IQBAL REVIEW (64: 4)
(October - December 2023)
ISSN: P0021-0773
ISSN: E3006-9130

MYSTICISM AND IDENTITY: THE CASE OF ISLAM

Prof. Vincent J. Cornell

ABSTRACT

If society were a mere addition or conglomeration of individuals, one would directly take a start from the 'individual'; but the things are not so simple, for what complicates the matter is that the 'individual' and 'society' both need a mutual reference inasmuch as they are reciprocal and interdependent. It is, however, customary, and also in line with the scheme of the programme of current meeting of the ISM, to take a start from the individual, and to decide upon the nature of 'society' in the light of our view on him. Our theory of the society, then, will draw on whatever view we take of the individual and the 'interrelations' which obtain among the individuals constituting the society. On the organismic model, in any of its forms, the individual is pushed back into the background. On its individualistic interpretation, the individual being the basic component, he is relegated to a secondary position; while on the ecological interpretation, he is pushed back one step farther inasmuch as now the basic components are the 'sub-groups' rather than the individuals, who compose the sub- groups. The social organization, on this model, is the result of mutual interaction of the components, individuals or sub-groups, which moves towards a more and more stable equilibrium. Such a position tends to over-organization of the society which Iqbal has condemned on the ground that in an over-organized society "the individual is altogether crushed out of existence".

The Interweaving of Individual and Collective Identity in Islam

Western scholars have often disagreed over whether collective/group identity or individual identity is more important in Islam. This is because both forms of identity are stressed in the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad. In addition, Islam itself is described in transactional terms. The Qur'an defines Islam with the statement, "Religion in God's view is the Submission" or "Verily God's only religion is the (that of) Submission." (Q 3:19). Based on this verse, theology in Islam revolves around the term dīn. In general terms, dīn is the Arabic word for "religion." However, this term means more than the Western idea of a "church" or institutionalized religion. The root of the Arabic word dīn has four primary meanings: (1) mutual obligation; (2) acknowledgment or submission; (3) juridical authority; (4) natural inclination or tendency. For example, the word dana, which is related to dīn, means "being indebted"; this term conveys an entire group of meanings related to the idea of debt. Similarly, the verbal noun da'i may mean either "debtor" or "creditor," words which have opposite meanings but are based on the same root concept. To be da'in means that one is obliged to follow all of the laws, customs, and ordinances covering indebtedness. Being in debt also implies obligation, which is expressed in Arabic by the term dayn. Indebtedness may involve a formal judgment (daynūna) or conviction (idana), terms that relate to the obligation to fulfill a debt or a contract. Commercial life, which is based to a large extent on the responsibility to fulfill one's contracts and debts, is centered in a town or a city, which is designated in Arabic by the term madīna. A city has a judge, ruler, or governor, each of whom may be designated by the term dayyan (just as in Hebrew, which has a similar root concept).In Islam, belonging to a community, whether a family, a tribe, or an urban community, is fundamental to the human condition. Similarly, the concept of civilization has always been associated in Islam with towns and cities. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the Arabic terms for civilization are also derived from this root: tamaddana means "to build or found cities," "to refine," or "to civilize," while tamaddunis a common Arabic term for "civilization." Islamic theology asserts that having a religion— in the sense of dīn— is natural to the human condition. In the dīn of Islam, the concept of religion conveys the idea of obligation or indebtedness, the acknowledgment of indebtedness,

and the requirement to pay back one's debts. This notion also includes two additional concepts: responsibility and reciprocity. The human being is indebted to Allah, the One God, for creating her, providing for her, and maintaining her existence. According to the Qur'an, every human being must acknowledge her debt to God at the very core of her being. This debt is expressed in the Qur'an as a primordial contract or covenant ('ahdor mīthaq), which is established between humanity and the Creator prior to the placement of humanity on earth: "When thy Lord drew forth their descendants from the children of Adam, He made them testify concerning themselves (saying):

'Am I not your Lord?' They replied,

'Yes, we do so testify'" (Q 7:172).

Because the human being owes a debt to God that can never be repaid, the Qur'an portrays the individual believer as the "slave of God" ('abd Allah). This term, in its masculine ('abd Allah) or feminine (amat Allah) form, is traditionally considered to be the most honorable name that a Muslim person can bear and is the most important marker of Islamic identity. Because the individual owes her very existence to God, she knows that she, herself, is the substance of her own debt. Thus, the only way she can repay God is by giving herself over to the service of her Creator and submitting to God's commands. This act of submission is what is meant by the term Islam. The person who submits to God is called a Muslim (fem. muslima). In a famous saying (hadīth) of the Prophet Muhammad, Islam is described as a form of indentured servitude:

> "The intelligent man is he who indentures himself (dananafsahu) to God and works for that which shall be after death."

This tradition echoes a similar verse inthe Qur'an:

> "Verily God has purchased from the believers their persons and possessions in return for Paradise . . . So rejoice in the sale of yourself which you have concluded; for it is the supreme achievement" (Q 9:111).

Ibada, the Qur'anic term for "worship," comes from the same root as 'abd, the word for "slave." 'Ubūdīyya, the term used to describe the state of devoted worship in Islam, literally means "slavery." In the early centuries of Islam, the pious Muslim was often called muta'abbid, literally, "one who makes himself into a slave."

However, the transactional nature of Islam as dīn is not just a one-way street. The responsibility of the human being to acknowledge and repay her existential debt to God demands a certain amount of reciprocity on the part of God Himself. In the economy of Islamic moral theology, God may be said to "owe" the human being a fair return for her worship. "Who is the one who will lend to God a goodly loan, which God will double to his credit and multiply many times?" asks the Qur'an (Q 2:245). The Qur'an makes clear that the human being's "loan" to God is not only to be repaid in worship, but also in charitable works. This implies both collective responsibility and the concept of collective identity because the Muslim is seen as an integral part of the wider Islamic community:

> "Verily, we will ease the path to salvation for the person who gives out of fear of God and testifies to the best. But we will ease the path to damnation for the greedy miser who thinks himself self- sufficient and rejects what is best" (Q 92:5-10).

The transactional ethos of Islam can be observed on multiple levels: Religion is a transaction between the human being and God but it also involves transactions between other groups of human beings. Similarly, just as religion (dīn) and practice ('amal) are interrelated in Islam, so are the realms of the private and the public. This is summarized in a famous tradition of the Prophet Muhammad known as the "Hadīth of Gabriel." In this account, the angel Gabriel comes to the Prophet in the form of a man and asks, "Oh Muhammad, tell me about Islam." The Prophet replies, "Islam means to bear witness that there is no god but Allah, that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, to maintain the required prayers, to pay the poor-tax, to fast in the month of Ramadan, and to perform the pilgrimage to the House of God at Mecca if you are able to do so.

