeal and application.[2]

It must be admitted that early in his career his writings showed a feeling of nostalgia for the glory that had departed or was departing from England, but in course of time he outgrew this feeling. His studies of Rūmī and Iqbāl brought home to him a feeling of brotherhood in mankind. Meanwhile, his studies of the *Qur'ān* and Ṣūfīsm brought to him new light and a broadening of sympathies. After years of studies he wrote about the language of the *Qur'ān*: "Briefly, the rhetoric and rhythm of the Arabic of the Koran are so characteristic, so powerful, so highly emotive, that every version whatsoever is bound in the nature of things to be but a poor copy of the glittering splendour of the original."[3]

In a language of great warmth and depth, Professor Arberry writes in his Preface to *The Koran Interpreted:*

> "During the long months, the dark and light months, of labouring at this interpretation, eclectic where the ancient commentators differ in their understanding of a word or a phrase, unannotated because notes in plenty are to be found in other versions, and the radiant beauty of the

---

[1] Arberry, *Oriental Essays*, p. 237.

[2] From the records of *Bazm-i Iqbāl*, Karachi.

[3] Arberry, *Koran Interpreted*, p. 24.

> original is not clouded by such vexing interpolations — all through this welcome task I have been reliving those Ramadan nights of long ago, when I would sit on the varandah of my Gezira house and listen entranced to the old, white-bearded Shaykh who chanted the Koran for the pious delectation of my neighbour .... It was then that I, the infidel, learnt to understand and react to the thrilling rhythm of the Koran, only to be apprehended when listened to at such a time and in such a place. In humble thankfulness I dedicate this all too inperfect essay in imitation to the memory of those magical Egyptian nights.[1]

I have known very few Christian scholars refer to the *Qur'ān* with such feelings of devotion and admiration. Every word written by the Professor radiates his sincerity and echoes with his faith. This shows how with age and studies he had come to appreciate the spirit of Islām and Islāmic Culture.

Throughout his career, Professor Arberry worked hard to make Oriental studies more popular in Great Britain, and in Scarbrough Report he saw signs of his hopes being realised after all. The Scarbrough Commission, consisting of fifteen men of distinction, was appointed on December 15, 1944 by the then Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden. Its Report has been with all justification called the Charter of Modern Orientalism. The report suggested means for affecting advances in the humanities comparable in scale with advance already achieved in science. But in subsequent years the action taken on the recommendations of the Scarbrough Report was not very encouraging, and this made Arberry write: "I look forward to the time which I shall certainly not witness myself when it will be considered as normal for an undergraduate to study the history of Arab, or Persian or Indian or Chinese or Japanese civilisation as to investigate the ancient and modern civilisations of Europe." There are no signs of Professor Arberry's hopes being realised in the near future. But it must be acknowledged that he did his best to achieve the aims of the Report at least in Cambridge.

Professor Arberry produced books of great learning based on original research in great numbers. It can be truly said of him that

---

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

productivity was at full spate throughout his career. Owing to the pressure under which he worked his health broke down frequently and he needed holidays often which he utilised to collect fresh material for new books. In all he has left us over forty books.

Once when Professor Arberry and the writer were having lunch with the Master of Pambroke College in the College dinning hall, the Master asked Arberry, "Arberry, do you read all the books you write?" This remark provided an index to the dimension of his literary output.

Arberry died on October 22, 1969. In him we lost a great friend of Oriental learning, a devoted scholar and worker on Iqbāl. While it is true that "Nicholson was the first man in the West to recognise the greatnes of Iqbāl,"[1] it was Arberry who really made Iqbāl accessible to Western readers. In Iqbāl he discovered Rūmī's teachings presented in the light of modern thought, and this served to intensify his admiration for Iqbāl.

[1] Arberry, *Oriental Essays*, p. 215.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AL-GHAZZĀLĪ

—*R. E. Abū Shanab*

The aim of this paper is to make explicit some of the philosophic contributions of the Medieval Persian scholar, al-Ghazzālī.[1] In our discussion we shall endeavour to delineate his philosophic significance by concentrating on two of his major works, *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah* (The Goals of the Philosophers) and *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers).[2] In addition to this, we shall indicate at length al-Ghazzālī's importance in the development of logic in Medieval Islām.

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AL-GHAZZĀLĪ'S *MAQĀṢID AL-FALĀSIFAH*

Al-Ghazzālī's interest in philosophy began at an early age under the direction of the prominent Ash'arite theologian of the period, al-Juwaynī. It was al-Juwaynī who introduced his pupil not only to the study of *Kalām*, but also to the study of philosophy and

[1] His full name is Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, the Algazel of the Schoolmen. He was born at Ṭūs in Khurāsān, near the modern Persian city Mashhad. Much discussion centered on whether his *nisbah* should be spelled as Ghazālī or Ghazzālī. The latter spelling is the one we shall use. For a discussion on this controversy see W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual: A Study of Al-Ghazzālī* (Edinburg: The Edinburgh University Press, 1963), pp. 181-182.

[2] We are not suggesting that these are the only two books that al-Ghazzālī wrote; nor are we also suggesting that these are the only significant books. In the course of our discussion we will be referring to other works of his. For a list of al-Ghazzālī's works, we refer the reader to the following: (1) M. Bouyges, *Essai de chronologie des oeuvres de al-Ghazzālī*, ed. M. Allard (Beirut, 1959); (2) F. Jabre, "La Biographie et l 'oeuvre de Ghazālī reconsidéries a la Lumiere des Ṭabaqāt de Subkī," *Mélanges de l 'Institut Dominicain d'etudes orientales elu caire*, 1954; (3) W. M. Watt, "The Authenticity of the Works Attributed to Al-Ghazzālī", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1952), pp. 24-45; (4) G. F.

logic. It was not until al-Ghazzālī was appointed Professor at the Niẓāmiyah College in Baghdād in 1091 that he started seriously delving into a systematic study of philosophy. It would seem that his keen interest in phliosophy reached its zenith between the years of 1091 and 1095, the duration of his appointment as Professor at Niẓāmiyah College. According to al-Ghazzālī's own account in *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl* (Deliverance from Error), his interest in the study of philosophy stemmed from the desire to comprehend, prior to refuting, those philosophers whose theories were in conflict with the tenets of Orthodox Islām. In less than two years, al-Ghazzālī was able to master the sciences of the philosophers.[1] The result of these philosophical contemplations was the work entitled *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah*. His interest in philosophy is further delineated in *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl* in which he categorizes seekers of knowledge into four groups:

1. The theologians (*mutakallimūn*) who claim to be the expounders of thought and speculation.
2. The *Bāṭinīs* who contend that they are the party of instruction (*ta'līm*) and that they derive their truth from the infallible *Imām*.
3. The philosophers (*falāsifah*) who consider themselves as the exponents of logic and demonstration.
4. The mystics (*Ṣūfīs*) who claim to have the privilege of *presence, vision* and *revelation*.

