

THE LOGICAL DISCREPANCIES OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM

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I

The movement of Logical Positivism as it has been developed in the hands of Wittgenstein and Carnap, and its many other adherents, who disagree with one another on minor points (though some times these points are very significant) is but a 20th century form of subjectivism, with the only difference that the classical subjectivism "explained" reality in terms of subject, while this new form of it actually "limits" reality, by "analysing language" and by arbitrarily proclaiming what 'can' and what cannot be 'said' by considering the logical syntax of the language in which we express them.

It is my intention to show in this article that the theory of Logical Positivism is full of inherent contradiction, and that a sound philosophical system can only be based upon a proper realization of the objective reality of the self. For this purpose I shall first elaborate the point of view of Logical Positivists.

II

Hitherto the main obstacle in the way of true philosophy is the belief that *apriori* reasoning for the discovery of new facts is possible. Kant's quest for the possibility of synthetic judgment *apriori* was a vain attempt after a mirage. Philosophy can't discover new facts. All the questions of human interest belong to special sciences and are capable of being decided by empirical evidence (at least in theory). Hence all the problems of philosophy are the problems of logic, which means every philosophical problem when subjected to analysis is found either not philosophical at all or logical. Such a treatment can be accomplished in the following way:—

- (1) Positive knowledge gained empirically is transferred inductively into facts and generalizations. No *apriori* reasoning is of any help in epistemology.
- (2) Propositions formed as a result of step (I) is subjected to logical analysis.
- (3) The analysis produces a new clarity by analysing logical form of truth to the facts already known.

The idea of such a logical analysis is rooted in pure mathematics and mathematical logic. In mathematics the need for exact definitions of the terms used was very strongly felt. Russell suggested that the same method of exact definition of terms can as well be applied to philosophical investigations.

For instance in the sphere of differential calculus the idea of the differential functions was very obscure. A differential function gives the velocity of a moving body at a given instant of time, and this was thought to involve the very obscure conception of the infinitely small distance travelled in an infinitely small time. Obviously, the whole idea of infinitely small quantities was impossible and contradictory since all real quantities, howsoever small, are necessarily finite. This difficulty was removed by giving a more exact definition to differential functions. It was defined as the LIMIT towards which the relation of the distance travelled to the corresponding period of time approaches as the distances and time considered, get smaller

and smaller. $\left\{ \lim \frac{\delta s}{\delta t}, \delta t \rightarrow 0 \right\}$

In the same way the difficulty of an explanation of irrational numbers was avoided by defining them (*i.e.* $\sqrt{2}$) in terms of rational numbers, and thus showing that all irrational and imaginary numbers have an ultimate mathematical reality.

Not only this but Russell has attempted in his '*Principia*' to analyse all numbers in terms of logical idea or classes, which he later on attempted to apply to philosophy.

The most important idea in this conception of logical analysis is that of logical form. Every proposition and inference has apart from its subject matter a particular form, a way in which the constituents of a proposition are put together. Different propositions may possess same form, but differ in content, some others may have same content expressed in different forms. The proper object of philosophy is this form of a proposition, in abstraction from the real world, which is reflected in these forms on the one hand, and the process of thought which create these forms on the other. A main series of logical forms of propositions has to be worked out, and Russell in '*Principia*' and Wittgenstein in his '*Tractatus*' have tried to work out the same.

This begins with elementary propositions, from which complicated and complex propositions are arrived at. Elementary propositions say that

a certain thing has a property or certain thing stands in certain relations with other. Complex propositions are arrived at by assigning truth functions to these propositions. For example P is a proposition. Then P is either true or false (not P or P) that it is true when not P is false, is false when not P is true. Thus we get by assigning truth functions to elementary propositions a negative proposition which is the simplest truth function. If we take two propositions *i.e.* P and Q a lot more truth functions can be obtained *i.e.*

P implies Q — $P \supset Q$.
 either P or Q — $P \vee Q$
 not both P and Q — $P \cdot Q$

These compound propositions, can be exclusively defined as truth functions of elementary propositions. General propositions are also simply constructed and may be of any order or complexity.