" Then Gabriel says, "Tell me about faith (īman)." The Prophet replies, "Faith is to believe in Allah, His angels, His books, His Messengers, and the Last Day, and to believe in Allah's determination of affairs, whether good comes of it or bad." "You are correct," Gabriel replied. "Now tell me about the perfection of religion (ihsan)." The Prophet replies, "The perfection of religion is to worship Allah as if you see Him; for if you do not see Him, surely He sees you."

In this tradition, the term Islam stands for religious practice, īman stands for religious knowledge, and ihsan stands for the combination

of knowledge and practice. Most people think of religious practice as coming after religious knowledge. People follow the commandments of God because they believe in God and know that His rules must be obeyed. But in the Hadith of Gabriel these roles are reversed. Instead of faith coming before practice, it is practice— including socially conscious practice— which defines and confirms one's private faith. It is not enough just to be born a Muslim or simply to call oneself a Muslim. To be a complete Muslim, the believer must perform all of the actions— both individual and collective— that confirm the person as a Muslim before God. These actions are summarized in the "Five Pillars of Islam," which are identified in the first part of the Hadīth of Gabriel. These requirements of practice formally define the Muslim identity in comparison to other religions:

1. To affirm that that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah (al-Shahada). (Individual Identity)

2. To maintain the five required daily prayers (al-Ṣalat). (Individual Identity)

3. To pay the poor-tax (al-Zakat). (Collective/Group Identity)

4. To fast the lunar month of Ramadan (Ṣawm Ramaḍan). (Individual Identity but performed ritually in a way that affirms Collective/Group Identity)

5. To perform the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in one's lifetime (al- Hajj). (Collective/Group Identity)

The key to the Five Pillars of Islam is al-Shahada, the "Act of Bearing Witness." This formal act of bearing witness to the truth also serves to symbolize the complementarity of faith and practice in Islam. The statement "There is no god but Allah," confirms the believer's acceptance of divine Reality. As the formal proclamation of the oneness of God, it represents the essence of religious knowledge ('ilm). However, with respect to the question of religious identity, al-Shahada contains both a negation (nafy) and an affirmation (ithbat). The negation in the formula— "There is no god but Allah"— sets the theological identity of the Muslim apart from other theological identities, as confirmed by the Sūra of the Unbelievers (Q 109) in the Qur'an:

> Say: Oh, you who reject Allah (Yaayuha al-kafirūn):
> I do not worship what you worship;

And you are not worshippers of what I worship. I am not a worshipper of what you [habitually] worship; And you do not worship what I worship. To you your religion (dīn) and to me mine.

The affirmative part of al-Shahada— expressed in the statement, "Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah"— affirms the believer's submission to God, which is the formal meaning of the term Islam. In this statement, the believer affirms a separate religious identity from other individuals by acknowledging the truth of the mission of the Prophet Muhammad, who is both the transmitter of the Qur'an and the paradigmatic Muslim. Thus, through the two formulas of al-Shahada, the Muslim commits herself to fulfilling her Islamic identity as both a "knower" and a "doer." By affirming the necessity of both faith and practice, the Muslim also commits herself to follow the Sunna, the moral and behavioral example of the Prophet Muhammad, who is exalted (muhammad) above all other human beings because he embodies the dīn of Islam both inwardly and outwardly. This is expressed in the final part of the Hadith of Gabriel, where ihsan, the perfection of religion, is defined as "worshipping Allah as if you see Him; for if you do not see Him, surely He sees you."

Human accountability is epitomized in the Qur'an by a primordial covenant with God, in which humanity takes on the moral responsibility for the Heavens and the Earth. This covenant, which serves to define the collective identity of humanity as essentially "Muslim," constitutes another major criterion by which faith and action are judged in Islam. Called "God's covenant" in the Qur'an (Q 2:27), it separates the hypocrites and those who assign spiritual or material partners to God from true Muslims, who maintain their trust in the Qur'anic message (Q 33:73). Collectively, those human beings who trust in Allah and are true to God's trust in them by not breaking God's Covenant in thought, word, or deed are the trustees or vicegerents (khulafa') of God on Earth (Q 2:30-33). A society made up of such persons thus constitutes a normative human community, which serves as a religious and moral exemplar for other social groups and acts as a collective witness to the truth (Q 2:143).

In the Qur'an, this community is called the Umma Muslima(Q 2:128), the "Mother Community of Those Who Submit to God." In social terms, it is defined by adherence to the Sharī'a, "The Way of God," as expressed in the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad. In Islamic salvation history, the first such umma was

the community created by Muhammad and his Companions in Medina between the years 622 and 632 CE. Acknowledgement of the normative example of this community and membership in it is the main criterion for collective/group identity in Islam. For this reason, several verses of the Qur'an stress the need for conceptual and even physical separation from other groups that do not share the same values: "Oh you who believe! Do not turn [in friendship] toward people who have incurred God's wrath. They are in despair about the Hereafter, just as the deniers of God (al-kuffar) are in despair about those who are buried in their graves" (Q 60:13).

As explained in the above discussion, Islamic identity as expressed in the Qur'an and the Sunna is conceived in transactional terms and weaves together collective/group identity and individual/personal identity like the warp and woof of a carpet. The social scientific field of identity and social formation studies similarly defines identity in transactional terms and sees identity as emerging out of a web of multiple networks of interactions. According to Harrison C. White, a major figure in this field, "An identity emerges for each of us only out of efforts at control amid contingencies and contentions in interaction."[1] However, "asserting control" in identity formation does not necessarily mean the domination of one identity over other identities. Rather, "control is about finding footings among other identities. Such footing is a position that entails a stance, which brings orientation in relation to other identities."[2] These "stances" or positions are social realities for other identities and serve to differentiate identities from each other. Indeed, "the world [as a whole] comes from identities attempting control within their relations to other identities."[3] White goes on to explain:

Identity achieves social footing as both a source and a destination of communications to which identities attribute meaning. Consequently, without footing, identities would jump around in a social space without meaning and thus without communication. Gaining control presupposes a stable standpoint for orientation. Identity becomes a point of reference from which information can be processed, evaluated. Footings thus must be reflexive; they supply an angle of perceptions along with orientation and assessments that guide interaction with other identities, to yield control.[4]

In terms of White's theoretical model of identity and control, the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunna may be seen to define the Islamic collective/group identity as a "netdom" or network domain

governing individual and intergroup relations.[5] As such, these divine or divinely inspired rules and precepts also function as disciplines: these are defined as "self-constituting conveners of social action, which each induce an identity on a new level."[6] However, despite the sacred origin of these disciplines, the identities that they create are not hermetically sealed off from one another. Rather, they are open to different interpretations, which allow people to create multiple webs of network relations. As White puts the matter, disciplines provide "concepts about processes rather than about structure in sociocultural life."[7] Instead of laws cast in stone, they provide the "stances" or interpretive positions around which identities are constructed.