Al-Ghazzālī even contended that truth cannot lie outside these four classes. As he put it: "If the truth is not with them [knowledge seekers], there is then no point in realizing the truth; for it does not make sense to return to the area of imitation [or derivative belief], after one has already left it."[2] According to his scheme it is then imperative that one's intellectual activity be concerned with the study of philosophy, for philosophers "regard themselves as the exponents of logic and demonstration."[3] It should be noted here that al-Ghazzālī's concept of philosophy is restricted to logic and demonstration both of which he considered in subsequent

---

Hourani, "The Chronology of Ghazzālī's Writings", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (1959), pp. 225-233; (5) W. M. Watt, "The Study of al-Ghazzālī", *Oriens* (1969), xiii-xiv, 121-131.

[1] Al-Ghazzālī, *Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*, eds. J. Saliba and K. 'Iyyād (Beirut, 1967), p. 75.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

[3] *Ibid.*

works as indispensable tools in intellectual endeavour. (We will consider this point later in the paper).

The underlying reason behind al-Ghazzālī's study of philosophy was primarily to enable him to sort out those views that were in conflict with orthodox Islām. But this intellectual enterprise first led to a reproduction of the philosophic views of his predecessors, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. The philosophic work which reported this non-critical account of the philosophers was *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah*. Al-Ghazzālī's reason for writing this book was aptly stated in the introduction to his book:

> You have asked for a beneficial discussion in uncovering the destruction (or incoherence) of the philosophers, the contradictions of their theories, and the areas of their ambiguity and deceit. And there is no advantage in helping you [in this respect] except after informing you of their theories and beliefs. For the understanding of the falsity of their theories before fully comprehending their purposes is absurd .... Hence I thought to proceed by explaining briefly the purpose of their logical, physical and metaphysical sciences without distinguishing between that which is true from that which is false. For I only intend to make you understand the purpose of their theories without taking into account any detail concerning that which is considered to be redundant and far removed from their goals. Hence I only want to introduce them just for the sake of narration by linking them to that which they believed to be significant.[1]

In addition, he claimed that the "purpose of the book (The Goals of the Philosophers) is to make you acquainted with their sciences which amount to four divisions: mathematics, logic, physics, and metaphysics."[2] It is interesting to note in this connection that al-Ghazzālī did not discuss mathematics in *Maqāṣid* believing as he did that mathematical propositions "do not contradict the intellect, and they are not the kind to be met by denial. On account of this there is no reason in discussing them."[3] However, with respect to

---

[1] Al-Ghazzālī, *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah*, ed. Kurdī (Cairo, 1936), p. 1.
[2] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. 2.
[3] *Ibid.*

the other fields, al-Ghazzālī felt that their acceptance was met by disapproval from various intellectual circles. He contended that most of the beliefs in metaphysics were contrary to the truth and, furthermore, "their correctness is rare." Most of the logical propositions, he claimed, were correct and that error in them was rare. With respect to physics, al-Ghazzālī felt that the truth about it was mingled with that which was false, and that that which was correct about it resembled that which was incorrect. In *Maqāṣid*, al-Ghazzālī devotes approximately 70 pages to logic, 140 to metaphysics and 75 to physics. Some of the important philosophic topics that he addressed himself to were:

A. Part I (Logic). (1) The significance of utterances, (2) universal notions, (3) compositions of singulars, (4) arrangements of propositions, (5) discourse on categorical and exceptive syllogisms, (6) the content of syllogism, (7) construction of premises.

B. Part II (Metaphysics). (1) Substance and accidents, (2) universals and particulars, (3) one and the many, (4) causation, (5) priority and posteriority, (6) necessity and contingency, (7) potentiality and actuality, (8) necessary existent, (9) attributes of the First.

C. Part III (Physics). (1) Types of motion, (2) simple and compound corporeals, (3) the vegetative, animal and human soul, (4) external perception, (5) internal perceptions, (6) active intellect.

The above topics clearly indicate al-Ghazzālī's sophistication with the philosophical language of his predecessors. It is indeed quite an achievement for an intellectual to be able to report such an objective account, knowing all along that what these philosophers had to say is, for the most part, in sharp opposition to the religious orthodox community of Islām. Whether al-Ghazzālī wrote the book without plagiarizing is perhaps difficult to ascertain. Undoubtedly, he reproduces many of Ibn Sīnā's arguments *verbatim*. Most likely al-Ghazzālī attempted simply to be as faithful as he could to these philosophers and, hence, was bound to reproduce *verbatim* some of Ibn Sīnā's arguments.

It would be worthwhile to study, and compare the texts of Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazzālī. The advantage that might accrue from such a project would consist not only in determining how textually close al-Ghazzālī was to Ibn Sīnā, but also in attempting to locate

any philosophical misinterpretation on the part of al-Ghazzālī. Such a textual analysis might enable us to dispel some of the erroneous interpretations imputed to al-Ghazzālī's predecessors. To illustrate this point, consider the important "essence-existence" distinction by Ibn Sīnā. It is commonly held by scholars[1] of Islāmic medieval philosophy that Ibn Sīnā subscribed to the thesis that "existence is an addition to essence" or that "existence is an accident of an essence." Recently, however, one author[2] attempted to dispel this commonly held view, basing it on some of Ibn Sīnā's texts. In al-Ghazzālī's *Maqāṣid*, there is an interesting passage that might shed some light on the source of this confusion. The passage in its entirety is as follows:

> Irrespective of how you underetand the essential and that which is essential to it (universal), the subject matter cannot occur in your mind unless you understand first the attainment of that which is essential to it, and you cannot comprehend it without *that* essential. If you understand man and animal, then you cannot understand man without first understanding animal. And if you understand number and understand four, then you will not be able to comprehend four without understanding first number. And if you substituted "animal" and "number" respectively for "existence" and "white", then you are able to understand four without realizing whether it exists or not, or whether it is white or not. But it may be doubted whether there is in the world the number four or not. But this does not match our understanding of the essence of the number four. And thus one undersrands the essence of man by the intellect without having recourse to

[1] The following authors have at one time or another attributed to Ibn Sīnā the view that "existence is an addition to an essence": A.M. Goichon, *La Distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d' aprés Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne)* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937), p. 132. n. 1, and *passim*; J. Weinberg, *A Short History of Medieval Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1964), p. 114; A. Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 98; Ḥ. Naṣr, *Three Muslim Sages* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1964), p. 26.

