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## INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S ETHICAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY\*

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### ABSTRACT

Pre-Kantian Philosophy was RATIONALISM; – it held that theoretical or logical reason is capable of discovering the nature of all ULTIMATE REALITY. “Scepticism” doubted this and felt- back upon EMPIRICISM on sense as the only organ of knowledge. In modern Philosophy these stages viz. “Dogmatism” and “Scepticism” are represented by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Locke, Burkley and Hume; Leibnitz (Spinoza) and Hume are Kant's immediate predecessors. — “Dogmatism” and “Scepticism” had come to their completion in them. On the question of knowledge Dogmatism (Rationalism) held the Sense can give no knowledge whatsoever — the “Ideas” it gives are “Obscure” and “Confused” thoughts. Only Reason or Thought reveals truth; and it reveals the whole truth. “Scepticism” (Empiricism) on the contrary asserts that Sense alone and not Thought is the Source of all knowledge. What you call Universal propositions are but generalisations from empirical facts. Knowledge is Confined to experience—. Thus raged the controversy between the two schools. But Kant’s main work consists not only in distinguishing (negative) but also determining the positive nature of morality and of the Moral Law. Philosophy does not investigate the nature of This or That particular phenomenon or group or groups of

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*Kant's Ethical and Political Philosophy*

phenomena. Its business is to inquire into the Universal nature of things, into what is their “Form” and not what is their “Matter”, into their essence ( i.e. a priori elements), and not into their accidents (i.e. a posteriori elements). This again was properly brought out first by Kant. He asked: What is the “Form of Morality (not of the morality of this or that act or individual, but of all acts and all individuals), What is the “Form” of the Moral law (not of the ethos of this or that age, but of all ages); just as he asked: What is the form of Knowledge and what is the form of science (logos). He puts this question to himself in this shape: ‘What synthetic judgments a priori are involved in morality etc

## Introductory to Kant

Pre-Kantian Philosophy was RATIONALISM; – it held that theoretical or logical reason is capable of discovering the nature of all ULTIMATE REALITY.<sup>1</sup>

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In modern Philosophy these stages viz. “Dogmatism” and “Scepticism” are represented by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Locke, Burkley and Hume; Leibnitz (Spinoza) and Hume are Kant's immediate predecessors.<sup>2</sup> — “Dogmatism” and “Scepticism” had come to their completion in them. On the question of knowledge Dogmatism (Rationalism) held the Sense can give no knowledge whatsoever — the “Ideas” it gives are “Obscure” and “Confused” thoughts. Only Reason or Thought reveals truth; and it reveals the whole truth.<sup>3</sup> “Scepticism” (Empiricism) on the contrary asserts that Sense alone and not Thought is the Source of all knowledge. What you call Universal propositions are but generalisations from empirical facts. Knowledge is Confined<sup>4</sup> to experience—. Thus raged the controversy between the two schools. But there are certain propositions which must be universal and necessary if there is to be any knowledge worth the name, e.g. the principle of Cause and Effect, Substance Attribute etc. Before Hume both the school consciously or unconsciously assumed that their propositions were analytic truths and no difficulty arose.<sup>5</sup> But take Cause - Effect Hume

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<sup>1</sup> This unquestionably was “dogmatism”.

<sup>2</sup> The antithesis, according to Kant, is not but Leibnitz and Hume but bet Spinoza and Hume. This is the opinion of Kuneman in his great work on Kant published in 1924.