This is why Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, Salafi Muslims, and Sufi Muslims are still "Muslims," despite all of their differences. With respect to the Qur'an and the Sunna as disciplines for identity formation, four sets of "stances" define the collective/group identity of Islam and the Umma Muslima within the worldwide network of religions and societies:

1. Over against other religions;
2. Over against other theologies;
3. Over against other communities;
4. Over against other moralities.

B. What Is "Islamic Mysticism?"

The question of mysticism and identity in the spiritual economy of Islam cannot be addressed meaningfully without the term, "Islamic mysticism," first being clarified. It has become something of a cliché in the field of Religious Studies to assert that "mysticism" is a uniquely Western concept. As such, it has been regarded by a number of scholars as merely an academic category. For example, in The Mystic Fable (1982), the French historian Michel de Certeau argued that the "invention of mysticism" as a concept could be traced to specific developments in the literary imagination of early modern Europe. A related view is that "mysticism" as it is known in Western academia is untranslatable outside of its original Western context. Thus, it has often been observed that non-Western languages have no word for "mysticism." Although this assertion may be true in most cases, the argument on which it is based ignores the logic of comparative studies. Comparison is not dependent on the logic of identity: The Western concept of mysticism does not

have to be exactly like an analogous concept in non- Western religions for the two to be compared. If the comparison of concepts depended only on a one-to-one correspondence of meaning, not only academic but also most linguistic comparisons would be impossible. As the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) pointed out, the logic of comparison does not depend on identity but on "family resemblances." The governing principle is one of similarity or congruence (a mathematical term of logic) rather than of identity. Just as different religions may be compared on this basis in the field of Comparative Religions, so can different forms of mysticism. Thus, when comparing "mysticisms" across world religions, the relevant question is not whether one can compare them at all but rather which aspects of "mysticism" are most important to the comparative project at hand? This is the approach that I will take in the following essay.

If one approaches the Western concept of mysticism etymologically, from the Greek verb muo("I conceal") or the noun mustikos ("initiate"), it is relatively easy to find "family resemblances" in Islam. However, in the Islamic context, the notion of concealment per se is not the essential feature of mysticism; instead, it is revelation. From the point of view of both doctrine and practice, the focus of mysticism in Islam is not primarily about what is "veiled" (mahjūb). Rather, it is more about the process of "unveiling" (kashf). This can be seen in the title of a famous early manual of mystical practice by the Persian Sufi ʻAlī al-Hujwīrī (d. 1077 CE), Kashf al-Mahjūb (The Unveiling of the Veiled). Another common term for the goal of the mystical path is ishraq ("illumination," literally, "dawning"). This can be seen in the title of a famous treatise by Abū Najīb al-Suhrawardī (d. 1168 CE), Hikmat al-Ishraq (The Philosophy or Wisdom of Illumination). When viewed from its own perspective, Islamic mysticism is thus most accurately defined as "the unveiling or illumination of transcendent knowledge, which is not apparent to the ordinary believer." In theological terms, this definition corresponds fairly closely to the working definition of mysticism proposed for the current project on Mysticism and Identity: "Mysticism is the direct experience of transcendent reality." Although the Islamic view of mysticism is not fully identical with this latter formulation, it is still "all in the family," so to speak. "Family resemblances" with other types of mysticism can also be found when Islamic mysticism is conceived as an initiatory path or as an esoteric approach to knowledge, as in the Greek etymology of "mysticism"

described above. For example, in the mystical perspective of Islam the religion of Islam is commonly seen as having an "outer" (ẓahirī) and an "inner" (baṭinī) dimension. If the Law (al-Sharī'a) is the most appropriate means of access to the outer dimension of Islam, mysticism (i.e., in the sense of knowledge as al-haqīqa, "the inner reality") is the most appropriate means of access to the inner dimension of Islam. On this basis, the hermeneutical method of Islamic mysticism requires the initiate to "go back to the source" (ta'wīl) or "plumb the depths" (istinbaṭ) of scripture and tradition in order to discover their "inner meaning" (baṭin al-ma'na). Similarly, the mystical initiate is described as a "seeker" (murīd, literally "desirer") or "wayfarer" (salik), who requires a "guide" (murshid) to conduct her on the "way" (ṭarīq) to esoteric knowledge ('ilm al-baṭin). The mystical guide is portrayed symbolically in Muslim cultures as an "old man" (Arabic shaykh; Persian/Urdu pīr; Turkish dede, "grandfather") in order to convey his learning, wisdom, and familiarity with scripture and tradition. In this sense, the concept of mystical training in Islam shares much in common with the Hellenistic concept of education as paideia, as expressed in Plato's depiction of Socrates and his students or in the late antique wisdom traditions of Hermetism, Cynicism, and the Orphic mysteries.

Unlike in other traditional languages, there is a term in Arabic that comes close to the Western understanding of "mysticism." This term is 'irfan, which is a verbal noun (maṣdar) that refers to the act of "knowing" in the sense of an ongoing project or discipline. However, the term may be a neologism because it first appears in the works of the Islamic philosopher Ibn Sīna (Avicenna, d. 1037 CE). In fact, it is possible that 'irfan was developed as the Arabic translation of mustikismós, the Greek word for "mysticism." Today, 'irfanis used primarily to refer to the formal study of Islamic mystical theology in Shiite seminaries (al-hawza al-'ilmīyya). In this latter context it refers to the esoteric study of the Qur'an, the teachings of the Shiite Imams, and the works of Shiite mystical theologians.

However, 'irfanis only rarely used in Sunni Islam. In Sunni Islam, "mysticism" is usually translated as taṣawwuf("Sufism"). This term literally means, "wearing the wool" (ṣūf) or "following the practice of those who wear wool." According to Sufi sources, it originated as a reference to the habit of early Muslim ascetics to wear woolen garments. However, in Sunni Islam, the concept of mysticism is also rendered as al-ṣūfiyya. According to the Central Asian scholar Abū

Rayhan al-Bīrūnī (d. 1048 CE), this term is also a neologism and was derived from the Greek word sophía, meaning "wisdom." However, Sufis tend to reject Bīrūnī's etymology of al-ṣūfiyya because it weakens their argument for Sufism as a traditionally authentic method of Islamic practice.