Logical analysis as it is developed has taken two procedural forms in the hands of logical positivists. Wittgenstein follows the Socratic pattern in a casuistic way——individual confusions clarified, and cases treated. But the general theory of treatment is not elaborated systematically. On the other hand Carnap and others formulate a complete system. These two procedures differentiated the two groups of philosophers on the basis of their respective logical reconstructions. One headed by Wittgenstein, Schillick and Waismen remained experientialistic, while the other headed by Carnap, Neurath and Hempel became physicalistic. I will take Wittgenstein as the representative of the first and Carnap of the other to elaborate my point.

III

The fundamental characteristic of Wittgensteinian philosophy is the relation he wants to establish between language and world. Language is the totality of significant assertions which is related to the totality of objectives of those assertions. Those assertions which are not related to any such objectives are simply insignificant, and either nonsense, poetry, or metaphysics. The objectives which are related to such significant assertions or propositions are facts, or more correctly they may be described as the combination of objects. This 'fact' is different from that of Aristotle, because here it is a conceivable structure whereas Aristotle limits the fact to "the inherence of something in some thing else." The fact is a fundamental entity and hence is indefinable. Object can be defined as (a) set of

facts in which it occurs *i.e.* the set of facts which possess at least one feature of absolute similarity (blue colour of sky) or (b) as whatever is distinguishable constituting a fact. Fact is an independent entity, whereas objects are dependent in as much as they occur in one fact or the other.

The world is a totality of independent atomic facts. Whether a fact is atomic or not cannot be known on *apriori* grounds, but only by direct inspection. These atomic facts are composed of objects in immediate combination. When objects are combined it is called structure of the facts.

The form of the object is therefore the possibility of the structure of the fact. Possibility is a logical concept and not an ontological one, hence object is a formal reality requiring completion in order to exist and is only conceivable as being complete in a given set of ways.

The atomic facts must exist as a demand of logical theory, and are capable of being completely logically demonstrated. This demonstration consists in showing the relationship between facts and propositions. The intricate symbolism of language is definitely more complex and seems surplus than atomic facts. Hence a theory must be worked out to establish the relation between this symbolism and that which is being represented by these symbols.

Wittgenstein's demonstration is simple. There are two ways of relation.

1. Relation between the proposition and the fact.
2. Relation between the proposition and propositions.

The relation of a proposition and a fact is that of agreement. When a proposition agrees with a fact it is true otherwise not.

In what this 'agreement' consists. The answer is, it is a pictorial relation. The proposition is a picture of fact. The pictorial character consists in the circumstances that it is itself a fact possessing certain features in common with the fact which it pictures. These common factors, are (1) the logical form and (2) a one-one correlation between objects comprising the respective facts. This relation can't further be explained it must be presupposed.

Logical form is the common invariant feature of various modes used to express a proposition. Therefore several facts differing in many particulars may be used to express the same sense *i.e.* to picture the same objective fact if they enjoy a community of form. Thus the definition of a proposition is that it is a fact used to picture another fact or a class of facts used to picture another fact. In this case the structure of the proposi-

tional fact is identical with the structure of the other fact, in the second case the class of facts enjoys a common structure, and this structure is identical with the structure of fact.

As noted above the sense of a proposition depends upon its form of representation and it is the possibility of the fact which it represents. It is quite different from its truth, and from the proposition itself. The proposition neither can be said identical nor it contains its sense. Two propositions may express the same fact and any proposition can be understood without knowing it to be true; because truth is the agreement of the proposition with reality, while sense is the possibility of agreement.

All the propositions which are significant or in other words which have a sense have an ultimate reference to the empirical realm. The atomic facts are experiential facts and sense can only be found in experience.

But all the propositions are not pictures of facts. The general propositions, concerning logic and arithmetic seem to be understandable without any reference to experience (Wittgenstein then has to show that all general propositions are reducible to elementary and all elementary propositions are simply and exclusively concerned with empirical reality).

The theory that elementary propositions are pictures of reality is not a novel attempt in the history of philosophy, Hume's theory of ideas as copies of impressions is virtually the same save the fact that the nature of psychological process does not enter, into consideration in the Wittgensteinian theory.