<sup>3</sup> The truth of rationalistic position lies in the fact that Knowledge means Knowledge of necessary and Universal proposition, and such propositions can not be empirical. The difficulty or error of it consists in claiming the knowledge of Supersensible. Really – in making metaphysics a Science

<sup>4</sup> The truth of Empiricism consists in holding that Knowledge is confined to experience. The difficulty or error of it is that it makes Knowledge i.e. Certainly of Universal Truths, incomprehensible

<sup>5</sup> This discovery, i.e., of synthetic judgments a priori (a priori does not mean ‘before experience’ but ‘rational’ - just as ‘a posteriori’ means empirical) was not possible for Rationalism, which worked only with concepts (Concept of cause involves that of effect); but only for Empiricism which works with Percepts (Instances) – the Percept of one event, i.e. an event does not

found that it was not an analytic proposition; — that its predicate is contained in its subject. Yet it claims to be Universal and Necessary. How this can be on his principle (Empiricism)?; there can be only empirical proposition, and they are not Universal and Necessary. Whence this necessity then? Hume explained it as a subjective (of habit, of association and of Ideas, the idea of association or association of ideas) necessity and refused objectivity to it. It is, said Hume, due to habit; it is only the Compulsion which the association of ideas (or the “idea” of association of idea) of two events exercises upon me, and no apprehension of any Connection of events between themselves — it is psychological and not a logical necessity; the events are not Connected, they are only conjoined.<sup>6</sup>

Hume’s Explanation of the causal principle undermined all science and aroused Kant from his “dogmatic Slumber” (“Dogmatic slumber” i.e. Slumber in rationalism no slumber in empiricism to which Kant has already passed). (Windleband) Kant realised the importance of the fact that the principle is not analytic. It is Synthetic, and yet not a posteriori. There are then Synthetic Judgements a priori. Casual principle is one such a Judgment. Are there others? Kant discovered that there were many: – Mathematics is full of them; science is based upon them, — also Metaphysics. Like a Philosopher he tried to find out all the fundamental Judgments of this kind (List of Catagories). Next he had to meet Hume’s doubts. He had to explain their objectivity i.e. to “deduce” them (Mind + validity is the very essence. Knowledge).

In view Hume’s Scepticism he concentrates himself upon this deduction on the proof<sup>7</sup> of their validity<sup>8</sup>. (Validity is the very essence of all knowledge. Hence it is the problem of Epistemology).

Unlike Hume, he does not doubt their validity. Their wide scope and reach make, holds Kant, doubt impossible.

Hume too should not have doubted their validity, — had he, known their Scope; — had he Known that Science and Mathematics are full of them. They are valid, they hold. But what considerations can be brought forward to show that they are valid? The Considerations, pleads Kant, are these:-

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involve that of a definite event necessarily preceding or following — B does not involve A.

<sup>6</sup> Hume is contradicting himself when he attributes Compulsion (causality) to ideas, — when he admits subjective necessity. This necessity subjective or objective, is necessity — it is causation. He is consistent in his Empiricism when he maintains that we apprehend no necessity between events.

<sup>7</sup> Mark that the Proof is of the nature of Indirect proof.

<sup>8</sup> Validity is the very essence of all knowledge. Hence it is the problem of Epistemology.

## Metaphysical Deduction

### Transcendental Deduction<sup>9</sup>

- (i) There is a Stubborn fact of our Consciousness<sup>10</sup> (which, even Hume accepts) namely the (fact) Consciousness of Objective Reality.
- (ii) There is the undeniable fact of Science the later being indeed only the working out of the former. Now the Conception of objects involves these Synthetic Judgments a priori; so does the Conception of science. The Judgments (or categories) form the very notion of objects and of Science. Hence the validity of these judgments is given in the admission of these facts – facts which can not reasonable be denied.

#### Notes:

##### (1) Starting Point in Philosophy

Descartes took Doubt as the starting-point, as the principle of his method — as the method of the discovery of the Undoubtable Certain Truth. This ended in the doctrine “I and my Ideas” — in “Solipsism”, pure and simple, in which the being of “I” (= a substance) too is doubtful (Cf- Hume).

Kant would take as his starting point the validity of Experience — of Perception and Thought — the Objectivity of the external world and of Science (Nature and Science of Nature), the validity of what a Sane Moral Man believes in, the validity of human (Common) Consciousness.