C. The Impact of Mysticism on Personal and Collective Identity

Islamic mystics— and especially the Sufis— have long defined their collective/group identity as specialists in ihsan (the perfection of religion). In this way, they are able to distinguish themselves from their non-mystical opponents as the best of Muslims. However, when they consider the concept of ihsanin light of al-Shahada, they focus primarily on the first part of the testimony of faith by pointing out the poverty of the individual human identity when compared to the identity of God. Insofar as the identity of God is absolute, this means that the identity of the human being— and especially the human concept of the ego— is so contingent as to be existentially unreal. For example, for the Persian Sufi 'Alī al- Hujwīrī (mentioned above as the author of Kashf al-mahjūb), the concept of negation (nafy) in the first part of al- Shahadaincludes the negation of all the vanities associated with the concept of personal or ego-identity. He states, "By negation (nafy) [the Sufis] signify the negation of the human attributes, and by affirmation (ithbat) they mean the affirmation of the Lord of Reality (Sulṭan- i Haqīqat). This is because effacement [of identity] is total loss, and total negation is applicable only to [contingent] attributes; negation of the Essence is impossible."[8]

For Hujwīrī, this focus on the affirmation of divine Reality in al-Shahadais to be maintained even in the second part, "Muhammad is the Messenger of God." This is because following the path of Muhammad with full sincerity involves the replacement of the self-constructed identity of the human being with a divinely bestowed identity. "It is necessary," Hujwīrī argues, "that blameworthy attributes should be negated by the affirmation of praiseworthy attributes (Pers. khiṣalmahmūd). [That is to say], the pretension to love God is negated by the affirmation of [God's] Reality, for pretension is one of the vanities of the lower soul (nafs)."[9] Note that the term used for "praiseworthy" in this quotation, mahmūd, is related to the name Muhammad, which means more or less the same thing. For Hujwīrī, when the individual or ego-identity is critically

assessed in light of the divine identity, personal attributes are negated by the affirmation of more universal attributes in God. On the existential level, this means that Islam, as total submission to God, requires the negation of human choice and the affirmation of God's choice:

> I have read in the Anecdotes that a dervish was drowning in the sea, when someone cried, "Brother, do you wish to be saved?" He said, "No." "Then do you wish to be drowned?" "No." "It is a wonder that you will not choose either to die or to be saved." "What have I to do with safety," said the dervish, "that I should choose it? My choice is that God should choose for me."[10]

For Hujwīrī the spiritual state expressed by the drowning dervish is one of the highest states of normal human consciousness. However, from the wider Sufi point of view, it represents only the lowest grade of Love mysticism. If one aspires to ascend further up the rungs of the ladder of Love mysticism, one must eliminate all belief in the reality of the personal or ego-identity before setting one's foot on even the first rung.

I. Collective/Group Identity

Based on Hujwīrī's discussion of the concepts of negation and affirmation, one can say that from the point of view of Islamic mysticism the question of collective/group identity is less important than the question of individual identity. However, to say that collective/group identity is of lesser importance is not to say that it has no importance at all. First, all Muslim mystics consider themselves part of the Umma Muslima, whatever non-mystical Muslims might think of them. This means that they share in the same general concept of collective/group identity as all Muslims do. Second, their identities within their own mystical traditions are governed by what Harrison White terms conventions: these include rules of interpersonal behavior, different types and formulas of invocation (ahzabor dhikr Allah), and special ritual practices. Such conventions emerge over time and serve to shape the definition of internal mystical networks as they develop.[11]11 Third, collective/group identities are also created and maintained by what identity theorists call stories. In the book Stories, Identities, and Political Change (2002), sociologist Charles Tilly describes the sociological function of stories in the following way:

> Most of social life consists of interpersonal transactions whose consequences the participants can neither foresee nor control. Yet after

> the fact, participants in complex social transactions seal them with stories. . . Identities are social arrangements reinforced by socially constructed and continuously renegotiated stories. . . we can contextualize stories, which means placing crucial stories in their nonstory contexts and seeing what social work they do.[12]

"Standard stories," which reinforce collective/group identities within Islamic mysticism, may include hagiographies (known as tarjamat al-awliya', "the 'translation' of saints"), initiatic chains (sing. silsila), chains of transmitters of tradition (sing. is nad), or semi-official descriptions of established groups, such as the summary of Sufi groups and doctrines found in Hujwīrī's Kashf al- mahjūband similar works.[13] Stories may also include the metaphysical doctrines discussed in mystical treatises, which are written for members of a particular group of mystics but may be read by anyone with sufficient education. However, although such stories demarcate the boundaries between groups, most Muslim mystics would agree that there are a number of legitimate ways to seek God.

Historically, the question of collective/group identity in Islamic mysticism has been most relevant for institutionalized Sufism, where the members of Sufi orders (sing. ṭarīqa, pl. ṭuruq) may number in the thousands or even millions. Worldwide Sufi ṭuruq such as the Qadirīyya or Naqsh bandīyya have multiple spiritual masters teaching different but related spiritual methods and their networks may extend from North Africa, Europe, and the Americas to Southeast Asia and even Japan. Partly because of the existence of such institutionalized groups, exoteric religious scholars ('ulama') in Sunni Islam often accuse Sufis of having divided loyalties. Not all of these accusations are off the mark. Some later examples of institutionalized Sufi orders, such as the Tījanīyya (eighteenth century to present) or the Moroccan Qadirīyya-Boutchichia (twentieth century to present), require their followers to proclaim exclusive oaths of loyalty and may even go so far as to claim that non-members cannot attain full salvation. Other Sufi groups espouse doctrines that are barely different from those of the so-called Muslim fundamentalists who oppose them. Such groups of Muslim mystics would have relatively little to contribute to interfaith discussions of the problem of collective/group identity. For this reason, some Islamic reformers, such as Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) of Pakistan— who otherwise regarded the spirituality and aesthetic sensibility of the Sufis in a positive light— denounced institutionalized Sufism as "Pīr-ism," or the Sufi cult of the leader. As a result of such critiques, both Islamic

modernists and Salafi traditionalists have relegated institutionalized Sufism to the margins of the Islamic Umma. Today, Sufi groups— along with their stories and disciplines— are looked down upon or even banned in significant parts of the Sunni Muslim world.