Elementary propositions are said to picture the reality which means both of them agree one another, as I have referred above. But proposition and a fact does not resemble with one another save in few respects (as a map of a country resembles with the country).

Shilick, who later agreed with the picture theory of Wittgenstein once criticised him on the very question. Thus, he wrote, "In ordinary language agreement simply means likeness. Two tones, two colours two propositions, two opinions agree if they are alike. The word is obviously not to be taken in this sense here, for the judgment is something completely different from that which is judged. . . . it is not like that which is judged and this can be contested from the stand point of adventurous metaphysical systems which equate thought and being in general, and about which we should waste no words here."

If agreement does not mean likeness, perhaps it could mean similarity.

In what sense our judgments are similar to facts? Similarity must mean at least partial likeness, hence it must be possible to find certain moments of judgment which are revealed in the facts themselves. In purely conceptual truths, where the object judged, as well as the judgment consists of purely ideal forms, likeness might be found in both sides under certain circumstances but that cannot be the essential requisite for truth, for propositions about real things also make claim to truth. here, indeed, the nature of truth first becomes a problem but in both, one will seek for such similar moments. For the concepts occurring in the judgement are certainly not of the same nature as the real objects which they designate, and the relations among concepts are not like the relation of things, for in the latter temporal moments always occur, and they are spatial, where as conceptual relations are non-spatial and non-temporal. In the judgement 'the chair stands at the right of the table,' the concept of 'chair' is not placed at the right of the concept 'table'.

Thus the concept of agreement melts away under the rays of analysis in so far as it is to mean sameness or similarity, and what remains of it is simply univocal arrangement. The judgement pictures the nature of the judged as little as the note pictures of tone or as the name of the man pictures his personality. 'Shilick's criticism mainly covers the type of criticism levelled against the pictorial theory of Logical Posotivism. For Wittgenstein the answer to such a criticism consists in showing that the minimum requirements for picturing are:

- (1) That the fact pictured and the fact used to picture it possesses the same number of distinguishing parts and
- (2) That the structure of the first is identical with the structure of the second.

But some facts may possess only the first condition, as in the example given by Shilick of notes of a melody. The relation among the notes in the score and the relation among the tones of the instrument or voice are not identical for the former relation is spatial and the latter temporal, the relation between different colours of a map is different from the relation of the altitudes which they represent.

But nevertheless for Wittgenstein all these pairs have in a sense some form in which their pictureness consists. This can be very easily compared with geometrical projections. In geometrical projection a figure may be projected on a surface such that the result is visibly quite different

from the original. The laws of geometrical projection determine that certain properties remain invariant for all possible projections of a given figure. A geometrical science could be developed, and in fact has been partially developed, such that the facts from different modalities could be used as projections of one another. On the same pattern the logical form of a fact may be identical with that of another fact even if the entities and relations of one differ from those of others.

The essential connection between discourse and empirical reality is thus established by demonstrating the pictorial character of propositions which have empirical reference. The sense of proposition is the method of verification, that is to say what it represents if it is true. The sense of empirical propositions is the possibility that the facts which they picture exist. But several problems present themselves. How do we know that all propositions are reducible to elementary propositions? Is it possible to show that all elementary propositions are exclusively concerned with picturing empirical reality?

The answer to these problems consists in showing that all propositions are truth functions of the elementary propositions, and that elementary propositions exist which are not truth functions of any other proposition. Wittgenstein describes the truth of a proposition in its agreement of its sense with reality, disagreement of sense with reality is falsehood.

Truth and falsity are neither properties nor relations of propositions or of facts. Thus, 'A' loves 'B' and 'it is true that A loves B' are exactly the same thing. The addition of 'It is true' is simply redundant. On the other hand to say that $P = X$ is true is nonsense, since 'it is true' is not the predicate of X. The addition of 'is true' "exists" etc. to the term X is nonsensical.

Hence the word 'true' 'false' "exist" "does not exist" do not stand for any entities whatsoever. A proposition is true when it agrees with reality, otherwise is false. This can only be established by comparison. Truth is not the comparison but its result.

When two propositions P.Q. are asserted the result of the double assertion does not represent two facts and a conjunctive relation between them. Moreover, 'and' is not the name of any proper entity. Similarly when a proposition is negated the negation sign is not any entity of the objective world. Truth and falsity are therefore, not objective entities. The logical content 'and' 'not' etc. are simply a part of linguistic apparatus necessary

to represent the world.