##### (2) Hume and Kant:- Objective Connection between things and Events:-

**Hume:** There is no objective Connection

**Kant:** Objective Connection there is. You can't help admitting it.

**Hume:** But we can't perceive Connection.

**Kant:** Yes, we can not.

**Hume:** How then can we affirm it?

**Kant:** we must affirm it for two reasons: -

- (i) The world of objects exists; also the science thereof. We cannot Sanelly deny these stubborn facts;
- (ii) Now the existence of the world (and Science) is impossible unless we affirm objective connection.

But all these truths (Synthetic judgments a priori) are discoveries of thought. Thought, therefore, is the organ of truth, of knowledge. Kant thus justifies Rationalism so far. — But he further finds that these truths are by themselves empty concepts and do not take us far enough. (N.B. Being the very notion of objects and of science of

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<sup>9</sup> Transcendental Deduction:- In this Kant is never proving the validity of Synthetic Judgments a priori. They can never be proved in the manner we are accustomed to. They are Fundamentals. All human thought is based on them. In Transcendental Deduction Kant is giving justification for holding these principles as valid.

<sup>10</sup> It is consciousness which in the first instance proves the objective validity of the “world outside”; and when this Consciousness of the “world outside” is systematised on certain principles it forms the subject matter of various sciences. (Cf i, ii)

objects, they must necessarily be confined to the world of these objects; i.e. Empirical reality.)

As pure concepts of reason they are hardly intelligible. Only when translated in terms of Time (in forms of sensibility) do they get meaning for us; and they yield Knowledge when applied to facts — facts which are discovered by Sense; i.e. when they are used to organise the data of Sensibility. Empiricism, therefore, is so far right.

Knowledge is Sensa<sup>11</sup> (Sense) — Particulars organised by Concepts, Universals — and hence Rationalism is wrong in passing beyond experience and holding that thought, pure and simple, can discover supersensible Reality. — Metaphysics as a science, the science of supersensible Reality, is consequently impossible. Knowledge is confined to experience or experiencible reality. Pure or Theoretical reason can not lead us further. Super-Sensible entities, Freedom, Soul, God, can neither be affirmed nor denied on the basis of theory. This is Kant's Criticism = an analysis of the faculty of knowledge and the consequent limitation thereof.

The analysis of the faculty of knowledge, of Theoretic Consciousness, of the Consciousness of Existence,<sup>12</sup> has confined us to the Sensible. But Knowledge is not our only faculty. We are also Active — Beings. Action, the faculty of Practice, of Moral Consciousness — The Consciousness of Ought — takes us beyond experience to the intelligible World — to the world of pure thought.

As complementary to his Epistemology (Theory of Knowledge), Kant undertakes the analysis and criticism of the Moral faculty (or Conscience) — of Practical Reason. what his results are, we shall see in the study of moral Philosophy.

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<sup>11</sup> Sena is plural of Sensum – objects grasped by senses.

<sup>12</sup> Knowledge deals with what is? Action in its very essence, involves going beyond what exist!

## Introduction to Kant's Ethical and Political Philosophy

N.B. the determination of the concepts of Moral Law and its Object (the Good) in the abstract, is Theory: they are so and so. The theory may be quite correct; but the concrete question is: How are they possible for me? The Theory of Morality must be brought to bear on practice. It must be shown that Moral Life is possible. The problem, therefore, now comes to be: "How is Moral Life possible for us real beings?"

How is the Moral Life possible? Clearly, it is possible and realizable only if my constitution and the constitution of the world are such as to admit of its realisation, are in harmony with its demands. In other words, if I am Free to act on the moral law; am an abiding being (Sustance) to achieve perfect morality, i.e. the Ideal of Morality by prolonged and sustained endeavour; and if the world is so constructed that Happiness will be the result thereof — the Ideal of Life. Absolute Good = Greatest Good — object of Practical Reason = Happiness to proportionate virtue.

Kant points out that the Moral Law, through the Concept of freedom, also affirms (implies) my being as substance.