Surprisingly, the situation is not much different in contemporary Shiite Islam, despite the historical acceptance of the 'Irfan tradition of Islamic mysticism in Shiite seminaries. In revolutionary Iran, the tradition of 'Irfan was promoted so long as Ayatollah Khomeini was alive because he specialized in this subject. However, after Khomeini's death in 1989 and the accession of Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader of Iran, 'Irfan has come under increasing doctrinal and political pressure, to the point where it is now most often taught in a semi-clandestine manner. In this latter case, however, the problem is not divided loyalties as with Sufism and Sunni Islam. Instead, the key problem appears to be the potential of teachers of 'Irfan to attract a greater following than exoteric and politically appointed Shiite clerics as sources of religious knowledge.

Although many of the most famous mystics of Islam do not seem to have been overly concerned with boundaries of collective/group identity, some were concerned that the reinforcement of boundaries might excessively limit or even cut off the development of new networks of knowledge acquisition. Because it is defined by bounded networks of mystics, institutionalized or Ṭarīqa Sufism comprises what Harrison White calls an arena discipline. Whereas interface disciplines such as 'Irfan— which draws many of its concepts from Neoplatonic philosophy— "pump flows" of information from "outside" or "upstream" of disciplinary boundaries into networks that are "downstream," arena disciplines restrict the flow of information across boundaries in order to maintain internal consistency and purity. For exclusivist Sufi orders in particular, information flows from "outside" are considered dangerous to the integrity of the discipline.[14]

Ironically, one of the mystics of Islam who was most concerned to maintain access to "outside flows" of information networks was himself the founder/eponym of a Sufi order that was exclusivistic with respect to ṭarīqa membership. Muhammad ibn Sulayman al-Jazūlī (d.1465 CE) was the most important Sufi of Morocco in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries CE. What enabled him to create an institutionalized Sufi order (al- Ṭa'ifa al-Jazūlīyya) that was formally an arena discipline but could still maintain the information flows of

an interface discipline was the fact he was trained in two different institutionalized Sufi traditions, the Qadirīyya and the Shadhilīyya. Outside of Morocco, Jazūlī is best known for creating al-Ṭarīqa al-Muhammadīyya ("The Muhammadan Way"). This was a less formally institutionalized and more universal spiritual method (i.e., an interface discipline), which reoriented the devotional practices of Sufism toward the inner spirituality of the Prophet Muhammad. His most famous extant work is a book of prayers on behalf of the Prophet, Dala'il al-khayrat was hawarīq al-anwar fī dhikr al-ṣalat 'ala al-Nabī al- Mukhtar(Tokens of Blessings and Advents of Illumination in Invoking Blessings on the Chosen Prophet), which served as a handbook for this latter method. Today Dala'il al-khayratis known and recited throughout the Muslim world. By the time of his death, Jazūlī had over 14,000 followers in Morocco alone. In addition, he recruited women into al-Ṭa'ifa al-Jazūlīyya and some of his successors trained women to become spiritual masters in their own right. Finally, he also developed a political ideology (distantly related to Shiism), that vested leadership in spiritual and genealogical closeness to the Prophet Muhammad. After his death, this political ideology— known to modern scholars as "Sharifism"— was taken over by Moroccan descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (sharīf), who still use their genealogical descent to legitimize their rule over Morocco today.

All accounts of Jazūlī describe him as a highly charismatic figure. In identity formation studies, the charismatic figure is an individual who confounds the expected pattern of behavior or "style" that defines personhood within an institution or discipline. According to Harrison White, "[T]he charismatic is a person purged of style, a manifestation of unpredictability in profiles of switchings [between networks]."[15]

However, being purged of style does not mean the total absence of style. "The charismatic person stands above styles and integrates them in unpredictable patterns, a very strategic perspective indeed."[16] By using the "story" or spiritual uniqueness of "The Muhammadan Way" to transcend the limits of Sufi collective/group identity, Jazūlī was able to turn his version of Sufism into an arena discipline in some ways and an interface discipline in other ways. This transcendence of style can be observed in Risala fī-al-tawhīd (Treatise on Divine Oneness), one of the few doctrinal works of Jazūlī to survive down to the present day. This text, which was written as an introductory manual for al- Ṭa'ifa al-Jazūlīyya, presents

a model for the "Jazūlī style" of Sufism by setting out fourteen "stances" or positions around which both the individual and collective/group identity of Jazūlī Sufis could be formed. These stances include moral, ritual, and epistemological positions, which, when taken together, provide a bridge between the aspirant's institutional identity as a member of al- Ṭa'ifa al-Jazūlīyya and a more universal notion of personhood. Every seeker (murīd) who joined the Jazūlīyya order was required to shave his head as a sign of initiation and swear to follow this fourteen-step program. Significantly, the program is reminiscent in several ways of the "Twelve-Steps" or "Twelve Traditions" of Alcoholics Anonymous. It also brings to mind the "Moral Rearmament" programs of early twentieth-century Protestant Christianity because the first stages of Sufi training were more concerned with character building than with mystical doctrines. The teachings of such doctrines would come later, when the seeker had fully assimilated the fourteen steps and had advanced to the level of "The Sincere Seeker" (al-murīd al-ṣadiq). The translation given below comes from a sixteenth-century manuscript of Risalafī-l-tawhīd found in the Qarawīyyīn Library of Fes. The explanations in parentheses come from Jazūlī's own observations, contained in the Fes manuscript.[17]

1. Follow spiritual masters who are knowledgeable in both the exoteric and esoteric aspects of religion. (This establishes the boundaries of the seeker's knowledge.)

2. Avoid places where prohibited things are done. (This lessens the urge to sin.)

3. Practice self-discipline. (This combats laziness of the soul.)

4. Avoid evil, love the good, follow the way of the Prophet Muhammad, become a friend of the Friends of God (awliya' Allah), and be an enemy to the enemies of God. (This establishes righteousness.)

5. Practice constant remembrance of God and prayers on behalf of the Prophet Muhammad. (This takes the seeker outside of himself.)

6. Never hate those who have faith. (This fosters unity by encouraging love for all believers.)

7. Perform all the required prayers at their proper times. (This upholds the Sharī'a.)

8. Never sully your spiritual practices with egoism, arrogance, tyranny, or self-love in act, word, or deed. (This builds character.)

9. Make your speech wisdom, your silence contemplation, and your vision deliberation. (This fosters spiritual maturity.)

10. Know that salvation is in God, His saints, and the prophets of God and that perdition is in the ego (nafs) and what arises from it. (This establishes the hierarchy of spiritual authority.)

11. Avoid backbiting, gossip, and slander. (This eliminates divisiveness and disharmony in the community.)

12. Do not love the mighty but love the doers of good and be their companion. (This combats elitism and worldly ambition.)

13. Avoid the evildoers and love the [economically] poor (al-masakīn) and the Sufis and be one with them. (This fosters the [ethical] connection between spiritual poverty and righteousness.)