It remains to be shown that why Wittgenstein believes that elementary propositions are exclusively about empirical reality. The importance of this problem is overwhelming for the Logical Positivist. For if all propositions are truth functions of elementary propositions and if the elementary propositions are concerned with empirical then all words, sentences, assertions, about the non-empirical would be simply nonsense.

The demonstration of the exclusive empirical content of proposition consists in showing the existence of logical simples. A logically simple object is an object which according to its nature makes any further analysis impossible. In history of philosophy we may find similar conceptions. For example the monad of Leibnizian metaphysics is an absolutely simple entity without qualification. It differs however, from the logical simples in being a non-empirical notion. Perhaps the 'simple impressions' of Hume would serve a better example. If one translated Hume's literary psychology, into the language of logic and at the same time removed the naturalistic tendency from the system whatever would correspond to the simple impressions would be very much like the logically simple object of Wittgenstein. The reasons for demonstrating the existence of simple objects as being the 'ultimate furniture of the world' are: In order to show the exclusive concern of elementary propositions with empirical facts, it is necessary to show that there is one and only one complete analysis of any proposition and this analysis absolutely terminates in the elementary proposition, and finally the elementary propositions are not capable of analysis save into the names which compose them. If many distinct analysis were possible then even though a given analysis of propositions lead to elementary propositions which were not solely concerned with empirical reality, another possible analysis might very well lead to elementary propositions which were not solely concerned with empirical reality. Similarly if there is no ultimate limit to analysis then although a given analysis led solely to elementary proposition of the kind in question, when carried out to any previously assigned limit, further analysis might reveal some non-empirical content in the propositions. Both these possibilities are excluded first because of the fact that propositions are composed by truth-operations and the second can be excluded if the objectives of elementary propositions can be shown to be composed of logical simples.

The argument for logical simples is this "If the world had no substance

(simple objects) then whether a proposition has sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world true or false."

Perhaps the above complicated argument can be summed up in one sentence: "If there are pictures of facts then some propositions have sense without being truth functions of other propositions, then the existence of propositions with independent sense implies the existence of simple objects."

IV

Carnap has attempted, avoiding the difficulties of the older doctrine, to maintain the empirical tradition and anti-metaphysical direction of logical positivism.

The first difficulty of the older doctrine was the empiristic absolutism which is hardly the spirit of a non-metaphysical and scientific philosophy. The doctrine of atomic facts, the rigid distinctions between discourse and empirical reality, depend upon the assumptions which cannot be demonstrated.

Carnap in his attempt has simply abandoned the Wittgensteinian atomism as being without proof, and the distinction between discourse and reality has been dispensed with in favour of a purely discursive theory of truth and meaning. It is no longer necessary to distinguish between discourse and fact because everything is expressible. Logical syntax of language may now be formulated in a significant way.

The most interesting part of Carnap's philosophy is his Radical Physicalism according to which all sentences may be translated into a universal language which is similar in form to the contemporary physics. The methodological solipsism and the extreme empiricism which prevented Positivists from formulating a satisfactory account of scientific objectivity are thus simply avoided without reintroduction of metaphysical principles.

"The questions dealt within any theoretical field" wrote Carnap, "can be roughly divided into *object questions* and *logical questions*. By object questions are to be understood those which have to do with the objects of the domain under consideration such as inquiries regarding their properties and relations. The logical questions on the other hand do not refer directly to the objects but to sentences, terms, theories and so on, which themselves refer to objects."

Thus, science deals with objects. But philosophy that is the logical

analysis of science, does not deal with objects at all, but with language.

Thus, it appears that Wittgenstein should not have spoken of objects and facts and of the comparison of propositions with reality. Scientific philosophy must confine the discourse to the relation of propositions with *propositions* and of thought with *thoughts*. This standpoint means that a new interpretation of logic is required. Carnap gave this new view by defining 'logic as syntax,' and he explains it, "By the logical syntax of a language, we mean the formal theory of the linguistic forms of that language—the systematic statement of the formal rules which govern it, together with the development of the consequences which follow from these rules."