### Kant's Ethics

#### General Method of Kant (Kant's Method)

##### Introduction

Following the development of Kant's thought in his theoretical and practical philosophy — the two domains which he worked out fully and side by side, we find the following stages:-

##### 1. Propaedeutic Critical

Which consists in his dissatisfaction with the old and the discovery of the new. This breaks up into:

(a) Determination (discovery) of the main problem and its solution in general — his "Voyage of Discovery". Here the method is Analytic<sup>13</sup>. — Kant takes up the concrete facts of consciousness and analyses them (This we find in "Prolegomena" and "Fundamental").

(b) Breaking up (Exposition) his main results into their elements and constructing them out of these elements step by step with all fullness — the method is Synthetic. (This we have in critiques of pure and practical Reason).

In this first stage Kant takes up 4 points for investigation:

(i) Distinction: Distinguishing one value from other cognate values, e.g. Knowledge from Opinion or Hypothesis (Science from Metaphysics = Ontology).

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<sup>13</sup> Prolegomena, Section 5, and note: Kant prefers to call the analytic method the "Regressive Method", while the synthetic method the "Progressive Method".

Morality from (Holiness), Beatitude and happiness, Beauty from Knowledge and Morality, (Holiness from Morality). Distinction is Kant's strong point.<sup>14</sup>

**(ii) Determination:** Determining the “Form”<sup>15</sup> versus (Matter) of the subject of inquiry, e.g. the Form of Knowledge, of Morality, of Beauty — The synthetic judgments a priori, the positive essential nature of the values in question.

**(iii) Deduction:** “Deduction” or Implication<sup>16</sup> of these forms or judgments showing their objective validity (Transcendental Deduction) or where that is not possible or is unnecessary, Kant takes the reverse course (reverse to Transcendental Deduction) and penetrates behind these forms or judgments to find out what they imply (postulates of morality)<sup>17</sup>. In Transcendental Deduction he shows that the judgment is implied in something else; in postulates that the judgment implies something else.

**(iv) Limits:** Limits of the inquiry with deduction or implication come out the limits of the inquiry; which were indeed already implicit in No. (i) and (ii) which define the nature and scope of the value. The determination of limits has become of paramount importance for Kant as the result of his theoretical<sup>18</sup> Philosophy, which led to the denial of the knowledge of all Super Sensible Reality. In practical philosophy it comes out in connection with the practical utility but the theoretical uselessness of the postulates.

**2. Dogmatic or Constructive:-** Having established his main thesis in the propaedeutic of Critical, Kant works out their consequences into a system of scientific knowledge<sup>19</sup>.

This stage is very important for grasping Kant's meaning however his students, specially his English students, have as a rule neglected it

<sup>14</sup> Note: Distinction (which is the negative side Determination) is the first condition of all clear thinking (of all philosophy) — Aristotle. The subject matter be seen, must be realized in its purity, in itself, without being confused with anything else. Kant, think the Hegelians, presses distinction to the verge of breaking.

<sup>15</sup> Form the essence of the thing, says Kant. Further he says, Mathematics and all philosophy has to do only with the form.

<sup>16</sup> When Kant cannot proof by transcendent deduction he brings out implications.

<sup>17</sup> Implication that the judgment is implied in----- = transcendental Deduction; that the Judgment implies----- = Postulate.

<sup>18</sup> Both these aspects are complimentary. One cannot be understood without the other.

<sup>19</sup> Here the question is: What modes the form or the principle takes; What the laws are under the Law or the principle; i.e. the principle in its application to actual existence, to matter, to man, yet only so far as the laws are a priori. It is the treatment of the a priori in the application to the a posteriori.

contented themselves with the study only of their results of this stage.

### **I. Critical Stage:**

The results of this stage are given in "Metaphysics of Nature" (Metaphysics of Morals).