14. Learn all forms of knowledge that bring one closer to God. (This reinforces the notion that the only real ambition for the seeker is the ambition to find God.)

II. Individual/Personal Identity

One of the striking aspects of the fourteen-step program of the Jazūlīyya with respect to the question of mysticism and identity is how closely this program reflects the balance between individual/personal identity and collective/group identity described for Islam in general. If identity is defined on the basis of access to information networks, as understood by the sociological theorists of identity formation, exactly half of the fourteen- step program (seven stances or positions) deal with precisely this aspect of identity formation. Using the terminology of this field, one could say that being a Jazūlī Sufi meant having access to "Jazūlī-style" information flows. The above program also indicates that Jazūlī saw the overall institution he created primarily as an outward-looking "interface discipline" of multiple networks rather than as an inward- looking "arena discipline" of limited networks. As might be expected for institutional rules, five of the collective or "social" stances of the fourteen-point program are moral or ethical in nature. However, two of them— which are placed first and last as bookends in order to stress their importance— are epistemological or knowledge-based stances. These are: "Follow spiritual masters who are knowledgeable in both the exoteric and esoteric aspects of religion," and "Learn all

forms of knowledge that bring one closer to God." The first of these precepts warns seekers not to use Jazūlī Sufism as a way of cutting off their ties to the Umma Muslima was a whole and the second stance opens the search for knowledge of God up to all relevant means, including those that may be beyond the domain of Sufism or (potentially) even Islam itself. As Jazūlī states in his explanation of this precept, "The only real ambition for the seeker is [i.e., ought to be] the ambition to find God."

However, not all of Jazūlī's fourteen- step program was meant to be social. The other half of the program was about individual/personal identity and like other Sufis, Jazūlī viewed his positions on collective/group identity as grounded in the concept of dīn as a transactional relationship between the believer and God. For Jazūlī as for all masters of Islamic mysticism, the transformation of the collective was related to the transformation of the person. Furthermore, the key to the transformation of the person was the transformation of the personal self- identity or ego. This is a long tradition in Islamic mysticism. As early as the first half of the ninth century CE, the early Baghdad Sufi al-Harithibn Asad al- Muhasibī (d. 857 CE) developed a personality theory that placed the blame for most social problems on the individual human ego. Using the Arabic term nafs("spirit" or "soul") to designate the ego, he argued that the problems of ego-centrism and human self-delusion begin as soon as the baby develops the sense of self versus other. In other words, the problems of humanity begin with the development of the individual identity. The great paradox of the ego is that it is necessary for human survival and cognitive development, but at the same time it leads the individual into a self-absorbed narcissism, a state that Muhasibī designated by the Qur'anic term, al-nafs al-ammara, "the Commanding Self." If the Commanding Self is allowed to govern the personality in an undisciplined manner, it can lead the person to commit an unlimited number of sins, mistakes, misperceptions, acts of heedlessness, or narcissistic self-delusions. Thus, beginning with Muhasibī, mystics in Islam were more often social psychologists than sociologists and saw the roots as well as the solutions to societal problems as vested in the individual. The question of individual identity formed an important part of this focus.

According to Harrison C. White's theory of identity development, the formation of the individual/personal identity is manifested in four ways. Although White calls these "senses" of identity, they may also be thought of as stages of identity, despite the fact that they do

not always occur in order. These four "senses" of individual identity formation are as the following:[18]

1. Control— This is the most basic type of identity formation, and characterizes both individual/personal and collective/group identity formation. In White's formulation, this is an expression of the attempt to secure a separate "footing" (i.e. an incipient identity) in a network of interpersonal interactions.

2. Conformity— The second sense of identity comes about as the individual situates herself within a network that is set off or defined over against other networks. Also called "face," this type of identity describes the individual in the sense that she reflects the "social face" or identity of the group to which she belongs. As such, she assumes certain stances or positions as a member of the group.

3. Creativity— As White puts it, "The tension between identity and control can be seen as conformity versus creativity." This third sense of identity comes about as a result of frictions across different social settings, which results from individuals switching among different "netdoms," such as families, communities, occupations, or secret societies. Most importantly, White notes that with respect to descriptions of position and the like, this third sense of identity "transports to a higher level," which allows the individual to act as a critic as well as an artist.

4. Rationalization— this fourth type of identity "is close to what is usually meant by identity in ordinary talk." It "corresponds to an ex post account, after the fact, about identity; it is career seen from the outside." It is at this stage of identity formation where one begins to speak about definitions of the "person" and the "self."

The relevance of these four "senses" of identity formation can easily be seen with respect to collective/group identity in Islamic mysticism. For example, Identity as Control can be observed historically in accounts of the early formation of institutionalized mystical groups, where some groups begin to distinguish themselves from other developing groups, such as pietists and seen as the stage of production of mystical treatises, histories, and hagiographies— the "stories" of mystical collectivities or groups within Islam.

However, the picture that emerges from these four senses of identity formation becomes more complex and counterintuitive when collective/group identity is replaced by individual/personal identity. This is because both Harrison C. White and Islamic mystics

agree— although for different reasons— that the "self" as conventionally understood is a myth. For White, a "self" is nothing but "a narratively embedded history of a ascetics.[19] Identity as Conformity can be seen in more fully institutionalized Sufism, with the creation of orders and rules, stances, and positions that demand institutional conformity. Identity as Creativity can be seen particularly in Islamic Mystical Philosophy, where practitioners try to maintain membership in multiple "netdoms" and "transport to a higher level" by appealing to the "perennial philosophy" of Plato, or Aristotle. Finally, Identity as Rationalization can be journey through different netdoms."

Identities exist, and "persons" exist (according to a specific definition of the term), but "selves" are merely conventions. In fact, the term "selves" can be replaced by "intimate ties."[20] By contrast, "Persons come into existence and are formed as the result of overlaps among identities from distinct network- populations. Identities and network positions do prefigure persons, but persons emerge only as the contexts become more sophisticated. Persons build in terms of styles across distinct populations. Conversation prefigures personal identity."[21]

In other words, a "person" is nothing more than a "style" created in the process of negotiating different networks and is constituted by "stories" (much like group identities), which recount "conversations" or negotiations across such networks. The concept of the autonomous self, which has formed the basis of rational choice theories from Plato and Aristotle down to present-day social sciences, is in reality nothing but a "story-line," taken from "micro- and macro-explanations that share an underlying ontology of 'spirits'."[22] Here Harrison C. White's radically de- ontological notion of the "self" intersects with the worldview of Islamic mysticism. This is because the concept of "spirit" in the previous quotation is very similar to the Sufi notion of the nafsas the ego- self.