[2] See P. Morewedge's article "Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sīnā's 'Essence-existence' Distinction," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, (forthcoming).

> understanding that ne is white or that he is existing; and you cannot understand him (i.e., man) without knowing that he is an animal. And if your intellect does not help you understand this example because you are an existent being, and [because] of the plurality of man's existence, then substitute the example by "crocodile" or whatever animal you want. And hence *existence is accidental to all essences*, but that animal [in relation] to man is essential and likewise is "color" to "blackness" and "number" to "five" [are essential].[1]

This passage substantiates the views of the expounders of the thesis that "existence is an addition to an essence." If this were the correct rendition of Ibn Sīnā's view and if one were to accept Professor Morewedge's claim that Ibn Sīnā never entertained such a view, then it would be feasible to contend that the source of confusion with respect to this issue perhaps stems from al-Ghazzālī's discussion of it in *Maqāṣid*. Whether this in fact is the case does not concern us here. What we have tried to suggest is that it is quite conceivable that al-Ghazzālī in *Maqāṣid* was not simply reproducing *verbatim* the views of his predecessors, but that he might also have attempted to go beyond those views. Such a claim could only be substantiated by subjecting al-Ghazzālī's book to a careful philosophical as well as critical analysis, and then comparing it with the available texts of his predecessors in order to demonstrate whether in fact he was simply giving an objective account of them.

Before considering the significance of al-Ghazzālī's book, it is necessary to consider his claim that "most of the logical propositions are correct and that the error in them is rare."[2] This assertion is odd in that al-Ghazzālī never criticised logic. As a matter of fact, he wrote treatises to promote the study of logic. To wit, in his book *Mi'yār al-'Ilm* (The Standard of Knowledge) he offered an extensive treatment of logic; in *Miḥakk al-Naẓar* (The Touchstone of Thinking), he offered a shorter version of *Mi'yār*. Both these books were designed for persons trained in jurisprudence. Al-Ghazzālī hoped that the study of logic would facilitate their subject matter. In *al-Qusṭās al-Mustaqīm* (The Correct Balance), al-Ghazzālī applied

[1] Al-Ghazzālī, *Maqāṣid*, Part I, pp. 11-12. (Emphasis added).
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

syllogistic reasoning to theological questions. Thus if logic does contain any errors, why did not al-Ghazzālī demonstrate them, as he did with the physical and metaphysical theses in his *Tahāfut*. Our only suggestion is that when he wrote *Maqāṣid* he was under the impression that logical propositions did contain some errors and hence were to be refuted. He did likewise with the physical and metaphysical theses of the philosophers, which later proved to be contradictory. If this assumption is incorrect, we fail to understand how to interpret the remark underlying his assertion that logical propositions contain some errors. Indeed, one wonders why he bothered at all to write about logic in *Maqāṣid* if his intention was not to refute it, as he did with the other claims of his predecessors. Again, our suggestion was that he did not find anything controversial about logic. His concluding remarks in *Maqāṣid* bear out what we are suggesting:

> That was what we intended to discuss about knowledge (logic, metaphysics, and physics) without paying attention to distinguishing that which is good from the bad, and the correct from the incorrect. Now let us start the book, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) in order that that which is incorrect of their opinions would be clear and God is the one who will let us arrive at the truth.[1]

Now let us focus our attention on the significance of *Maqāṣid*. The following three salient points stand out:

1. It was considered the best introductory study of Islāmic philosophy. The Latin scholastic philosophers used it extensively to the point that they mistook the views expounded in *Maqāṣid* to be al-Ghazzālī's own, despite his warning in the introduction to his book that he was simply giving an objective account of the theories of his predecessors and was not embarking on any critical analysis. In addition to the scholastic philosophers, the Jewish medieval philosophers, especially Ibn Maymun (Maimonides, d. 1204) of Cordova, used al-Ghazzālī's book. *Maqāṣid* became one of the most widely read and influential books on neo-Platonism in the Medieval Ages.

---

[1] *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 77.

2. Ibn Rushd's *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (The Incoherence of Incoherence) generated a great deal of interest in the Medieval Ages. Since Ibn Rushd's book was a refutation of al-Ghazzālī's *Tahāfut*, it thus was imperative to comprehend al-Ghazzālī's philosophic position, not just as embodied in *Tahāfut* but also as narrated in *Maqāṣid*.

3. Since Ibn Sīnā was a highly influential philosopher, Medieval scholars resorted to al-Ghazzālī's *Maqāṣid* in order to understand his theories.

II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AL-GHAZZĀLĪ'S *TAHĀFUT*

In *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazzālī embarked on the task of refuting the views of the philosophers. Note that it was only the physical and metaphysical theses that al-Ghazzālī wanted to refute. Logic, as mentioned earlier, was praised by al-Ghazzālī, for he considered it a useful tool in man's intellectual activity. Logic, contended al-Ghazzālī, was doctrinally neutral and hence did not conflict with the religious tenets of orthodox Islām. However, with respect to the metaphysical and physical theses, al-Ghazzālī contended that the philosophers' views were objectionable to orthodox Islām and hence should be refuted if one is to preserve Islām.

In the book al-Ghazzālī noted twenty objectionable theses, three of which were deemed to be the doctrines of infidels and the remainder the doctrines of heretics. The metaphysical-physical doctrines which al-Ghazzālī considered the most objectionable were:

1. The eternity of the world.
2. The denial of God's knowledge of particulars, i.e., that God only takes cognizance of the universals.
3. The affirmation only of the immortality of the soul, and hence the denial of the resurrection of the bodies.

Al-Ghazzālī's contention was that the world was created *exnihilo*, hence his rejection of the philosophers' views concerning the eternity of the world; that God takes cognizance not only of the universals but also of particulars, hence his rejection of the second point; that the resurrection of the bodies is conceivable,

hence his rejection of the third point. Interesting as these topics are, we shall not treat them at length; rather we shall focus on one of al-Ghazzālī's most important philosophical theses discussed in *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, i.e., his views on the theory of causation. Specifically, we shall discuss his refutation of the concept of a *necessary causal nexus* and note the striking parallel of his views to those of the British philosopher David Hume (1711-1776).