### **Special (Ethical)**

#### **N.B. The Distinction of Virtue and Happiness, The Two Practical Values**

(Socrates, Cynics, Stoics, Cyrenaics, Epicurus, Plato and Aristotle)

#### **1. The Greek Mind and Greek Philosophy**

The Greek mind seems to be in childlike harmony with its world, which is small and mundane, is a rounded whole, a sphere for it the unity of the world is not yet broken up into the Actual and the Ideal — the two are homogenous, are in one line for it. Pleasure and virtue are one — Virtue is the means to pleasure, it brings advantage, it brings superiority over others, it is my triumph over them. The Greek is like a child or the well-to-do man living in a narrow circle of definite duties, which are easily performed and are praised by all. He is a finite of the earth and of his time. He naturally conceives of morality in terms of the end of desire and its satisfaction; unity of pleasure, the ideal and the actual are not heterogenous for him philosophy is not reflection on human consciousness. Hence the Greek philosophers abide by the unconscious view the Greek mind takes of virtue and pleasure.

For them all pleasure or happiness is the end, and virtue a means to it, the two values are not conceived as independent. Socrates held virtue to be the really pleasant, the advantageous. The Cynics sought this pleasure in following Socrates, life of independence of simplicity, of neglecting worldly goods. The Stoics too who followed Cynics seem to come nearer to the fundamental distinction of virtue and happiness really hold that happiness is the true end, but it can be had only by suppressing feelings etc; that virtue is happiness.

The Cyrenaics, followed by Epicureans, hold that happiness is virtue. Thus both the ancient "Rationalists" and "Hedonists" identify the two values. Plato and Aristotle, the idealists, indeed set aside the one-sidedness (Reason and feeling) of these schools; for them the satisfaction of the whole self becomes the end; yet the self consists for them of (lower and higher) desires. It is the satisfaction of all these desires i.e happiness which is the end; virtue which is a means to this end. Hence they are Eudaemonists. Plato and Aristotle is truth go back nearer to the Greek mind and its concrete harmony of desire and virtue. For the Greek thought indeed there is really but one practical value, viz, pleasure or happiness; virtue is, with more or less emphasis, subordinate to it, it derives any value it may have from pleasure, it is a means to happiness.

#### **2. The Modern Mind and Thought**

The modern mind (and thought) is heir to an ancient Greek mind as well as the Middle Ages. So far as it is thinking naturally (like the Greeks), it holds pleasure or happiness to be the end; the position is so natural that anyone who starts thinking thinks of happiness as self-evidently the end of action and the only practical value, the only thing worth having for its own sake. Philosophers like Hobbes, Rousseau, propounded the position, (Bentham and Mill) and even philosophers of the Moral Sense school Shaftsbury, Hutcheson subscribe to it. Virtue is not regarded as having an independent value (This empirical school, There are Rationalists or Idealists (Leibnitz,

Wolff) who hold perfection or self-realization to be the end; which is only a shelter why of making virtue subordinate (means) to happiness. Happiness is now hold to consist rather in the satisfaction of the higher desires).

N.B: These school does not remain uninfluenced by the spiritual experience of the Middle Ages. Hence why they are more reflective and find it more difficult to reconcile virtue and happiness (Shaftsbury, Hutcheson).

But the modern mind so far as it inherited the spiritual experience of the Middle ages has lost that inheritance, that sense of the harmony, of the unity of the Actual and the Ideal, which Greek possessed. It is not a citizen of this world; its world has become much larger, indeed infinite; it is a citizen of eternity. It is from eternity and his relation to eternity that his duties arise. It seeks their realization, it seeks perfection in that world, a perfection much wider and much deeper than it can attain to have. The ideal is, it finds never realized. The ideal falls outside the actual. Hence its essential is unhappiness and its pessimism (Carlyle: Man's unhappiness is due to his greatness). It is dissatisfied with the actual. The actual does not please it. The pleasures of here are of no value to it. Indeed pleasure does not seem to be the concern of this mind. It seems to seek virtue for the sake of virtue. Virtue, Duty, Morality is for it something higher, something valuable for itself. Unity it feels is a command, the Law ordained by something superior, Mine is to obey. Righteousness consists for it in implicit obedience to this law.