Consider, for example, the following statement on individual/personal identity by Abū al-Qasim al-Junayd of Baghdad (d. 910 CE), who is considered the first major Sufi theologian. This statement is part of a letter written by Junayd to the Iranian Sufi Yahyaibn Mu'adh al-Razī (d. 871 CE), of Rayy near modern Tehran. Presumably, it was written as the answer to a question, in which Yahyaibn Mu'adh described a recent mystical experience, or what contemporary scholars of mysticism would call a "Pure

Consciousness Event": You were not prevented because of yourself from bearing witness to yourself. And your witnessing of yourself does not prevent you from knowing yourself. You were not yet fully transformed by virtue of the transformation of your [previous] condition. And your state was not transformed through the transformation of what you [originally] were. Neither were you fully revealed by the reality of what you expressed. Likewise, your expression of yourself was not clarified by your absence from your own self- expression. However, you are still an eternal witness to eternity by virtue of your eternality. Eternity still belongs to you and is supported by that which is taken away from your conventional sense of self. You have [always] been what you have been, just as you are not, but then you were (fa-kunta bi-haythukuntakama lam takunthummakunta). You are a singular being in your unique identity and are maintained through your identity, without need for an outside witness to recognize you (bi- fardaniyatikamutawahhidan wa bi- wahdaniyatikamu'ayyidan bi-lashahidin min al-shawahidiyashhaduka). You did not become absent [to yourself] with respect to absence from the absence of your absence. Where does "nowhere" belong in "whereness" (fa-aynamalaayna li-aynihi)? For the location of the "wheres" (al-ayniyat) is unrelated to what establishes [their reality]. Similarly, extinction is extinguished by the extinction of the means of extinction. Unification is in what separates; and separation is in what unifies, separated through the unification of the unified. For the All is with the All, for the sake of the All, having unified that which is already unified [in the All] (wa-idh al- jam'u bi-l-jam'i li-l-jam'ijumi'afī-majama'ahu).[23]

Before going any further, it is important to point out that White's de- ontology of the self as described above is somewhat different from Junayd's. In White's view of the self, to paraphrase the writer Gertrude Stein (1874-1946), "There is no 'there' there." The self is merely a conventional way of describing a "footing" or positioning within a complex web of interpersonal relations. For Junayd, there is a 'there' there, but it is the Divine Self, not the human "self," that possesses "real reality." However, both White and Junayd share the notion that the concepts of self and identity are conditional and changeable, and that identity depends on one's "footing" or positioning in a relationship of interaction or transaction. In addition, both agree that the human "self" is neither ontologically nor epistemologically real, and that the "autonomous self," which is supposed to critically judge reality from "nowhere"— i.e., divorced

from both time and space— is a myth. After all, says Junayd, "Where does 'nowhere' belong in 'whereness'?" This is a crucial question because all forms of identity are based on location or "whereness." For Junayd, since "whereness" in individual/personal identity is ultimately unified in the All, this is where our true self and identity belong as well. In fact, the only accurate way in which to describe our "real identity" is in relation to the All.

The question of individual/personal identity was also of importance to another early Sufi of Iraq, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Niffarī (d. ca. 961 CE). Niffarī, about whom little is known in detail, was famous for a collection of short texts titled, Kitab al-Mawaqif wa-l- mukhaṭabat, literally, "The Book of 'Stayings' and Addresses." The "stayings" or "stops" (al-mawaqif) in the title refer to stages of mystical awareness, with each short text being related to a mystical stage of awareness of divine Reality. The following text is one of several in this work that deal with the subject of identity:

The 'Staying' of "Who Are You?" and "Who Am I?"

He stopped me, and said to me: "Who are you and who am I?"

And I saw the sun, the moon, the stars, and all the lights (al-anwar).

He said to me: "There remains no light in the current of my sea but that you have seen it." Then everything came to me, such that nothing else remained. Then He kissed me between my eyes and greeted me, but stayed in the shadow.

Then He said to me: "You know Me, but I do not know 'you.'"

Then I saw the whole of Him clinging to my garment, but not clinging to me. Then He said, "This is [humanity's] worship of Me." And my garment inclined [toward Him] but "I" did not incline [toward Him]. And when my garment inclined [toward Him], he said to me, "Who am I?" Then the sun and moon went into eclipse, the stars fell from the sky, the lights went out, and darkness covered everything but Him. My eyes did not see, my ears did not hear, and my senses were dulled. Then all things spoke [as one] and said, "God is Most Great!" Then the All came to me, bearing in His hand a lance. He said to me, "Flee!" And I said, "Where?" Then He said, "Fall into the darkness!" So I fell into the darkness and examined my [concept of] self (abṣartunafsī). And He said to me: "You shall never perceive other than yourself, and you shall never henceforth go out from the darkness. But when I take you out from it, I will reveal

Myself to you such that you will see Me. However, when you have seen Me, you will still be farther from Me than all that are far."[24]

This text and the previous text of Junayd illustrate what is perhaps the most important contribution that can be made by Islamic mysticism to the question of individual/personal identity. The text by Niffarī in particular interweaves the concepts of individual/personal identity and collective/group identity in a transactional framework, as does the Qur'an. In a statement that bears on the question of the collective/group identity of Muslims as "people of God," the text reminds us that the concept of the ego-self always gets in the way of our worship of God, such that we cling only to the "garment" (i.e., the external aspect) of God in our devotion, not to the Divine Person Himself. Even when we see God more deeply— for example, in the way of the theologian, the philosopher, or even the mystic— we still do not see Him in an essential sense: "You will still be farther from Me than all that are far." This is why God says at the beginning of the discourse, "You know Me but I do not know 'you.'" Those who are proud of the superiority of their theology should think deeply on the moral of this story: What are "you" in reality anyway? As Junayd said in the previous selection, "Where does 'nowhere' belong in 'whereness?'" In other words, what is the value of your identity when compared with your absolute contingency and essential unreality?

In epistemological perspective of Islamic mysticism, the main focus of texts such as these is the meaning of conventions and concepts. In fact, this focus on meaning in depth is the main criterion that differentiates Islamic mysticism from other varieties of Islam. The importance of meaning (ma'na) is stressed over and over again in the writings of Islamic mystics as the point of the mystical quest for knowledge. To give just one well-known example, the title in Persian of the Sufi Jalal al-Dīn Rūmī's (d. 1273 CE) masterwork of poetry and Sufi teachings is Masnavī-i Ma'navī, literally, "The Meaningful Poetic Couplets." With respect to identity or that artificial construct that we call the "self," Hujwīrī, Jazūlī, Junayd, Niffarī, and Rūmī would all agree with Harrison C. White's epistemological critique of rationality and identity as expressed the following passage:

> Rationality is misapprehended. Rationality follows in the train of identity. Pressure for control comes from identities, themselves triggered often by pressures from other identities. Chance in the realm of work and practical production also triggers identities. Styles may

> emerge out of complicated contexts that result, and it is exactly as such a style that rationality gains its relevance.