"A theory, a rule, a definition, or like is to be called formal when no reference is made in it either to the meaning of the symbols (*e.g.* the words) or to the sense of the expression (*e.g.* the sentences) but simply and solely to the kinds and order of the symbols from which the expressions are constructed."

Formal logic or logical syntax is then concerned simply and solely with symbols or with language without regard to meaning. This means that it is concerned only with the rules of formation and transformation of a language. The rules of formation show that how symbols may be combined together to form sentences. The rules of transformation show how sentences may be derived from other sentences.

Thus if we know the rules of formation we can know which sentences are significant and which insignificant (allowed by one language or not allowed).

It may be objected, how do we know which are the right rules of formation and transformation without knowing the meaning of sentences.

Carnap's answer is that this question is the result of a prejudice that the principles of logic, must constitute a faithful rendering of the 'true logic' *i.e.* the eternally valid principles of logic, which any system of logic may contrive to mirror. This is merely a metaphysical illusion.

The rules of formation and transformation are chosen quite arbitrarily. This choice whatever it may be, determines what meaning is to be assigned to the fundamental logical symbols. On this very basis and owing to the difficulties of the world languages, the general syntax of an artificially constructed language may be formulated, which may be applied to any language later on what so ever.

By application, the correct sense of any language may become clear. A few examples will suffice to explain the intent of Carnap:—

Material Mode of Expression
(natural language)

Formal Mode.

A thing is a complex of sense data.

Every sentence in which a thing designation occurs is equipollent to a class of sentences in which nothing designation but sense data designations occur.

A thing is a complex of atoms

Every sentence in which a thing designation occurs is equipollent to a sentence in which spacetime coordinates and certain descriptive functors (of physics) occur.

The world is a totality of facts not of things.

Science is a system of sentences not of names.

A fact is a combination of objects (entities, things)¹.

A sentence is a series of symbols.

From the above sentences it is clear that when they are in material mode they sound as if they were asserting some property of the objective world, while they are only syntactical assertions (about words not about objects).

According to Carnap there are three kinds of sentences:—

- (1) Object sentence.
- (2) Pseudo-object sentences.
- (3) Syntactical sentences.

The sentences of science are object sentences. To use the material mode they are about the properties of objects. Philosophical sentences of the analysis of science are pseudo-object sentences, when they are expressed in material modes, but if they are significant they are 'equipollent' to syntactical sentences.

Science according to Carnap is a system of statements based on direct experience and controlled by experimental verification. . . . Verification is based on *protocol sentences*.

Protocol sentences refer to the given and describe directly given experiences or phenomena *i.e.* the simplest states of which knowledge can

be had. The programme of the logical analysis of science is only to show that how the whole system of scientific statements is derived from protocol statements according to certain formal rules.

Sentences are to be compared with sentences not with 'experiences' not with a 'world' not with anything else.

All these senseless duplications belong to a more or less refined metaphysics, and are therefore, to be rejected. Every new sentence is confronted with a totality of sentences which are present and which have been brought into agreement. Then a sentence is called correct if it can be brought into a system. (we can also alter the whole system for the inclusion of some new sentences which can't be rejected).

Carnap says that there can be one Universal Language of science into which all statements of different sciences can be translated. The unity of sciences is being established by showing that there is a universal language of science into which all scientific statements can be translated.

The language is called the physical language, and the theory of the Unity of Science is called 'Physicalism.'

In Carnap's own words this is a kind of materialism. Thus he wrote, "Our view that protocols constitute the basis of the entire scientific edifice might be termed Methodical Positivism. Similarly the thesis that physical language is the Universal Language might be denoted as methodical Materialism. Our approach has been termed as Positivist, it might equally be termed as materialist. Nevertheless for the sake of clarity we would prefer the name of Physicalism."