Virtue has thus entangled itself from pleasure. It is a law absolutely binding, binding for itself. But the Superior whose law it is, is not yet clearly grasped by Christian consciousness. It remains a being outside myself, it is God. With this, Eudaemonism seem again to creep in, morality remains a heteronomy. The school of Moral Sense (Shaftsbury, Hutcheson) even Butler and the succeeding school of Intuitionists (Reid, etc) represent this aspect of modern moral consciousness. They emphasize virtue, morality as independent value, and yet can in the sanction of conscience (Aeasure), Butler well-nigh gets out of it and comes nearer to Kant. Kant as the heir to the great mind as well as to the spiritual experience of the Middle ages is the first to realize that pleasure and virtue are two independent values; and that for the latter no sanctions are required; the law of morality is the law of my own self, it is autonomy.

### **Critical Stage :-**

(Stages: Distinction, Exposition, Propaedeutic)

#### **(Stage Distinction:)**

##### **1. (Fundamentals and Critique of Practical Reason)**

(i) As in the Theory of Knowledge, so in the theory of morals the pre-Kantian thought is divided into Rationalism (Idealism) and Empiricism (Hedonism or Realism) Leibnitz — Wolf school teaching perfection to be the end to which morality is the means; Hobbes — Rousseau (Individual) Shaftsbury — Hutcheson (others) holding pleasure to be the end and morality the means to it. [Indeed both the schools make the “satisfaction of desires” the end — Rationalism only emphasizing the higher desires (Desires originating in reason), Empiricism tending to emphasize the lower desires (Desires originating in Sense or Instinct). Now in the continued satisfaction of desires on the whole consists happiness. We can, therefore, say that before Kant all Ethics was Eudaemonism. The

ethical inquiry had been since the time of Socrates, says Kuhnemann, the doctrine of “happiness”.

Kant was the first to bring out that Morality and Happiness are two different and independent values;<sup>20</sup> that morality is not a means but an end in itself and that the supreme, the highest. He is thus the founder of Ethics proper as he is the founder of Epistemology proper.

Thus both the inquiries started by Socrates (who sought knowledge of moral principles) find their completion in Kant.

**(Stage: Determination of Exposition Prodaedetic)**

(ii) But Kant's main work consists not only in distinguishing (negative) but also determining the positive nature of morality and of the Moral Law. Philosophy does not investigate the nature of This or That particular phenomenon or group or groups of phenomena. Its business is to inquire into the Universal nature of things, into what is their “Form” and not what is their “Matter”, into their essence (i.e. a priori elements), and not into their accidents (i.e. a posteriori elements). This again was properly brought out first by Kant. He asked: What is the “Form of Morality (not of the morality of this or that act or individual, but of all acts and all individuals), What is the “Form” of the Moral law (not of the ethos of this or that age, but of all ages); just as he asked: What is the form of Knowledge and what is the form of science (logos). He puts this question to himself in this shape: ‘What synthetic judgments a priori are involved in morality etc<sup>21</sup>.

(iii) But a further question arises: How are such judgments possible? For these forms, the synthetic judgments a priori, and yet we understand that is objectively valid. This is the case when judgment is analytic e.g. all bodies are excluded. But the judgments, the forms in question are not analytic; they are synthetic<sup>22</sup>. The predicate of the judgments adds something to the concept of the subject of the judgment<sup>23</sup>. On what basis, then can we say that every event has a cause? On what ground can we hold that the Moral law is

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<sup>20</sup> Moral action is other than ordinary action, which is action by desire, i.e. for happiness. Morality is a value by itself. (Two independent values; and that for the later no sanctions are required – the law of morality is the law of my own self it is autonomy)

<sup>21</sup> The form of morality is that it is determination of the of the will by the concept of this law; and the form of the moral law is that Law Universal which is absolutely binding. It is “Categorical Imperative”, It is an absolute “Ought”. Mark that really all systems of ethics must recognize this form. Indeed they do recognize that something (happiness, self-realization) is absolutely limiting.

<sup>22</sup> Definition of Synthetic judgments.

<sup>23</sup> Note: That the Moral Law is a synthetic judgment a priori, to bring this out is called exposition.

real; in other words, that the synthetic judgments in question are objectively valid? To show this is called Transcendental Deduction.