It is meaning not rationality that is the focus of most social organization. Meaning [in the sense of conventional concepts of selfhood] comes into being only as accommodation to patterns of social action that have been able to reproduce themselves. Identities are rafts cobbled together out of leftovers to face cross-tides of circumstance. Sustenance of identities requires comparability of and meaning between identities, so that meaning is the focus of insight for projects of control. The useful way to treat rationality is as but a special case of meaning, a case of limited scope.[25]

D. From Muslim Mysticism to Interfaith Relations

As noted at the end of the first section of this essay, collective/group identity in Islam is established in relation to four domains:

1. Over against other religions;
2. Over against other theologies;
3. Over against other communities;
4. Over against other moralities.

All four of these domains present formidable challenges for contemporary Muslim religious thought, as they do for the thought of any contemporary religious worldview. The Muslim mystical tradition provides resources for engaging all four domains. The following comments address the first two domains in particular, but have relevance for the others as well.

The above presentation has offered several resources for confronting these challenges. Returning to the point made at the conclusion of the previous section, the emphasis on the meaning of conventional concepts of self and identity, along with the critique of these concepts, opens a path to mutual understanding between religions. It stands to reason, and historical evidence has shown that often similar meanings and critiqeus can be found and recognized across religions, despite differences in theology and worldview.

We have also noted the importance of deconstructing the self for certain Muslim mystics. If the self is merely a conventional way of describing a stance or positioning within a complex web of

interpersonal interactions, the mystical process is an invitation to go beyond this construction and discover the Divine Self that transcends the human self. That people in other traditions engage in similar processes suggests a fundamental commonality across religions, which can be used to transcend their outward differences. From another angle, the web of relationships and interactions may be extended, and perhaps has always included, those who are not in one's own group. If these also include members, or the mystics, of other religions, then a new sense of self- identity may be constructed that is broader in scope from the individual/personal self that is constructed out of exclusive relationships between members of a single religion. If the development of a new identity is characterized by the common quest to transcend these networks, then a mystical understanding of the self and its spiritual processes may contribute both to a broader construction of self and to its eventual deconstruction as an idealized autonomous reality.

Finally, I would like to return to Muhammad ibn Sulayman al-Jazūlī's fourteen-step program of preparation for membership in al-Ṭa'ifa al-Jazūlīyya. This may be used as an example to argue that Islamic mysticism— at least when it appears in the guise of an interface discipline— may provide a greater depth of understanding and a wider epistemological perspective to the question of collective/group identity than other approaches to religion. Perhaps most importantly, the type of universalism implied in this approach is non-coercive. This is especially important for Christianity and Islam, which tend to view universalism only from their own creedal perspectives. In addition, it would move the question of religious understanding beyond the subject of tolerance. The philosopher T. M. Scanlon has argued that tolerance is a problematic attitude in interfaith relations because it occupies an intermediate position between acceptance and opposition. Although tolerance is usually seen as a better alternative than intolerance, it falls short as a solution to the problem of religious difference because it avoids most of the key theological and epistemological issues. As Scanlon explains, the indeterminacy of tolerance limits its effectiveness: too often it can be dismissed as "a way of dealing with attitudes that we would be better off without but that are, unfortunately, ineliminable."[26] As can be seen in the following observations derived from Jazūlī's fourteen-step program, the mystical perspective arguably has the advantage of providing tolerance with more cogent and philosophically grounded arguments:

1. Mysticism can provide a wider epistemological perspective than religion in general by stressing the complementarity of esoteric and exoteric forms of knowledge.

2. Mysticism may provide a wider epistemological perspective than religion in general by extending the quest for knowledge of God beyond creedal boundaries.

3. Mysticism may promote greater understanding among religions by seeing all people of faith as part of a common community.

4. Mysticism may promote greater understanding among religions and moral philosophies by seeing all doers of good as part of a common community.

5. Mysticism may promote greater universal social awareness across religious boundaries by favoring the poor and acknowledging the intrinsic value of all human beings, regardless of social status.

Notes and References

[1] Harrison C. White, Identity & Control: How Social Formations Emerge (Princeton, NJ and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2008),

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid, 2

[4] Ibid, 1-2

[5] Ibid, 7

[6] Ibid, 8.

[7] Ibid, 8-9

[8] 'Alī B. 'Uthmān al-Jullābī al-Hujwīrī, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufiism, Reynold A. Nicholson, trans. (London: Luzac and Company Ltd., 1976), 379.I have revised Nicholson's translation somewhat from the original, following the online Persian edition: 'Alī ibn 'UthmānHujwīrī, Kashf al-maḥjūb, FarīdūnAsyābī 'IshqīZanjānī, ed., 225.https://archive.org/details/KashfulMahjoobFarsiError! Hyperlink reference not valid.

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[10] Ibid, 379-380; Farsi edition, 226.

[11] Ibid, 28-29

[12] Charles Tilly, Stories, Identities, and Political Change (London: Rowan and Littlefield, 2002), x-xiv, quoted in White, Identity & Control, 29.

[13] Hujwīrī, Kashf al-maḥjūb, Nicholson trans., 176-266

[14] White, Identity & Control, 64-65; the terms in quotation marks are White's.

[15] Ibid, 130

[16] Ibid.

[17] Muḥammad ibnSulaymān al-Jazūlī, Risālafī- l-tawḥīd (Fes: Khizānat al-Qārawīyyīn, ms. 723/7), 131v.-131r.

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[18] White, Identity & Control, 10-12
[19] Ibid, 17
[20] Ibid, 48
[21] Ibid, 129
[22] Ibid, 138
[23] Ali Hassan Abdel-Kader, The Life, Personality, and Writings of al-Junayd: A Study of a Third/Ninth Century Mystic with an Edition and Translation of His Writings (London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1976), p. 2 of the Arabic text. My translation.
[24] Arthur John Arberry Ed., TheMawáqif and Mukháṭbát of Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abdi’L-Jabbar Al-Niffari(London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1978), English text 80, Arabic text 73. This work was first published by Arberry in 1935 and contains some serious mistakes in translation. I have corrected Arberry’s translation above.
[25] White, Identity & Control, 140.
[26] T. M. Scanlon, “The Difficulty of Tolerance,” Rajeev Bhargava, Ed., Secularism and Its Critics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 54-