OSWALD SPENGLER: THE INTERPRETATION OF WESTERN CULTURE

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ABSTRACT

Every culture-soul has a unique form, which happens to be valid to that culture and understood by its individual members. Soul-image of a classical man is quite different from that of the Faustian man or Western man. Similarly, the soul-image of the Magian man is different and unique to his peculiar physicopsychic experiences. Moreover, when one tries to comprehend the 'soul' of other cultures, in Spengler's analysis, he is attempting nothing but displaying an understanding of his 'own soul-image.' In his opinion 'soul-dynamic' of the Faustian culture essentially different from the 'spiritual static,' of the classical, 'Apollonian culture'. He points out that, 'the hallmark of the Magian-soul is a strict dualism of two mysterious substances, spirit and soul. Spengler therefore, reflects that the dynamical soul of western culture has led it to endless formations and transformations, not only in art, politics, economics, diplomacy but also in physics, mathematics and exact science. This historical integration of Faustian soul, Spengler, observes, awaits its fulfillment in the 'body' of Western culture and may also constitute its 'legacy' to the cultures that should follow the footsteps of the historical drama of grand culture-form of the Western Faustian reason. He has also propounded another very important idea, which he terms as 'historical pseudomorphosis'. He postulates with utmost certainty that the 'Faustian soul' is inherently at variance with the 'Magian soul' and its cultureforms though at certain points they may converge but in general outlook, they diverge, disagree and differ, because of their essentially different soul-structure and the weltanschauung which rules the categories of their cognition and world-outlook.

Spengler, lived, thought and wrote his classical work, *The Decline of West*, at a time when the West-European societies and its enlightened-industrialized-modernized culture came under the sweep of severe historical-moral testing during the World War 1 (1914-1918). He is the first serious thinker of modern European intellectual history, though much neglected and misunderstood, who considered the development of West-European cultural system and its almost global expansion and impact in Asia and Africa (rather the entire globe!), in a unique philosophical way. He proposed a grand thesis about the philosophy of history of the West-European societies and their place and relationship with other forms of cultures and civilizations of the world.

In his work, he outlined a 'Copernican view' of history, replacing what he considered, hitherto, a 'Ptolemaic view'² of history. He argued that the phenomenal growth of West-European civilization in historical processes, does not accord it any centrality or primal significance in relation to other forms of civilizations or cultures, such as Arabian or Chinese. This, he thought, provided a true methodological framework for understanding and interpreting the unique, independent and autonomous 'morphologies' of various civilizations and cultures of the world. He contends that history has reached to a point in time, where the West-European man, can not only understand his cultural reality in a more wider perspective, but also his relationship with other cultures, in great 'chronological' order of unfolding of historical process of civilization-making and its consequential demises, one after the other. He reflects in unambiguous terms that, "the future of the West is not limitless"⁵ and that expression of its life- form is, "a single phenomenon of history, strictly limited and defined as to form and duration." Therefore, he advises the West-Europeans in the following characteristic way:

The West-European, however *historically* he may think and feel, is at a *certain* stage of life invariably uncertain of his own direction; he gropes and feels his way, and if unlucky in environment, he loses it. Now at last the work of *centuries* enables him to view the disposition of his *onn* life in relation to the *general* culture-scheme and to *test* his own powers and purposes. And I can only hope that men of the new generation may be

moved by this book to devote themselves to *technics* instead of lyrics, the *sea* instead of the paintbrush, and *politics* instead of epistemology. Better they could not do. ⁷

Spengler argues that the West-Europeans, in order to perpetuate their universal cultural-historical role must attend to the *practical* or material aspect of their culture, which happens to be technological advancements, economic-political diplomacy and growth of markets all over the world. If the West-Europeans intend to continue a global sway of their culture over other cultures and societies, they must investigate from a different epistemological standpoint, not only their own cultural worth, *historically*, but also their *linkages*, with other life forms of non-Western cultures and civilizations. He underscores the significance of this point in these words:

The philosophy of the future, so far as the metaphysically-exhausted soil of the West can bear such, and in any case the *only* philosophy which is within the possibilities of the West-European mind in its *next* stages. It expands into the conception of morphology of world history, of the *world-as-history* in contrast to the morphology of the *world-as-nature* that hitherto has been almost the only *theme* of philosophy. And it reviews once again the *forms* and movements of the world in their depths and *final* significance, but this time according to an entirely *different* ordering, which groups them, not in an ensemble picture inclusive of *everything* known, but in a picture of *life*, and presents them not as things-become, but as things-becoming. ⁸

How Spengler proposes to construct this 'picture of life' of manifold culture-forms of different civilizations and societies? He comes forward with the following philosophical strategy:

The morphological relationship that *inwardly* binds together the expression-forms of *all* branches of a culture, who has gone beyond politics to grasp the ultimate and *fundamental ideas* of Greeks, Arabians, Indians, and Westerners in mathematics, the meaning of their early ornamentation, the basic forms of their architecture, philosophies, dramas and lyrics, their choice and development of great arts, the detail of their craftsmanship and choice of materials. ⁹

Now, the 'fundamental ideas' of a culture are what, in peculiar Spenglerian sense, contribute towards a unique, independent, autonomous, and self-contained *identity* of a life-form of a particular culture, which makes its existence, differentiated and distinguishable in relation to other categories of world-cultures. Despite their mutually exclusive identities, they remain comparable to each other or even 'influence' in certain phases of their life cycles on the historical plane, different culture-forms. According to him, cultures are unique feeling of *inward* human activity, which is free and creative. He therefore, speculates about the inner or spiritual

foundations of culture and comments upon this 'uniqueness' of expression-forms of each culture in the following words:

Each culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression, which arise, ripen, decay and never return. There is not one sculpture, one painting, one mathematics, one physics, but many, each in its *deepest* sense different from others, each limited in duration, and self-contained, just as each *species* of plants has its peculiar blossom or fruit, its special type of growth and decline. These cultures, sublimated life-essences grow with the superb aimlessness as the flowers of the field. They belong like the plants and the animals, to the *living nature* of Goethe, and not to the *dead nature* of Newton. I see world-history as a picture of endless formations and transformations, of the marvelous waxing and waning of *organic forms*. The professional historian, on the contrary, sees it as a sort of tape-worm industriously adding onto itself, one epoch after another. ¹⁰

Each culture, thus in his view remains firmly rooted to its original abode or 'mother-region'¹¹ and grows and expands outwardly and attains to a level of maturity. That he dubs as 'civilization' and thus withers away like an old 'oak tree.' ¹² He therefore, proposes a 'physiognomic'¹³ study of the living or 'becoming'¹⁴ (Das Werden – he uses Goethe's terms) of the cultural world of the historical mode of understanding the human existence, in contrast to the 'dead nature' or the 'become' (Das Gewerden – again Goethe's term) of the natural world of the scientific mode of comprehending the human reality. In his opinion, the crucial issue which the human 'waking consciousness' (Wachsein), ¹⁵ has to face in the interpretation of cultural-life-forms is the question of *occurrence* of historical events in a particular fashion, reflecting a *hidden* aspect of the 'becoming,' ¹⁶ the 'oval'¹⁷ or the 'world-feeling'¹⁸ of a culture. He therefore declares with utmost urgency that the 'destiny-problem'¹⁹ is the:

... true problem of history (viz. the problem of time), that needs to be treated with all possible seriousness and scientifically regulated physiognomic in order to find out what strangely-constituted necessity, so completely alien to the causal, was at work. That every phenomenon ipso facto propound a metaphysical riddle that the time of its occurrence is relevant; that it *still* remained to be *discovered* what kind of a *living* interdependence (apart from the inorganic, interdependence) subsists with the world-picture, which radiates from nothing less that the whole man and not merely (as Kant thought) from the cognizing part of him; that a phenomenon is not only fact for understanding (verstand) but also an expression of the spiritual, not only an object but a symbol as well, be it one of the highest creations of religion or art or a mere *trifle* of everyday life. ²⁰

In his opinion, there is an irreconcilable conflict between the "destiny idea and the causality principle," ²¹ in the basic outlook

towards an understanding of human existence and 'the necessary foundation of the world-building." ²² He therefore, states that:

Every higher language possesses a number of words such as luck, doom, conjuncture, vocation, about which there is, as it were, a veil. No hypothesis, no science, can ever get into touch with that which we *feel* when we let ourselves sink into the meaning and sound of these words. They are *symbols*, not notions. In them is the centre of gravity of that *world-picture* that I have called the *world-as-history* as opposed to the *world-as-nature*. The Destiny Idea demands life-experience and not scientific experience, the power of *seeing* and not that of calculating, *depth* and not intellect. There is an *organic logic, an instinctive, dream-sure logic of all existence* as opposed to the logic of the inorganic, the logic of understanding and of things understood — a logic of direction as against a logic of extension — and no systematist, no Aristotle or Kant, has known how to deal with it. ²³

In his philosophical interpretations, he comes up with the notion that 'history' and 'nature,' 'physiognomic' and 'systematic' are two modes of 'comprehending' the world. In 'history,' one finds the working of the 'living nature' of Goethe, of 'Destiny Idea' and of 'soul' expressing to the fullest for the culturalization of the creative powers of 'humankind.' In 'nature,' one observes the functioning of the 'dead nature' of Newton, of the 'systematic' and the 'causality principle' and the 'world.' He therefore, displays extensive contrast between the 'living nature' of culture, history and the 'dead nature' of science and experimental methods as true sources of knowledge. In his opinion, ²⁴

Causality is the reasonable, the law-bound, the describable, the badge of our whole waking and reasoning existence. But destiny is the word for an *inner certainty* that is not describable. We bring out that which is in the *causal* by means of a physical or an epistemological system, through numbers, by reasoned classification; but the *idea* of destiny can be imparted only by the artist working through media like portraiture, tragedy and music. The one requires us to distinguish and in distinguishing to dissect and destroy, whereas the other is creative through and through, and thus destiny is related to life and causality to death. ²⁵

One can notice here, Spengler's clear-cut intellectual demarcation between world-picture as historical unfolding of the living soul of a culture governed by idea of time and world-picture as natural unfolding of the objective thought, ruled by causal principle. He openly criticizes the 'Western Intellectual,' attitude towards the idea of time or destiny, which he reflects, hold the key to the inner secrets of a 'soul' of a culture. He particularly takes on Kant and his philosophical progeny for treating 'time' as insignificant and part of the 'other world,' which seemed to them "actually impossible." ²⁶ This "other world," which Spengler speculates to be 'history-world'

is surely time-directed, destiny-governed' and *irreversible* world of cultures and civilizations. He declares that when:

...the stiff mask of causality is lifted by mere *ceasing to think*. Suddenly, Time is no more a riddle, a notion, a 'form' or 'dimension' but becomes an inner certainty, *destiny itself*, and in its directedness, its irreversibility, its livingness, is disclosed the very meaning of the historical world-picture. Destiny and Causality are related as time and space. ²⁷

He asserts that the 'systematic' spatialized conceptions of time as postulated by Western physics and mathematics cannot provide valid basis for understanding the foundations of culture-forms and their inner-soul. On the contrary, it is only a combination of artist's vision of tragedy, music, drama and world's great religions that we can comprehend that complex functioning of the inner labyrinth of destiny-idea and the time-directedness of a culture. He propounds that it was specifically the 'Faustian Soul' of Western man which was placed at and given a unique historical position by virtue of its world-historical feeling that it cannot only comprehend its own destined future course of development, but can also compare, interpret and comprehend the 'culture-soul' of classical, Egyptian, Indian or an Arabian culture-forms. He sees this to be the "lost great task of Western philosophy" ²⁸ and proposes in a unique fashion thus,

Every epoch, every great figure, every deity, the cities, the tongues, the nations, that arts, in a word everything that ever existed and will become existent, are physiognomic traits of high symbolic significance that it will be the business of quite a new head of 'judge of men' (Menschenkenner) to interpret. Poems and battles, Isis and Eybele, festivals and Roman Catholic Masses, beast furnaces and gladiatorial games, dervishes and Darwinians, railways and roman roads, 'Progress' and Nirvana, newspapers, mass-slavery, money, machinery – all these are equally signs and symbols in the world-picture of the past that the soul presents to itself and would interpret. "Alles Vergangliche ist nur ein Gleichnis." Solutions and panoramas as yet unimagined await the unveiling. Light will be shed on the dark questions which underlie dread and longing – those deepest of primitive human feelings – and which the will-to-know has clothed in the 'problems' of time, necessity, space, love, death and first causes. There is a wondrous music of the spheres which wills to be heard and which a few of our deepest spirits will hear. The physiognomic of world-happening will become the last Faustian philosophy. ²⁹