In this respect the method of Kant is to take a universally accepted and undeniable fact (e.g. consciousness of objects, or science), and to analyze it in order to show that the judgments in question are involved in its very notion, that they are its necessary implications. In this consists Transcendental Deduction.

Such a deduction is not possible in the case of a Moral Law; because no undeniable instances of perfectly and wholly moral action can be found, facts in which the moral law could be shown to be incorporated. But at the same time such a deduction is not necessary. For the moral law is not a statement of facts, it is a command; its reality or objective validity means obligatoriness; and its obligatoriness is accepted by man<sup>24</sup>. It is real, it is binding. The Inquiry therefore takes another form: How is the moral law as binding on us conceivable? What we must assume in order to understand that the moral law is binding on us? How is moral obligation conceivable? What are the conditions of these being a moral imperative? What are its implications? – A question just the reverse of the question of Transcendental Deduction<sup>25</sup>.

This is however a very real question. Kant puts in this form: How is the categorical Imperative possible? “Possible”, in this connection means, not justifiably actual (in the Transcendental Deduction), but properly conceivable.

Such a condition or implication is “Freedom” (negative as well as positive). I must have two natures:

(a) Rational, which is free from the bonds of natural (causal) necessity and which gives it own law; and

(b) Animal, which subject to the influence of instincts and environments, is governed by causal necessity, but which I recognize must submit to the law of my rational nature, i.e. I must be free.<sup>26</sup> Freedom is therefore the postulate of all Moral Actions<sup>27</sup>. The duty of realizing the perfect character or moral life however demands a

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<sup>24</sup> Note: Can merely the acceptance account for its objective validity? There are so many “notions” (Kant) which are generally accepted but Kant would reject them on his peculiar principles of criticism, e.g. Hedonism; Perfection, etc.

Note: For the question is not: of what the categorical Imperative is a necessary implication (Transcendental Deduction), but: whose the necessary implications of the categorical imperative.

<sup>25</sup> See note on Transcendental Deduction.

<sup>26</sup> N.B: Freedom is “deduced” from the moral law (categorical imperative); Immortality from the good (moral) and God from the complete good.

<sup>27</sup> A notion which the moral imperative assumes for its very possibility. The notion of duty involves “Freedom”.

further postulate, viz. Immortality (= continued existence = substantiality of the soul); and the duty of realizing the “Summum Bonum”, the complete good in which happiness is proportioned to Morality, makes it necessary to postulate the existence of a perfect ruler of the universe of God.

(iv) This brings us to the limits of the inquiry, which are in fact identical with limitations of moral consciousness. This consciousness has led us to the affirmation of the three ideas, which are only problematic for the theoretical or speculative reason; in this consists its primacy. But this affirmation is not knowledge, for knowledge there could be only if they were object of sense, concepts of understanding, or influence of reason, i.e., if they had become objects of the theoretic consciousness. That there is God, that we are immortal and that we are free, can in no way be proved<sup>28</sup>. These are not objective truths. They are only postulates of Moral consciousness, hypothesis which make the attitude of moral endeavor a reasonable undertaking, and nothing more. They are subjective conviction, faith, which the moral agent finds necessary in order to practice morality; and not objective even morally, because to have such a faith can not be a duty. Morally they are useful, theoretically they are absolutely useless, says Kant. Indeed immortality and God are postulates<sup>29</sup> which are not equally (certain) necessary with freedom. For without freedom, the moral imperative can not hold at all, without immortality and God it still holds, for I ought to act morally whether the attainment of Good or complete Good be or be not possible.

Indeed freedom etc we do not understand at all. To understand means to explain causally which would be a contradiction in terms; nor can we go behind it and break it up into elements, for it is an ultimate faculty. Inquiry stops when we come to an ultimate faculty.