In the last part of *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, al-Ghazzālī embarked on the task, *interalia*, to refute those philosophers who advocated the concept of a necessary causal nexus in natural events. His discussion of causality commences with the following:

> Customarily the association (connection) between that which is believed to be a cause and that which is believed to be an effect is not necessary for us. But consider any two things whereby neither of which is the other. And the affirmation of one of them does not guarantee the other, and its denial does not guarantee the denial of the other. And thus the existence of one does not necessarily depend on the existence of the other; neither on the non-existence of the other. Take any two things such as the quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning and contact with fire, light and the appearance of the sun, death and decapitation, cure and medicine, evacuation and the use of a laxative, and so forth for all the empirical connections in medicine, or astronomy, or arts or crafts.[1]

This passage clearly reveals al-Ghazzālī's basic point that when two things invariably follow each other, nothing can prove or demonstrate that one is the cause of the other. In other words, a necessary causal connection is neither logically nor empirically demonstrated. So far it would seem that al-Ghazzālī is as much an empiricist as the British philosopher, Hume. To wit, compare the above passage with the following:

> They are still more frivolous, who say, that every effect must have a cause, because 'tis imply'd in the very idea of effect. Every effect necessarily pre-supposes a cause; effect being a relative term, of which cause is the

[1] Al-Ghazzālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut, 1927), pp. 277-278.

> correlative. But this does not prove, that every being must be preceded by a cause; no more than it follows, because every husband must have a wife, and therefore every man must be marry'd. The true state of the question is, whether every object, which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause; and this I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain...[1]

Just as al-Ghazzālī asserted that co-existence does not indicate causation, so also did Hume. Because two events invariably follow each other, there is no necessary justification from experience for claiming that one is or is not the cause of the other. Let us consider one of al-Ghazzālī's examples in order to further reveal the similarity between him and Hume. Contact with fire burns cotton. Al-Ghazzālī admitted that it is quite conceivable that the contact might occur without the burning or that the cotton might be changed into ashes without coming into contact with fire.[2] What he inferred from such an example was that sense observation does not disclose that fire necessarily causes the burning of cotton. As he put it:

> They [philosophers] have no other proof than observation of the occurrence of burning when there is contact with fire. And that observation proves only that one is with the other, but does not prove that it is by it and that it has no other cause than it.[3]

So far al-Ghazzālī and Hume are in fundamental agreement concerning their denial of necessity to empirical events. To both the concept of a necessary causal nexus is not given in experience. All that we actually perceive when we look at the external world are events followed by other events with no necessary connection between them. The necessity that the concept of causality implies is nowhere to be demonstrated by experience. However, it is with respect to the explanation of how one arrives at the idea of "necessary connection" that both adopted different views. Al-Ghazzālī contended that events are necessarily connected in nature because of God's will. As he explained it:

---

[1] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 82.

[2] Al-Ghazzālī, *Tahāfut*, p. 279.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

> The connection of these things [i.e., empirical events] is a result of God's power, which preceded their existence. If one follows another, it is because God created them in that manner, and not because this connection is necessary in itself and cannot be disjoined. He has the power to create satiety without hunger, and death without decapitation, to prolong life after decapitation, and so on with respect to all concomitant things.[1]

Al-Ghazzālī's contention with respect to why things in nature are connected differed from Hume's explanation. To Hume, the belief in causality was found to be a matter of *custom, habit, instinct, expectation.* Specifically, all sequences do invariably occur, but these sequences, if repeated again and again, will produce in the mind a strong disposition to connect the events that form the sequence. Thus Hume's answer boiled down to the assertion that necessary connection is no more than psychological, i.e., the way in which we think. As he put it, "Upon the whole, necessary is something that exists in the mind, not in objects: nor is it possible for us even to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies."[2]

With respect to al-Ghazzālī's analysis of causation there is first the *empiricist* element which, as I attempted to indicate, closely parallels that of Hume. Second, there is the metaphysical element which al-Ghazzālī on the one hand invokes and Hume on the other rejects.

Further examination of *Tahāfut* seems to indicate al-Ghazzālī's closeness to Hume. After al-Ghazzālī denied that there is any necessary connection between cause and effect, he entertained the possibility of whether a book could turn into an animal, a slave boy into a dog or a stone into gold.[3] If we denied the necessary dependence of effects on causes and maintained that an effect is to be attributed to the will of its creator and, furthermore, that that will has no definite pattern, but that it may vary and be quite arbitrary, then one would be led to entertain the possibility of the above examples. Al-Ghazzālī's answer to that was:

---

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 279.
[2] Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 165-166.
[3] Al-Ghazzālī, *Tahāfut*, p. 280.

> ...God has created in us the knowledge that he will not do all these possible things ... but they are possible in that they may or may not happen, and the persistence of habit firmly fixes their occurrence in our minds in accordance with a previous habit in a fixed impression.[1]

This passage is quite revealing in its statemeent that God does not permit, for example, a book to be turned into an animal, or a slave boy into a dog. We do not expect such phenomena to occur, because we are not accustomed to seeing such things. Clearly there are overtones of Hume's analysis here too. As human beings, we are creatures of habit and tend to depend upon past events to justify future events. Yet, whereas al-Ghazzālī speaks about the orderly course of nature as being the habit of the divine will,[2] Hume believes that the justification of the orderliness of nature is psychological, the way we think, and therefore has nothing to do with God. Thus al-Ghazzālī's position is again similar to Hume's except that he introduced God as part of his argument.[3]

Tahāfut has proved of permanent interest and influence, not just in the Islāmic world but also in the Medieval Latin West. The following points are of importance:

1. It revived the religious atmosphere by saving orthodox Islām. Al-Ghazzālī's refutation of the philosophers' views were for the most part based on religious explanations, believing, as he did, that philosophic theory cannot be the basis of religious beliefs;

---

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 272, 285, 296.

[3] In my article "Ghazzālī, Berkeley and Hume on Causation," *Agora* (forthcoming), I discussed at length these views. In addition, I indicated too how close are the views of the British philosopher Berkeley (1685-1753) to al-Ghazzālī. Al-Ghazzālī, Berkeley and Hume are in accord concerning their fundamental empiricist theses, with respect to causation. All three rejected the view that there is any necessary connection between cause and effect in nature. However, there is a marked difference in the answers to "why sensible things are connected in nature?" Al-Ghazzālī and Berkeley provide a metaphysical justification; to both, causal connections are necessarily imposed by God. To Hume, on the other hand, causal connections are by-products of our subjective nature. Furthermore, there seem to be other similarities among the three in response to the question "How can we be sure that our inferences are to be trusted?" The al-Ghazzālī-Berkeley's empirical analysis suggests a metaphysical explanation, whereas Hume's empiricism is divorced from any metaphysical vestiges.

revelation alone can discover the essentials of truth. Thus, in opposing the positions of the philosophers, he was able to subordinate philosophy to theology.