One can discover here a methodology for a unique, different and creative study of human culture, which not only divulges upon the idea of culture as "the sum of total of its inner possibilities," ³⁰ but also as a "sensible phenomenon or appearance upon the canvas of history as a fulfilled actuality." ³¹ He interprets culture akin to "living organisms" ³² and the "world-history is their collective biography." ³³ One can observe, in Spengler, a close affinity to morphological ideas

of Goethe, who applied them in his studies of plants and natural phenomenon.³⁴ Elsewhere, in the "Decline," he regrets the prejudicial approach of modern Western academic towards Goethe, who has proposed a creative morphological study of nature, instead of a natural-law, causal and mechanical picturing of the nature. ³⁵ He partakes in this Goethean vision of 'morphology' and 'living nature,' in his methodology of morphological study of culture-forms, and world – as history in the following passage:

Culture is a prime phenomenon of all past and future world-history. The deep, and scarcely appreciated, idea of Goethe, which he discovered in his 'living nature' and always made the basis of his morphological researches, we shall here apply – in its most precise sense – to all the formations of man's history, whether fully matured, cut off in the prime, half opened or shifted in the seed. It is the method of living into (erfuhlen) the object, as opposed to dissection it. ³⁶

This he sees as the task of the 20th century, in contradiction to 19th century in which 'Darwinism' as a method of studying history and culture is promoted and never a 'physiognomic' and 'organic' method is allowed to play its role in the social and cultural studies. Even culture-forms are interpreted as a "systematic natural science based upon causality." ³⁷ Conversely, Spengler believes in the cultural foundations of the conception of 'nature' and natural world-form. He shows it again and again that each and every aspect of the culture, be it 'becoming' and 'become,' language or mathematics, 'time' or 'space,' 'life' or 'death' is governed by the 'soul' of that culture. He therefore states that, "nature is a function of the particular culture." 38 He has analyzed, in his peculiar style, the Kantian notion of space, which was based on the axioms of Euclidean geometry, which marred the space-problem by relating it to common-place geometry." ³⁹ Spengler points out clearly the 'error' of Kant in placing "classical school-geometry" at the centre of forms of nature around us." 40 In his opinion, it was Gauss, discovery of Non-Euclidean geometries, which provided true symbolism of space to the Western culture-soul vis-à-vis the classical Apollonian soul or the Arabian space-thought. For him, thus:

Infinite space is the ideal that Western has always striven to find, and to see immediately actualized, in its world-around; and hence it is that the countless space-theories of the last centuries possess – over and above all ostensible, 'results' – a deep import as symptoms of a *world-feeling*. In how far does unlimited extension underlie all objective things? There is hardly a single problem that has been more earnestly pondered than this; it would almost seem as if every other world-question was dependent upon the one problem of the *nature of space*. ⁴¹

Although, he highlights the significance of the concept of 'space' for the Western culture-soul as of basic significance, which's worldfeeling is uniquely comprehensible to minds of Western man. Therefore, he argues that such culture-soul possesses its own unique symbol for space and way of describing its 'depth-experience'42 to the other cultures. He reflects that a "plurality of prime symbols" for space exists in each culture-soul, which is understood, interpreted, and experienced by that soul alone. The significative meaning of the symbol of 'space' for each culture-soul is determined by it *inwardly*, and time construction of the notion of 'world,' thus constituted by each soul happens to be uniquely defined in a particular 'secret language of world-feeling,' which 'belong to that culture' alone. 43 He makes it ostensibly clear that each culture possess 'soul,' which conditions the expression of culture forms, in mathematics, music, arts, language, literature, poetry, morality, science, architecture. He therefore, comes up with his threefold methodology for studying the culture-forms, i.e. the Apollonian Soul, the Faustian Soul and the Magian Soul. In a fairly long paragraph in the "Decline," he sets forth the basic thesis of these three "forms" of culture-soul in the following manner:

Henceforth, we shall designate the soul of classical culture, which chose sensuously-present individual body as the ideal type of the extended, by the name (familiarized by Nietzsche) of the Apollonian. In opposition to it we have the Faustian Soul, whose prime-symbol is pure and limitless space, and whose "body" is the Western culture that blossomed forth with the birth of Romanesque style in the 10th century in the Northern plain between Elbe and the Tagus. The nude statue is Apollonian, the air of the fugue Faustian. Apollonian are: mechanical static's, the sensuous cult of the Olympian gods, the politically individual city-states of Greece, the doom of Oedipus and the phallus-symbol. Faustian are: Galilean dynamics, catholic and protestant dogmatic, the great dynasties of the Baroque with tier cabinet diplomacy, the destiny of Lear and the Madonna-ideal from Dante's Beatrice to the lost life of Faust II. The painting that defines the individual body of contours is Apollonian, that which forms space by means of light and shade is Faustian – this is the difference between Fresco and Polygons and the oil painting of Rembrandt. The Apollonian existence is that of the Greek who describes his ego as soma and who lacks all idea of an inner development and therefore, all real history, inward and outward; the Faustian is an existence which is led with a deep consciousness and introspection of the ego, and a resolutely personal culture evidence in memoirs, reflections, retrospect's and prospects and conscience. And in the time of Augustus, in the countries between Nile and Tigris, Black Sea and South Arabia, there appears - aloof but able to speak to us through forms borrowed, adopted and inherited - the Magian soul of the

Arabian culture with its algebra, astrology and alchemy, its mosaics and arabesques, its caliphates and mosques, and the sacraments and scriptures of the Persian, Jewish, Christian, "post-classical" and Manichaean religions. 44

He argues that every culture-soul has a unique form, which happens to be valid to that culture and understood by its individual members. Soul-image of a classical man is quite different from that of the Faustian man or Western man. Similarly, the soul-image of the Magian man is different and unique to his peculiar physico-physhic experiences. Moreover, when one tries to comprehend the 'soul' of other cultures, in Spengler's analysis, he is attempting nothing but displaying an understanding of his 'own soul-image.' 45 In his opinion the 'soul-dynamic' of the Faustian culture is essentially different from the 'spiritual static,' of the classical, 'Apollonian culture'. 46 He points out that, 'the hallmark of the Magian-soul is a strict dualism of two mysterious substances, spirit and soul. Between these two there is neither the classical (static) nor the Western (functional) relation, but an altogether differently constituted relation which we are obliged to call merely "Magian," for want of a more helpful term, though he may illustrate it by contrasting the physics of Democritus and the Physics of Galileo with Alchemy and the Philosopher's stone. 47 The dilates of the 'soul-dynamic' of Faustian culture, in Spengler's view, required of Western man to extend and expound in his 'limitless,' 'infinite' 'idea of space.' It aimed at 'extension,' political, economic or spiritual. It overrode all geographical-material bounds. It sought without any practical object, merely for the Symbol's own sake – to reach the North Pole and South Pole. It ended by transforming the entire surface of the globe into single colonial and economic system. Every thinker from Meister Eckhart to Kant willed to subject the 'phenomenal' world to the arrested domination of the cognizing ego, and every leader from Otto the Great to Napoleon did it. 48 Spengler therefore, reflects that the dynamical soul of western culture has led it to endless formations and transformations, not only in art, politics, economics, diplomacy but also in physics, mathematics and exact science. The conception of nature as enjoyed by the 18th or 19th century European man is no more in vogue and the methodology of exact science as well as age of scientific discoveries is gradually heeding towards more and narrower margins and closed-in areas. Minds like the caliber of Gauss, Gauchy, Riemann, and Helmholtz are no more visible and upcoming. One observes a rudimentary effect on the part of new intellectual in the brandishing and merging of their disciplines. He therefore, comes up with his original insight into the 'physiognomic' of Faustian culture and concludes:

But before the curtain falls, there is one more task for the historical Faustian spirit, a task not yet specified, hitherto not even imagined as possible. There has still to be written a morphology of the exact sciences, which shall discover how *all* laws, concepts and theories *inwardly* hang together as forms and what they have meant as such in the *life-course* of the Faustian culture. The re-treatment of theoretical physics, of chemistry, of mathematics as a *sum of symbols* – this will be the definitive conquest of the mechanical world-aspect by an intuitive, once more religious, world-outlook, a last master-effort of *physiognomic* to break down every *systematic* and to absorb it, as expression and symbol, into its own domain. ⁴⁹

This historical integration of Faustian soul, Spengler, observes, awaits its fulfillment in the 'body' of Western culture and may also constitute its 'legacy' to the cultures that should follow the footsteps of the historical drama of grand culture-form of the Western Faustian reason. He has also propounded another very important idea, which he terms as 'historical pseudomorphosis,' and uses it in his interpretation of "Magian Soul," which he considers to be a characteristic of the "Arabian culture." He claims that the true creativity of the "Arabian culture" was never released due to its overpowering by alien and major cultures, existing side by side. He therefore says that:

By the term historical pseudomorphosis,' I propose to designate those cases in which an *older* alien culture lies so massively over the land that a young culture, born in the land, cannot get its *breadth* and *fails* not only to achieve pure and specific expression-forms, but even to develop fully its own self-consciousness. All that wells up from the depths of the young soul is cost in the old moulds, young feelings stiffen in senile works and instead of rearing itself up in its own creative power, it can only *hate* the distant power with a hate that grows to be monstrous. ⁵⁰

He argues that the young Arabian culture was robbed of its 'light,' 'creative energy' and 'full blossom' by the classical culture along with such strongly prevalent traditions of Judaism, Nestorian Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Chaldean religions of Babylonia. The 'magian soul' is thus a crystallization of *historically* pseudomorphic culture-forms of such diverse spiritual traditions as Judaism, classical Christianity, Persian, and Chaldean and Greek religious symbolism. He therefore asserts that:

The kernel of prophetic teachings is already magian. There is one god – be he called Yahweh, Ahuramazda, or Merduk-Bal – who is the principle of good, and all other deities are either impotent or evil. To this doctrine there attached itself the hope of a *Messiah*, very clear in Isaiah, but also bursting out everywhere during the next centuries, under pressure of an inner necessity. It is the basic idea of Magian religion, for it contains implicitly the *conception* of the world-historical

struggle between Good and Evil, with the power of Evil prevailing in the middle-period, and Good finally triumphant on the Day of Judgement. ⁵¹

This dichotomy, this dualism, this polarity, in Spengler's notion, pervades in all aspects of Magian soul. The world-feeling of 'magian soul' and its expression-forms are unique to it. Its lifestyle, its view of history, rituals and rites, alchemy and algebra, poetry and literature, all reflect an inner movement of a unique culture-soul. He contends that 'magian soul' and its culture-forms and 'Faustian soul' and its culture-forms are mutually exclusive, independent and original in their structures of expressions. Concepts of space, time, destiny, architecture, nature and history are different from each other in many ways, which make it inherently incomprehensible to each other's styles and experiences of reality. Though, certain remarks of Spengler, in respect to the inclusion of Islam as part of the general scheme of culture-form of 'magian soul' are critical and lack solid historical data to support such judgments on his part. 52 In Spengler's assessment, firstly, magian consciousness possesses a 'cavern-like' sense of space, secondly, a soul which "participates in the spirit of the light and the good; the divine descends into him, thus binding all the individuals of the below together with the one in the above," and thirdly, the ego, for him resides, "only as part of a pneumatic We." 53 He postulates with utmost certainty that the 'Faustian soul' is inherently at variance with the 'Magian soul' and its culture-forms though at certain points they may converge but in general outlook, in world-feeling, in sense of space, in idea of time, conception of God and history, notion of nature-knowledge, origin and end of the world, place of human ego, and meaning of its existence; about on all significant issues of culture life-forms, they diverge, disagree and differ, because of their essentially different soul-structure and the weltanschauung which rules the categories of their cognition and world-outlook.

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