V

So far we concerned ourselves with a sympathetic exposition of the doctrine of Logical Positivists. As a matter of fact the school in the beginning was quite fanatic, making more claims than were absolutely necessary for a philosophy of clear meanings, by forming a kind of Metaphysical Liquidation Board. Later on their claims became more modest. Even Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* is less emphatic about certain extreme positions which he held before in *Tractatus*. Nevertheless the fundamentals remained the same. The kernel of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, and that of Moritz Schlick is their picture theory of reality. Though Schlick himself once raised doubts against the picture theory, but later on accepted it, and without being able to clear those doubts became stubborn about them. He declared that "he can" compare the statements

with facts, yet he can remain outside of the circle of metaphysicians.³

But apart from the difficulties, which Schilick himself enumerated, the picture theory suffers from the basic defect of involving the ego-centric predicament. The facts, if they can be compared at all, can only be compared with individual experiences of them. And such experiences are personal and subjective, unless we bring in some *apriori* categories, which is not warranted by their method. The Logical Positivists plea for declaring the subjective terms ('I', 'Mine' etc.) as meaningless does not solve the problem at all, it avoids it sullenly. The difficulties are still greater when a comparison is tried in between a proposition, and a fact belonging to the past, or referring to the experience of others. "Mr. Jamali has a pain in his right leg." The verification of this statement would perhaps consist in seeing Mr. Jamali making faces, holding his leg by his hands, limping while walking or grunting once a while. The meaning of such a proposition would never be clear to me, for how on earth can I 'compare' the pain in others experience with the statement of pain. If I also develop the same kind of pain in my right leg and can claim to Mr. Jamali's satisfaction, that now, I understand the meaning of the statement that 'he has got a pain in his right leg,' then too I can only verify 'my statement' with 'my experience,' but never will that of Mr. Jamali's. Even if this verification is granted, or is made possible by some sort of verbal trick it would ultimately lead to a solipsistic position, and as a matter of fact it does lead to it. The only difficulty is that it can not be said. "What solipsism means is quite true only it cannot be said."⁴

This Wittgensteinian adherence to facts, and all the attempts to picture them in propositions, seemed to be too much orthodox, and too weak, for the purpose of anti-metaphysicists. It also could not solve the problem, by making a rigid distinction between atomic facts, and propositions. Actually all the difficulties of Lockian correspondence theory presented themselves, only in a new form. Hence Carnap thought it fit to do away with all the references to facts, all together. It was a second and bold step to avoid the problem completely, by claiming all questions about reality as wrong questions.

Neurath, Hempel, and Carnap, at one time believed that propositions must not be confronted with facts. One can never compare reality with propositions and sentences. It is the same position which Schilick had once adopted against Wittgenstein. Hempel maintained that the system

we call true "may only be characterized by the historical fact, that it is the system which is actually adopted by mankind, and especially by the Scientists of our cultural circle."

But this type of philosophy actually leads us no where. The whole argument about the acceptance of a system by the mankind of a particular culture is circular. Because in order to know that a particular system is adopted by the scientists of a particular culture, it is necessary to know that "All sentences in a given system are accepted by the scientists of a particular culture" is accepted by a particular culture. This in its turn depends whether this acceptance of the scientists is accepted by the scientists of a particular culture. This is manifestly circular, and can establish no significant conclusion.

The obvious defect of the Carnap's method is this, that they have lost sight of the difference between the basis of mathematical, and empirical truth, and ultimately turned philosophy into a grand but extreme subjectivism, where we are told to shut our eyes, from the objective world, and to believe that whatever we say has no non-linguistic causes, and non linguistic effects. Now we are not to understand the world, but only sentences, and the syntactical rules governing them. Kant was modest to claim that metaphysics is impossible, Hume was sane enough to deny the existence of substance, but here all the assertions of all the philosophers are declared nonsense, and all the questions wrong save those of logical positivists.

On the whole the philosophy of Logical Positivism is beset with three drawbacks. Firstly by its very way of treatment it loses in substance. Logical Positivists go on talking to find that they are talking on nothing. All the grandeur of meaning of terms, of syntactical rules, of physical language, and of inter subjective verification, when developed to its utmost, one finds with dismay that the actual thing vanishes. It is like a continuous sharpening of one's knife till nothing is left.

The second drawback is of problem blindness. All the living and real issues of philosophy are very conveniently declared "nonsense" "absurd" or "senseless." "Most propositions and questions," says Wittgenstein, "that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot therefore answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our

language."⁴

Thirdly there is a danger of pursuing pseudo-problems instead of the actual problems of philosophy, simply because the perennial problems have been treated with prejudice and declared unlawful and illegitimate.