#### **N.B**

##### **Freedom a Postulate:-**

Freedom is conceptually necessary for moral action. Is it actual? Is freedom a fact? Am I free? This is a (difficult) different question. I may recognize that freedom is a necessary implication of morality, that I am to be moral, I am must be free, even that I ought to be moral (hence free). Yet I may not recognize that , I am actually free and that consequently I can be moral. Necessitarians and psychologists will take this view. Hence the affirmation of freedom as actual is not a necessity of thought, a fact demonstrable, but only a postulate, a postulate of our moral activity.

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<sup>28</sup> Proof: Freedom, Immortality, God are posited as facts, as existents (as objects). The proof a fact consists either in experiencing it or in showing that it is necessarily involved in an experienced fact. But freedom etc are neither facts of experience, nor can they be shown to be necessarily involved in facts of experience. Indeed they are based not on facts but on a command

<sup>29</sup> Does not Kant's argument lead to a vicious circle? We are free because we are moral beings. We are moral because we are free!

**Postulates :-**

That Moral Law is real (Obligatory) involves Freedom. That Morality (Life according to Moral Law = Perfect Moral Life) is possible because obligatory involves Immortality. That Morality (to lead a Moral Life) is reasonable involves God.

**Note:** Mark that theoretically speaking only if we hold reality of the sense of obligation (of responsibility), can we affirm freedom as its necessary postulate; and only if we assert that perfect morality is somehow realizable by us, can we postulate immortality, and only if we affirm that perfect morality will bring perfect happiness, can we postulate God? But all the three can be denied. Comparatively the first is the least doubtful, the second more than the first and the third more than the second. The third however necessitates the postulate of a moral order and not necessarily that of the existence of God. This theoretically. But morally or practically, i.e. in doing good, in good deed, they are unavoidably involved as the faith which under lies them, the faith without which moral practice (virtue) would be something irrational, a foolish endeavor. This faith is stronger than even our theoretical interests. Normally we shake our life itself and the whole work of our life on it.

Kuhnemann goes to the length of saying that freedom, immortality and God are more certain than theoretical truths, because we can lay down our life for our moral principles (moral principles involve freedom, etc). But this Un-Kantian. The explanation of the facts on which Kuhnemann relies lies in the superiority of the moral value to the theoretical value, rather than in the certainty or the greater certainty of that (eg. Freedom) which it involves.

Now should it be taken that because they are “subjective”, therefore they are arbitrary or individual. They are, means Kant, morally subjective, i.e. though they are necessary for all moral agents and hence so far objective, they are not morally “objective” because it is no duty to assume them ( nor are they practically objective because they can not be conceivably proved and simply hypothesis.

## II. Constructive Stage

(Metaphysics of Morals)

After finishing the “Critical” part in ‘Fundamental’ and ‘Critique of Practical Reason’, Kant comes to the “Constructive or Dogmatic” part of the work in his metaphysics of morals. He is interested only in the a priori elements of ethical life (though it is doubtful that he strictly confines himself to them). He calls them “Elements” (مبادئ) and does not claim completion, completion being impossible without bringing in their application to empirical conditions (which ipso facto plainly makes all exhaustiveness impossible<sup>30</sup>).

“Metaphysics of Morals” has two parts: part I dealing with the Laws which can be enforced by an external authority — with Right, with juristic; Principles of Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy, with juristics. Part II with the Laws which have only Internal Authority, with Principles of Morality proper, with the system of Duties and Virtues, with Ethical Philosophy, or Ethics proper. “Metaphysics of Morals” supplies the content (“Matter”) to the Categorical Imperative (“Form”) and completes Kant’s Moral Philosophy.

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<sup>30</sup> Critique determines the conception as such, in the abstract of object of duty etc, together with their Metaphysical implications and Limits. Metaphysics of nature, of morals apply the concept of concrete existents to nature, to man. However the concrete existents too are taken in respect of either essential natures\_\_ the necessary and universal or the a priori elements which go to constitute them.

They are elements because with an empirical fact which can not be exhausted.

1. In juristics the conception of law, though a priori, is connected with laws, its applications and they can not be exhausted.
2. In ethics again though the conception of duty is a priori, the duties arise out of empirical conditions. They can not therefore be exhaustively tested.