2. *Tahāfut* was one of the first attempts to separate Islāmic philosophy from Greek philosophy. Indeed, Al-Ghazzālī was one of the first Muslim philosophers to fundamentally deviate from Greek philosophy.

3. Al-Ghazzālī's attack on the concept of the causal necessary nexus was classical. He was the first thinker to embark on a systematic refutation of the notion of necessary connection in nature. It is quite conceivable, however, that al-Ghazzālī, in his attack on the concept of the causal necessary nexus, could have been influenced by the Greek skeptics, especially those of the Pyrrhonian school.[1]

4. Al-Ghazzālī's arguments in support of the theory of creation *exnihilo*, God's cognizance of particulars, and the resurrection of the bodies were widely received in the Islāmic world. When *Tahāfut* was translated into Latin, it was adopted by many scholastic philosophers.[2]

III. AL-GHAZZĀLĪ'S PLACE IN LOGIC

Now, we shall turn to al-Ghazzālī's significance in the development of logic in Medieval Islām. We indicated earlier that he had a keen interest in logic. Although he rejected most of Ibn Sīnā's metaphysical and physical theses, al-Ghazzālī was a staunch follower of Ibn Sīnā in the field of logic. Al-Ghazzālī's desire to accept logic stemmed primarily from the lack of any doctrinal content in it that might conflict with orthodox Islām. This indeed is the criterion that he adopted in his intellectual life. In other words, if the contents of a particular subject matter were not in conflict with religion, it was useful and hence should be utilized by the community. On the other hand, if the contents were in conflict with

---

[1] Van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) (London: Luzac and Co., 1954), Vol. I, *Introduction*, Vol. II, *passim*.

[2] See S. M. Afnān, *Avicenna: His Life and Works* (London: GeorgeAllen and Unwin Ltd. 1958), p. 239.

religion, then it was harmful and hence should be avoided by the community. It is in this sense then that logic passed al-Ghazzālī's scrutiny.

Because he found logic theologically useful and acceptable, al-Ghazzālī encouraged its study. Arguing that it was doctrinally neutral, that it was merely "a tool of knowledge," he wrote logical treatises for his fellow theologians, urging them to master the tools of logic in order to be better equipped in rebutting the opponents' doctrines. The most comprehensive logic book which al-Ghazzālī appended to *Tahāfut* was *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*. One of the motives for writing this book was, as he tells us, to explain the technical, logical vocabulary of the philosophers to his fellow theologians, thus enabling them to have a better understanding of the arguments delineated in *Tahāfut*. In *Mihākk al-Naẓar*, al-Ghazzālī offered a shorter version of *Mi'yār*, still hoping that logic would be utilized by his fellow theologians. In *Al-Qusṭās al-Mustaqīm*, he applied syllogistic reasoning to theological questions.

It should be noted in this connection that all of al-Ghazzālī's treatises on logic faithfully followed the ideas of his predecessors, particularly Ibn Sīnā. Although al-Ghazzālī was not original in his treatment of logic, he was still credited as being the first Islāmic Medieval philosopher who encouraged and utilized logic in discussion of theological questions. Indeed the link between theology and logic proved to be a decisive factor in the survival of logical studies in Medieval Islām, for logic came to be accepted by theologians and others as an important tool in the shaping of the Islāmic basic curriculum. The following structure was developed: (a) *Qur'ān*, (b) Arabic Language, (c) Logic, (d) Theology and Religious Law.[1] The slogan "*man tamantaqa tazandaqa*" (he who uses logic commits heresy) was no longer seriously entertained in the Islāmic community. Once again "Persia was to become the undisputed center of logical studies in the Arabic speaking world.[2]

Although the detachment of logic from philosophy proved to be of significance, it did not advance the development of logic. As Professor Nicholas Rescher so aptly stated:

---

[1] See A. S. Tritton, *Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages* (London, 1957), pp. 134-135; also see N. Rescher, *The Development of Arabic Logic* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), pp. 51-52.

[2] Rescher, *Arabic Logic*, p. 54.

> In making its peace with theology, as it was ultimately to succeed in doing, Arabic logic did not get off without paying a price. By breaking away from philosophy and becoming an accepted part of advanced religious instruction, the study of logic became sterile and stylized — a matter of memorizing handbooks rather than mastering a living discipline.[1]

Professor Rescher's comment is historically correct. But be that as it may, the logical treatises that the Muslim philosophers wrote, especially those of al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazzālī, were of profound historical significance in the development of logic. Though Islāmic logic was Aristotelian in its general outline, a closer examination of the logical treatises of the Muslim philosophers reveals that it was wider in scope and subject matter. No one is certain about the actual influences on Islāmic logic, but it may be safe to suggest that logic as propounded by Muslim logicians tended for the most part toward assimilation of Aristotle's *Organon* which was available to the Muslim scholars through the expertise of various commentators and the works of the Stoics. If this claim is correct, one may consider Muslim logicians as *synthesizers* of Aristotle's logic as well as that of the Stoics. In order to substantiate this claim, let us consider how the two significant Arabic terms *taṣawwur* (*concept*) and (*taṣdīq*), (*assent*) as well as *hamliyyah* (*categorical, attributive, non-conditional*) and *sharṭiyyah* (*conditional*) propositions were utilized by Muslim logicians.

(*I*) *Concept and Assent*

The origin of these two terms is not known; yet every Islāmic logic textbook of the Medieval period begins by stating that all knowledge is either of concept or assent (judgment). The concept, roughly speaking, is the realization of essence without judging it either affirmatively or negatively; and the way of apprehending it is by means of a *definition* (*ḥadd*). Assent (judgment) is the concept which is judged; that is to say, it is the ascription (predication) of one thing of another affirmatively or negatively; and the way of apprehending it is by means of a *demonstration* (*burhān*).[2]

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

[2] See al-Ghazzālī's *Munqidh*, p. 82.