In fact any philosophy that shuts its eyes from the concrete facts of reality and tries to indulge in fruitless linguistic quibbles cannot keep for a long time the human yearning for the knowledge of the reality. This age is an age of crisis. The classical metaphysical systems seem to have exhausted their possibilities, and the maglomina of technological progress has found its way into the field of philosophy as well. The question for a methodology of philosophy which the father of modern philosophy Descartes started three hundred years ago, because he was tired with the subtleties of scholastic philosophy, has turned itself into an elaborate and complicated system of technology, with the irony that Descartes did formulate the rules to find *the truth* which he believed worth searching, while the case here is totally different. Here the "Ideas are definitions of operations, plans of action, not the mere flow of phenomena in the subjective consciousness; and this development, known as the instrumental theory of knowledge, is in fact a theory of Technology as well. The quest for certainty with which the age began is thus brought to a new stage by the answer that secular values can only be realized by perfecting methods of inquiry and action...., it is the answer that the knowledge of most worth is the knowledge of technique by which values can be reached or restored."⁵

Or as Vahinger says, "we may compare it (thinking) with calculations or with the performance of a machine, we cannot uphold the ordinary view that thought is an end in itself; thought serves something else, and all its particular functions are to be regarded from the point of view of mechanical means of thought.

This mechanical and technological conceptions of thought, of whose Logical Positivism is one of the expressions is so much alien to the very nature of man, that apart from being a self contradictory system, it leaves human self in a total void. That is why a return to self—to concrete experience and to reality would seem to be the first requirement. Any knowledge which is not related to self is contingent and inessential. The essential and real knowledge is provided by the ego only by a process of *participation* in the reality, where the possibility of perceiving a *gestalt* is open. The

logical positivist is keenly searching for truth, but forgets that it is he who is doing so. He does not take into account himself, the searcher of truth at all. If truth is to be searched out by somebody, that somebody cannot be ignored in order to assure that the search is a success. The logical positivist should have, therefore, put such questions to himself before undertaking his quest for truth:

“Why should I set out in search of truth at all. Why do I desire the real? What for is it wanted by me? Am I equipped with the necessary capacity to search for truth? If so what is the nature of that capacity and how can I make the best use of it to achieve my object? Are there any factors which may interfere with the proper functioning of this capacity? If there are such factors what is their nature? What should I do to assure that they do not interfere with my capacity to search for truth? If there are no such factors what is the cause of the vast differences of opinion among human beings about the nature of truth.”

But he does not answer any of these questions and yet he embarks on his great adventure which has for its object the search for truth. He is like a man who sets out with an enthusiastic desire to buy some valuables but leaves his bag of money at home. He does not realise (and we are indebted to Iqbal for drawing our attention forcefully to this simple but significant fact) that man himself is the most important factor in his search for truth and he must not therefore ignore himself. The nature of self is the key to the knowledge of truth and the mystery of the universe:

هستی و نیستی از دیدن و نادیدن من چه زمان و چه مکان شوخی افکار من است

Logical Positivism is not a philosophy because it does not go far enough in its search for wisdom. It finishes just where philosophy ought to begin because the common man does not happen to be intellectually competent to go ahead. The logical positivist is like one of the non-Euclidian Geometrician who makes a number of wrong assumptions and then builds a fine geometrical system upon them. But when the foundations of an intellectual construction are wrong it must go wrong up to the top, no

matter how beautifully it is built after the foundations are laid :

خشت اول چون نہد معماری کج تا ثریا می رود دیوار کج

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- (1) Maurice Cornforth, *Science Vs. Idealism*, Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd, London, 1955, pp. 166-67
- (2) Moritz Schillick, "Facts and Propositions", in Margaret Macdonald (ed), *Philosophy and Analysis*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1954
- (3) Maurice Cornforth, *Science Vs. Idealism, ab. cit*, p. 148.
- (4) Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, Harcourt Brace & Co. Inc.
- (5) Richard D. Mosier, *The American Temperament*, University of California Press, 1952, p. 300.