The above indicates the bifurcation of logic into two parts: one dealing with concepts, the other with assent (judgment). It would indeed be historically helpful to locate the underlying reasons for this division. One explanation would be to claim that the desire on the part of Islāmic logicians to accomodate Aristotle's logic as well as the works of the Stoic logicians led them to such a division. If one were to claim that the part of logic dealing with concept is equivalent to the logic of terms and that of assent equivalent to the logic of propositions, and, furthermore, if one were to agree with Lukasiewicz's contention.[1] that Aristotelian logic was a logic of terms, while Stoic logic was a logic of propositions (judgments), then this would lend some credibility — not just to the view that is being suggested for the division of logic into concept and assent, but also to the view that Islāmic logicians tended to synthesize the best of Aristotle's logic and Stoic logic.

(*II*) *Conditional and Non-Conditional Propositions*

A non-conditional (categorical) proposition, according to Islāmic logicians, is one which affirms a predicate to a subject, or denies it of a subject. For instance: Zayd is a writer; Zayd is not a writer. In connection with the discussion of categorical propositions and syllogisms, Islāmic logicians did not substantially differ from the Aristotelian tradition, as evidenced in their discussions of the kinds of categorical propositions, the three figures, categorical syllogisms, etc. On the other hand, in their treatment of conditional propositions, Islāmic logicians deviated from the Aristotelian tradition. Conditional propositions consist of two parts, each part including a proposition. Starting with al-Fārābī and possibly earlier, Islāmic logicians discussed two kinds of conditional propositions: (a) *hypothetical conjunctive* (*al-sharṭiyyah al-muttaṣilah*), and (b) *hypothetical disjunctive* (*al-sharṭiyyah al-munfaṣilah*). The paradigm examples of (a) and (b) are respectively: "If the sun has risen, it is day." "Either the world is created or eternal." It should be pointed out that though conditional propositions were known to Aristotle, they were, however, never explored by him.[2] However,

[1] J. Lukasiewica, *Aristotle's Syllogistic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), pp. 47-48.

[2] See Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, $50^{a}32$.

Islāmic logicians went beyond Aristotle's promisory note. One indeed finds detailed accounts of coditional statements in the writings of Islāmic Medieval philosophers.[1]

It is interesting to note in this connection that Islāmic logicians were quite familiar with valid as well as invalid conditional syllogisms. In *Maqāṣid*, al-Ghazzālī cited the following paradigm examples of hypothetical conjunctive arguments:[2]

A) 1. If the world is created, then it has a creator.
2. The world is created
Therefore, it has a creator

Letting "A" stand for "The world is created," and "B" for "The world has a creator," the argument form of (A) is:

If A, then B
A
∴ B

B) 1. If the world is created, then it has a creator
2. There is no creator
Therefore, the world is not created.

The argument form of (B) is:

If A, then B
Not B
∴ Not A

C) 1. If the world is created, then it has a creator
2. The world is not created
Therefore, there is no creator[3]

---

[1] See N. Rescher, *Al-Fārābī on Aristotle's Prior Analytics* (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963), pp. 74-80; also see A.M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne)* (Paris, 1938); and *Livre des directives et remarques (Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt)* trans. A.M. Goichon (Paris, 1951). Yet the distinction between hypothetical conjunctive and hypothetical disjunctive propositions is not original with Muslim logicians, for one can find treatment of them in Boethius' treatise *De Syllogismo Hypothetico* (See N. Rescher, *Studies in the History of Arabic Logic* [Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963], p. 77, note 4).

[2] See *Maqāṣid*, Part I, pp. 36-37.

[3] Also, al-Ghazzālī stated that argument (C) could yield: "There is a creator." The form of this argument is:

(C[1]) If A, then B
Not A
∴ B

The argument form of (C) is:

If A, then B
Not A
∴ Not B

D) 1. If the world is created, then it has a creator
2. There is a creator
Therefore, the world is created[1]

The argument form of (D) is:

If A, then B
B
∴ A

Obviously (A) and (B) are valid arguments. They respectively correspond to *Modus Ponens* and *Modus Tollens* of the Latin logicians. (C) and (D) are invalid arguments. (C) commits the fallacy of *denying the antecedent*, while (D) commits the fallacy of *affirming the consequent*.

Islāmic logicians were also familiar with disjunctive syllogisms. In *Maqāṣid*, al-Ghazzālī reports the following as paradigm examples of disjunctive arguments:

> The hypothetical [disjunctive] syllogism is when you say "Either the world is created or eternal." From this kind of hypothetical disjunctive [sentence], there results four exceptive syllogisms. For you say that it is created and hence not eternal; but it is not created and hence eternal; but it is eternal and hence not created; but it is not eternal and hence created.[2]

Letting "A" stand for "the world is created," and "B" for "the world is eternal," then the above passage contains the following argument forms respectively:

A) Either A or B
A
∴ Not B

B) Either A or B
Not A
∴ B

[1] Also, according to al-Ghazzālī, this argument could yield: "The world is not created." The form of this argument is:

(D') If A, then B
B
∴ Not A

[2] Al-Ghazzālī, *Maqāṣid*, Part I, p. 37.

C) Either A or B
B
∴ Not A

D) Either A or B
Not B
∴ A

These four argument forms are all considered valid provided the logical operator "either...or" is understood in the exclusive sense. If the *inclusive*[1] sense is used, (A) and (B) would then be invalid argument forms.

The preceding discussion indicates al-Ghazzālī's familiarity with formal logic. Admittedly nothing is original in al-Ghazzālī's discussion of logic; he closely follows Ibn Sīnā. Al-Ghazzālī's aim, as mentioned earlier, was to render logic acceptable and palatable to his fellow theologians. Hence his significance in logic does not lie in introducing any new techniques to the development of logic. However, credit should go to al-Ghazzālī for his insistence that logic, since it does not conflict with the articles of faith, should be employed as a tool of inquiry.

IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be mentioned that much needs to be done with respect to al-Ghazzālī's *Maqāṣid*. So far the book has not received the scholarly attention that it should. Much light could be shed on al-Ghazzālī's predecessors if this book were available in English. We have suggested that a worthwile study would consist in a textual comparison of views of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā with those expounded by al-Ghazzālī in *Maqāṣid* in order to locate philosophical misinterpretations, if any, on the part of al-Ghazzālī. In other words, it behoves us to find out how accurate, philosophically speaking, al-Ghazzālī was in reporting the

[1] The inclusive sense of "or" means at least one, not requiring, but allowing the possibility for both to be true. The exclusive sense of "or" means that it is not the case that both are true.

doctrines of the philosophers. In *Tahāfut* one encounters a brilliant systematic refutation of the views of Ibn Sīnā. The translation of the book into English by S. A. Kamālī has enabled the western scholars to study and appreciate the philosophic acumen embodied in the book. Finally, with respect to al-Ghazzālī's contribution to logic, much credit should go to him for the support which he gave to its study. This enabled his fellow theologians to use logic as a tool in their intellectual endeavors.

A COMMONWEALTH OF MUSLIM NATIONS

—Nazīr Aḥmed Khān

Many great Muslims have, from time to time, put forward the idea of a political Muslim bloc or that of a practical demonstration of a world Muslim brotherhood, transcending all barriers of race, colour, geographical situation or notions of nationalism.

Syed Jamāluddīn Afghānī is the protagonist of the first idea; Iqbāl of the second.

Syed Jamāluddīn's movement was for the union of Islāmic countries and was, therefore, treated as a political (Pan-Islāmic) threat to Christendom by the European Powers, which did their utmost to defeat it, by all possible means. They employed most of the present methods which they now attribute to Soviet Russia in its cold war, *i.e.*, infiltration, indoctrination, creating political unrest and frustration, causing doubts and confusion, and finally sabotaging of the movement. The result of this mostly cold (and occasionally hot) treatment was, that the movement fizzled out, to the great detriment and shame of the Muslim world.

Iqbāl also seems to have been aiming at a Muslim Union which would be based on religious affinities disregarding all artificial barriers. An intellectual renaissance of Muslims was Iqbāl's suggestion for achieving the world Union of Muslims. But unlike Syed Jamāluddīn's practical approach, Iqbāl, the philosopher, had to journey long to reach his ultimate destination. He started as a nationalist, singing of his motherland—India.

سارے جہاں سے اچھا ہندوستاں ہمارا

This was, however, a passing phase.

His deep study of Muslim past and present, his contacts with the Western world, and his extensive travels abroad, made him realise that nationalism was, perhaps, not the answer to solve

mounting world tensions, and could not possibly resolve the political rivalries which world events had generated. He therefore, started taking a peep into internationalism as the penacea for some of the major political imbalances of his time.

It appears, however, that he soon found that internationalism, too, had its limitation.

He, therefore, started preaching a universal brotherhood, based on intellectual unity and moral values, in which the Muslims would naturally be the principal architects and builders. In the dedication of *Payām-i Mashriq* (1923), he says: "In the modern world, especially the Eastern world, every effort, which aims at widening the human horizon so that it transcends all geographical limitations, and creates or reorientates a truer and stronger concept of human values and affinities, is to be respected."

Iqbāl's concept of such a world does not seem to be based on any immediate political design or pattern. However, even a cursory glance at his teachings would convince the reader, that his concept of a مومن and his firm belief in the destiny of Muslims, was certainly the core of his philosophy of universalism. His teachings in the *Secrets of the Self* (اسرار خودی) and *Selflessness* (رموز بےخودی) all point unmistakably to the evolution, in course of time, of a Muslim political entity, though it would not seem to be based on political expediency.

آبرو باقی تری ملت کی جمیعت سے تھی
جب سے جمیعت گئی دنیا میں رسوا تو ہوا

فرد قائم ربط ملت سے ہے تنہا کچھ نہیں
موج ہے دریا میں اور بیرون دریا کچھ نہیں

and his faith in a centre مرکز

قوموں کے لئے موت ہے مرکز سے جدائی
ہو صاحب مرکز تو خودی کیا ہے؟ خدائی!

This brief resume of his thought leads me to the view that Iqbāl's teachings clearly support the idea of a Union of Muslim Nations, call it by whatever name you choose; "A Commonwealth of Muslim Nations" or "Muslim Bloc".

His faith in a "Centre", is again a pointer towards my conclusion that if Iqbāl had been with us today, he would have lent the weight of all his authority to the establishment of a Commonwealth of Muslim Nations.

I hinted (on an earlier occasion) to the institution of Ḥajj and the true significance of Mecca being our yearly meeting place. Mecca symbolises in essence the spirit and message of Islam. It was (and can be the centre round which Muslim reconstruction can be built up.

Iqbal believes in what is perhaps the first requisite for Union of Muslim States, a symbol—a Centre.

Again, in شمع و شاعر he says

پھر دلوں کو یاد آجائے گا پیغام سحر
پھر جبیں خاک حرم سے آشنا ہو جائے گی

Similarly, he is the most effective advocate of pulling down of all barriers which false notions of nationalism have put up. In his opinion, such shibboleths must be destroyed. This is how he treats these limitations in 'طلوع اسلام'

ہوس نے کردیا ہے ٹکڑے ٹکڑے نوع انساں کو

Again:

یہ ہندی وہ خراسانی یہ افغانی وہ تورانی
تو اے شرمندہ ساحل اچھل کر بیکراں ہو جا

غبار آلودۂ رنگ و نسب ہیں بال و پر تیرے
تو اے مرغ حرم اڑنے سے پہلے پرفشاں ہوجا

Incidentally, it will be noticed that Iqbāl is now journeying from 'nationalism' to 'internationalism' which was for him a high-road based on Muslim ideals or at least of the Muslims of the world.

Stronger currents of thought for world Muslim unity are soon noticeable in his teachings. They were the result of a deep study of history, specially, Muslim history, and current events.

Western Powers had since long, made Asia a sort of happy hunting ground. In fact, they had treated other lands also in much the same fashion (*i.e.*, Africa), but as Asia was the pivot of world domination schemes in those days, and had pronounced civilisations which must be destroyed to make it supine and easy to assimilate, European powers directed their particular attention towards liquidating this great erstwhile centre of world civilisation and advancement. Western diplomacy connected with, or emerging out of the first world war, made it plain to a seer like Iqbāl, that Asia was in the greatest danger of disruption and piecemeal annihilation.

For Asia's existence and regeneration, Iqbāl clearly defined the role of Muslims and opined that it was through their unity that not only Muslim countries but the whole of Asia could be saved from the octopus of European greed.

Mark his words in 'خضر راہ':

ربط و ضبط ملت بیضا ہے مشرق کی نجات
ایشیا والے ہیں اس نکتہ سے اب تک بے خبر

ایک ہوں مسلم حرم کی پاسبانی کے لئے
نیل کے ساحل سے لے کر تا بخاک کاشغر

جو کرے گا امتیاز رنگ و خوں مٹ جائے گا
ترک خرگاہی ہو یا اعرابی والا گہر

Again, it will be noticed that in a world movement of Muslim regeneration the important role which a centre must play has been stressed in prophetic words.

These random extracts from Iqbāl's writings are a clear proof of my assertion that Iqbāl was the fondest dreamer of a world Muslim Union.

He had a firm—an unshakeable—conviction that Islām and its practicality provided all that a movement needs to establish itself as a world force. It had a centre, a common faith, high ideals, moral, and ethical values, proud achievements, unprecedented contributions towards the happiness of mankind, in short a glorious past and therefore, an even more glorious future.

True, the conditions in which citizens of India were then living (between the two world wars), made it impossible for Iqbāl to launch a movement which a freeman like Syed Jamāluddīn could do. Even that movement failed. How could then Iqbāl hope for the success of a positive and clear-cut political movement for the regeneration and union of Muslims throughout the world? India was, then, under British domination. The British rulers of India had not forgotten the events of 1857. In fact, they had utilised the Muslim participation in that struggle, as an excuse for crushing, by every possible means, any sign of revival or reawakening amongst the Muslims.

Having destroyed the Centre of Muslim solidarity (the Khilāfah), and treacherously cut up the Arab world into Balkanised and unstable States, the British (and their allies) were most suspicious and intolerant of any movement for Muslim world solidarity. In these depressing conditions it would have been futile to launch any overt, tangible political movement for a Union or Commonwealth or Bloc of Muslim States. In fact, there were hardly many Muslim countries in those days which could claim to be independent and free to follow their own policies. Each one of them was either under foreign domination, or under such terrific foreign influence as to be completely immobile in actions of any magnitude or importance.

Moreover, Iqbāl was not a 'politician'. He was a philosopher, a sage and a seer. It was not for him to launch a cut and dried political scheme.

He therefore, gave the *thought* to the Muslims of the whole world. This thought was nothing but a living interpretation

of the pristine message of the Holy Qur'ān, and the Holy Prophet (peace be on him).

His six lectures on "The Reconstruction of Islāmic Thought" and his message conveyed through his verse, were based entirely on these two sources which are an everlasting source of inspiration for Muslims all over the world. Iqbāl was thus engaged on an intellectual regeneration of Muslims wherein would be manifest all the glory of Islām.

It was a message of hope, of faith in God, and faith in the Muslims' own ultimate destiny. Shorn of all philosophical refinemants, I can say simply that it conveyed three basic ideas:

1. The individual having faith.
2. The individual merging himself in the Millat.
3. The Millat to pattern its life on the primeval teachings of Islām, and to assume the leadership of world affairs, in the interest of world morality.

On this analysis of Iqbāl's message, it is quite obvious that Iqbāl's ultimate aim was a Union or Bloc of Muslim Nations or States for leading mankind through the righteous path of Islām and thus to usher in a peaceful and a better world.

A BALANCING FORCE

I am quite sure that if Iqbāl had lived to see the devastating effects of the Second World War and its aftermath in the form of a shattered generation devoid of all faith and if the present catastrophic stage of two eternally warring blocs had emerged as clearly then as now, he would have inevitably come to the conclusion that only hope for world peace was a third Bloc—a neutral Bloc—of Muslim nations which would not augment the potential for a world conflagration, but would be a restraining force to balance the fast toppling world.

From most of what Iqbāl said, at least from the time of the first world war, one purpose can be easily spelled out. It is a current of thought which is so obvious that one cannot possibly miss it.

This is the theme of Muslims being one Millat irrespective of colour, cast, or geographical situation or even national pride. He saw clearly that the future of the Muslim nations lay only in one course of action. To unite into a bigger nation, the *Millat-I Islāmia* the *Millat-I Baiḍa*. This glorious and ennobling teaching was based on five realities—one God, one Book (The Qur'ān), one Prophet, one *Ka'abā*. With these five unities, is it really very difficult to conceive of one Muslim Millat? Sings he in 'جواب شکوہ'

منفعت ایک ہے اس قوم کی نقصان بھی ایک
ایک ہی سب کا نبی دین بھی ایمان بھی ایک

حرم پاک بھی اللہ بھی قران بھی ایک
کچھ بڑی بات تھی ہوتے جو مسلمان بھی ایک

True this ideal has not been achieved so far.
What does that prove?
Is it impossible of achievement?
My answer is an emphatic No!
Is it difficult? Yes! But

مشکلے نیست کہ آسان نشود

The true cause of all our immobility is, that we have not made any effort towards achieving the end. We Muslims have become 'soft', pulverised; not tough, resilient.

We have lost heart before even taking the first step towards the goal. This is not like a *Mo'min*; not even like an ordinary Muslim.

Iqbāl himself stresses the importance of effort, supreme, ceaseless, unending, super-human effort to achieve the seemingly impossible.
and his faith in a centre مرکز

راز حیات پوچھ لے خضر خجستہ گام سے
زندہ ہر ایک چیز ہے کوشش ناتمام سے

Let us take the first step towards achieving Iqbāl's fond dream—one Muslim Millat; and we would notice that each point gained becomes a fresh starting point for future achievement, till this puny human being has the courage to say

ستاروں سے آگے جہاں اور بھی ہیں

The Russians have demonstrated this already on a material plane.

Cannot the Muslims do the same on the moral plane *i.e.*, with a view not to destroy the world, but to save it for a grateful humanity which may praise God for the excellence and beauty of His creation!

That the bond of Islām is a real linking force throughout the world has been my conviction born of my travels abroad.

Recently, my visit to some countries in the Far East has convinced me of the importance of this cementing force. Only it has not been utilised. It is like a gold nugget lying under a mass of debris. Superificially, you cannot possibly conceive of it as a lump of gold. But remove the overlying rubble, wash the metal and polish its surface and behold there is the lustrous material in all its glory!

This is exactly what happened to this noble ideal of Iqbāl. we have done nothing to achieve it.

But, I believe, now is the time to make a start. The two 'isms' are fast approaching a head-on clash. Camp followers of either merely augment the danger or expand the sphere of operations. They cannot possibly avert a clash.

On the other hand, a bloc of some 700 millions of sturdy, independent and free human beings morally dedicated to the cause of world peace, and not subscribing to any of the 'isms'; can certainly be the most hopeful, most potent force for averting a clash.

Secondly, the very existence (and the tall claims) of an unnatural, unreal anachronism of British Commonwealth of

Nations, is an unanswerable argument for the establishment of a real and natural Union based on common moral values and dedicated to noble ends!

I repeat, we have done nothing, nothing at all, to gain this objective.

We have accepted a defeat before firing a single shot! This defeatist attitude is negation of Iqbal's teachings.[1]

[1] This article appeared in Pakistan Times, April 21, 1961, but its content is now more important for the Muslims than ever.